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Foreword
We are currently witnessing a period in which actual and potential
migration flows are changing the political, social, and economic map
of Europe. These events cannot be seen out of their historical context
because the past processes laid the basis for the structure of present and
future migrations, as well as for our perception and interpretation of
these phenomena. This is the focus of the present book, which aims to
provide a comprehensive scientific overview of migration flows within
Europe since World War n with special emphasis on recent movements.
The book is one of the outcomes of an international conference
on Mass Migration in Europe organized by nASA at its Laxenburg
Conference Center, together with the Institute for Advanced Studies
in Vienna and the Institute for Future Studies in Stockholm, in March
1992. The production of the present volume has been the responsibility
of nASA together with the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Heinz
Fassmann and Rainer Miinz planned and organized the corresponding
conference workshop, selected the papers, and edited the book. We
are sure it will find its firm place in the rapidly increasing literature on
international migration.
Wolfgang Lutz
Sture Oberg
nASA
Laxenburg, Austria
January 1994
vii

Preface
Since the mid-1980s international migration has become a major issue
in Europe. One reason is obvious. The fall of the Iron Curtain has led
to the largest wave of migration the continent has seen since 1945-46.
The sudden freedom of travel and Eastern Europe's mounting economic
problems and social tensions caused by the transition to market economy
have been important push factors. In many cases ethnic discrimination
has also played an important role; in the early 1990s the largest single
wave of emigration was caused by the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Yet in most West European countries the focus still is
more on South-North migration than on East-West migration.
It is important to know about the quantitative side of these issues, but
today numbers alone cannot fully explain the impacts ofthese migrations
on public opinion and the political climate in Western Europe. The
symbolic side of the issue seems to be as crucial as the quantitative
one. For many people in the West migration has become a synonym
for social problems, and is seen as a threat to the welfare state. At
the same time we should not overlook that many problems related to
migration are not caused by the migrants themselves. Some are caused
by the fact that most European societies are not ready to cope with the
necessity to integrate immigrants. In many cases foreigners have to
serve as scapegoats.
This book contains both quantitative and policy-related information
on international migration within and to Europe. It focuses on the main
sending and receiving countries in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tm)'. Originally the chapters of the book were presented as papers at
a workshop organized by the editors in March 1992 within the frame-
work of a conference in Laxenburg, Austria, on Mass Migration in
Europe. The conference was organized by IIASA, Laxenburg, the Insti-
tute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, and the Institute for Future Studies,
Stockholm.
ix
x Preface
The papers included in this book have been reviewed by three refer-
ees, revised and updated by the authors, and finally edited by the editors
and by IIASA's publications department.
The initial workshop and this book are part ofa larger research project
jointly sponsored by three Austrian federal ministries: the Ministry of
the Interior, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, and the Ministry
of Science and Research. The project is being carried out at the Austrian
Academy of Science, Vienna, and at the Humboldt University, Berlin.
The editors would like to thank Andreas Andiel, Sarah James, Car-
men Nemeth, Ursula Reeger, Ulrike Stadler, and all others who helped
to organize the workshop and to edit this book.
Heinz Fassmann
Rainer Miinz
Vienna and Berlin
January 1994
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Chapter 1
Patterns and Trends of International
Migration in Western Europe
Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Miinz
1.1 West European Migration: Historical
Developments since 1945
Thirty years ago, the Federal Republic of Germany welcomed Armando
Rodriguez who was said to be its one-millionth "migrant worker". The
Portuguese national received an official welcome in Cologne and was
offered a motorcycle. The German news magazine Der Spiegel devoted
its cover story to this event. Three decades later in most West European
countries people like Armando Rodriguez are no longer referred to as
"migrant workers" or "guest workers". Usually they are seen simply as
"foreigners". Typically, migrants no longer come from Ireland, Italy,
Spain, or Portugal but from Turkey and former Yugoslavia, from the
Maghreb and the Indian subcontinent. Those who came during the 1960s
and 1970s no longer ride motorcycles, but many of them drive mid-size
cars. In Western Europe first- and second-generation immigrants are no
longer welcome. This has not, however, reversed the basic trend toward
the internationalization of European labor markets, a development also
found in capital and commodity markets. In many European countries,
despite widespread unemployment, the share of foreign workers and
employees has stabilized at high levels, and in most countries the share
of foreigners among the total population is still increasing.
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This chapter presents a brief account of salient developments in
international migration in Western Europe since the end of World War
II, discusses the patterns that characterize the distribution of foreign
resident populations in major West European receiving countries by
country of origin, considers the factors that help explain those patterns,
and comments on likely future developments and policy challenges
concerning international migration affecting Western Europe.
Until 1945 Europe's migration history was predominantly marked
by emigration. At the end of the colonial era and during the economic
boom that followed World War II, the situation in Western Europe
changed rapidly. At first, European settlers and colonial officers and
troops returned home in the course of decolonization. In the United
Kingdom, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands they were followed by
migrant workers from the former overseas territories. In some cases this
process created a steady inflow, in other cases the former colonial powers
were confronted with large waves of immigrants. During and after the
bloody war of independence (1954-62) more than 1 million former
French residents of Algeria were resettled in France. Return migration
from other former French colonies was of comparable size. Since the
early 1950s a sizable number of people have migrated from Indonesia
to the Netherlands, and since the 1970s from Suriname and the Dutch
Antilles. In the mid-1970s Portugal was also confronted with a sudden
surge of returnees and immigrants from its former African colonies.
This kind of migration was amplified by several European countries that
granted citizenship to the residents of their former overseas territories,
or facilitated their immigration by granting them special legal status as
quasi-nationals or privileged aliens.
It is impossible to specify who immigrated or emigrated over the
last decades to or from which country in Western Europe. No precise
data are available on the chronological course and the geography of all
relevant migration streams. The first problems are those of definition.
It is not always clear who is to be regarded as a migrant. Moreover,
statistics concerning foreigners or foreign workers and employees are
likely to be distorted owing to concealment.
In most West European countries nationality or citizenship is the de-
cisive criterion for distinguishing between "locals" and immigrants. In
only a few West European countries immigrants are officially or statisti-
cally divided into analytical categories. Most countries try to distinguish
between European Union (EU) nationals or privileged aliens and "other"
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foreign residents. In the UK, immigrants with British Dependent Ter-
ritory Citizenship or British Overseas Citizenship[ I] and immigrants
holding the citizenship of a Commonwealth country are recorded sepa-
rately from "other" groups of the foreign resident population. Sweden
distinguishes between foreigners and Swedish nationals born abroad,
and the Netherlands between "regular" foreign nationals and the former
residents of Suriname, the Dutch Antilles, and the Moluccas and their
descendants. Other countries whose international boundaries changed
markedly during the twentieth century and which granted preferential
immigration status to former nationals, or even systematically resettled
them, have frequently taken the opposite approach. If at all possible,
they have avoided statistically registering these residents as immigrants
once they were resettled. Above all, this holds true for Germany, which,
upon application, grants citizenship to all members of ethnic German
minorities from Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and Central Asia. Thus,
a person's citizenship does not necessarily distinguish migrants from
nonmigrants.[2] In West European countries, children of foreign immi-
grants are generally regarded as foreigners, although of course they are
not first-generation immigrants.
The national statistics summarized in Table 1.1 show sharp increases
in the foreign resident populations of almost all West European countries
during the 1950s through the 1970s, but no increase or only a minor in-
crease during the 1980s when immigration had become a major political
issue. [3] Between 1950 and 1980 the number of foreigners in countries
of the present-day EU and the (former) European Free Trade Associa-
tion (EFTA) tripled. In 1950 approximately 5 million foreigners were
living in Western Europe; in 1982 the number was 15 million;[4] and
in 1992, the number was estimated at 18-19 million. This trend clearly
suggests the ongoing internationalization of Western labor markets and
societies.
Around 1950, the greatest proportions of foreign residents were
found in "mini-states" like Liechtenstein (20% of the total population)
and Luxembourg (10%), as well as in Switzerland (6%) and Austria
(5%).[5] At the same time, scarcely any foreigners were living in West
Germany[6] and the Netherlands (I %). At the beginning of the 1950s
France had a significant number of foreigners (1.8 million), far more than
West Germany (less than 568,000) and Belgium (less than 368,000).
The picture would be quite different if we were to count not only
foreigners and stateless persons but all foreign-born residents of the
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Patterns and Trends of International Migration in Western Europe 7
respective host countries. Thus, even if return migrants are ignored,
a significantly larger number of people have migrated since 1945 than
those listed by statistics as foreigners. Apart from naturalized refugees
and migrant workers the available data usually do not include immigrants
from the former colonies who came to Europe as citizens of their new
home countries.
Several more or less distinct groups of migrants may be considered
"immigrants" or "foreigners", their relative importance varying in the
different West European countries. They include migrants from former
colonies with or without citizenship of the new host country;[7] mi-
grants with the same nationality or with ethnic affiliation from (mainly)
eastern areas of settlement;[8] migrant workers and their relatives; rec-
ognized refugees and de facto refugees and their relatives; and "other"
immigrants. [9]
1.1.1 Labor migration
Following the end of World War II, the West European economies first
had to integrate refugees, displaced persons, and returnees from the
colonies. By the end of the 1950s, these countries began to meet part of
their growing demand for labor by recruitment in several Mediterranean
countries: first in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and former Yugoslavia, and later
in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Turkey. In most cases the recruitment
took place on the basis of bilateral agreements. In the early 1970s the
employment of foreign labor in the countries of Western Europe reached
its maximum.
In terms of absolute numbers, in 1970 West Germany was already
leading with nearly 3 million foreigners or 4.9% of its resident pop-
ulation, followed by France (with 2.6 million foreigners, or 5.3% of
the resident population), Switzerland (1.1 million, or 17%), and Bel-
gium (700,000, or 7%). Large proportions of these foreigners, often
the majority, were migrant workers. In 1970, 2.1 million foreign work-
ers were employed in West Germany, 1.6 million in France, 520,000
in Switzerland, 330,000 in Belgium, 230,000 in Sweden, and 180,000
in Austria.[lO] In all these receiving countries the number of foreign-
ers also grew as a result of family reunifications (i.e., close relatives
arriving later), and because of the rising number of children born to
migrant workers in their host countries. At that time the most impor-
tant countries of origin of these migrant workers were Italy (820,000),
8 Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Miinz
Turkey (770,000), Yugoslavia (540,000), Algeria (390,000), and Spain
(320,000) (see United Nations, 1986).
In the mid-1970s, West European governments and employers re-
acted to the economic recession that followed the 1973 oil price shock
and the reduced absorption capacity of labor markets by halting recruit-
ment of foreign labor and by imposing restrictive immigration regula-
tions on residents of former overseas territories. The aim was to stop
virtually all further immigration. In some countries - particularly the UK
and France - the deteriorating economic position of "visible" immigrant
minorities and native lower classes led to the first racial conflicts.
Halted recruitment and restricted immigration in the second half
of the 1970s led to reductions in the foreign resident populations in
two countries - on the order of 180,000 in Switzerland (between 1974
and 1979; see Straubhaar and Fischer, Chapter 7, this volume) and
5,000 in Sweden. In Switzerland a massive antiforeigner movement
gained ground at that time. Some of its representatives were elected to
parliament, where they exerted political pressure by means of forcing
plebiscites on issues that fanned xenophobic sentiments. The reduction
in foreign labor was mainly achieved by not extending temporary res-
idence and work permits. Similarly, in Sweden, after years of liberal
immigration practices, in the mid-1970s immigration was restricted to
recognized refugees. At that time other West European countries, e.g.,
Germany and Austria, experienced only temporary reductions in their
foreign resident populations. While in some cases the return of foreign-
ers was strongly encouraged and rewarded with premiums, the newly
introduced restrictions only slowed rather than halted immigration.
Family reunions and birth rates of the foreign resident population
that were higher than the national average compensated for decreased
labor migration, while naturalization reduced the number of persons
recorded as foreigners. These phenomena led to significant changes in
the composition of the foreign population which had earlier consisted
mainly of males of working age. Among foreign residents the percent-
age of women as well as of children and adolescents increased. [II] This
entailed more than demographic consequences. The new restrictive im-
migration policies resulted in a marked increase in the foreign resident
population's average duration of stay, while their representation in the
labor force changed due to the high rate of female employment among
the new immigrants. Meanwhile, closed borders led to rising numbers
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of illegal immigrants. The control of the foreign labor supply by admin-
istrative means (work permits, residence permits, etc.) had only limited
success. The existence of infonnal ethnic networks and the opportunity
to enter the receiving country as a "tourist" became an essential basis
for illegal immigration.
No precise data on illegal immigrants are available, so we can only
speculate about the magnitude of this stream. However, many of those
illegal immigrants do not stay for more than a few months in Western
Europe. Many new patterns of illegal seasonal work and long-distance
commuting (under the cover of tourism) have emerged.
Along with these changes during the 1980s new patterns ofmigration
have also developed. Most southern European countries became coun-
tries of immigration. This is particularly so in the case of Italy, which has
nearly 800,000 legal foreign residents in 1990 (versus 300,000 in 1982)
and an even larger number of illegal foreign immigrants. To a lesser
extent the same holds true for Spain, Portugal, and Greece. At the same
time, the membership of Spain and Portugal in the EU has caused return
migration of labor from Gennany, France, and the Benelux countries,
and has also increased the number of immigrants from South America
holding Spanish and Portuguese passports. Italy has also become a
highly favored destination of the children and grandchildren of Italian
emigrants to South America.[12]
1.1.2 Refugees and asylum seekers
Another group of migrants who decisively influenced the size and struc-
ture of international migration flows to Western Europe are the over-
lapping categories of refugees, displaced persons, and asylum seekers.
Between 1945 and 1950 about 8 million displaced persons (see Reich-
ling, 1986) moved to the territory of West Gennany (within the 1949-90
borders). During the same period another 4.6 million people emigrated
from the fonner East Gennany before the construction of the Berlin
Wall in 1961, while some 0.5 million West Gennans moved to East Ger-
many (see Bethlehem, 1981: 26). The establishment of the Iron Curtain
and travel restrictions within the fonner Eastern Bloc reduced this type
of immigration from Central and Eastern Europe and from the fonner
Soviet Union. After 1955 mass emigration mainly occurred in cases
of political crisis (from Hungary in 1956-57, from Czechoslovakia in
1968, and from Poland in 1980-81). But for several decades Western
10 Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Miinz
governments pressed their Eastern counterparts to liberalize emigration
procedures. Some countries, notably the USA and West Germany, even
offered trade concessions or lump sum payments to induce Communist
countries to liberalize their emigration policies. Soviet Jews, Armeni-
ans, East German citizens, and other ethnic Germans profited most from
this political and economic pressure.
Despite the Iron Curtain, some 13 million people were able to leave
their East European home countries between 1950 and 1992.[ 13] Large
as this flow was, the division of Europe and the Cold War undoubtedly
reduced the scale of the traditional East-West migration in Europe, thus
contributing to the opening of Western Europe's gates for South-North
migration.
In recent years, with the division of Europe starting to dissolve and
the Iron Curtain falling, East-West migration has resumed on a larger
scale. This development is also clearly reflected in the number of
refugees. In 1983 there were just 76,000 asylum seekers in 14 European
OECD countries; three years later the figure had tripled. In 1992 some
680,000 people asked for asylum in the EU and EFTA countries; 438,000
of them in Germany (UNHCR data; United NationslECE, 1993).
The flow of refugees, resettlers, and asylum seekers is again playing
a major role in European migration. As a result of the wars in Croatia
and in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991-93 and ethnic repression of Serbia
in Vojvodina and Kosovo, the number of asylum seekers and de facto
refugees from former Yugoslavia in Central and Western Europe has
grown rapidly and by the end of 1993 reached 700,000 (UNHCR data).
As far as asylum in general is concerned, in 1992 more than 60% of
those who applied for asylum in Western Europe did so in Germany. In
1992, out of the 438,000 people who applied for asylum in Germany, less
than 5% were successful. However, many other asylum seekers stay on
as de facto refugees. In the past, repatriation was not enforced on a large
scale. Since 1993 Germany's restrictive Asylum Law has led to reduced
numbers of applications. Germany has also been particularly affected by
the surge of ethnic Germans from the East seeking resettlement. In 1990
about 377,000 and in 1991 another 397,000 such ethnic Germans arrived
in Germany, representing a tenfold increase compared to 1985.[14] In
1991 the German government imposed more restrictive procedures. [15]
German citizenship now has to be claimed before moving to Germany.
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As a result the number ofethnic German resettlers dropped from the peak
levels of 1990-91 to 219,000 in 1993.[16] All in all, between 1945 and
1992 West Germany accepted and integrated a total of about 24 million
displaced persons, refugees, ethnic Germans, and labor migrants. [17]
Although the motives of some East-West migrants are still political,
a large proportion of present-day immigrants from Central and Eastern
Europe try to escape from unemployment, political instability, rising na-
tionalism, and economic deterioration in their home countries. Others,
as noted above, are victims of the wars and ethnic cleansing in Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina or of political repression against ethnic or re-
ligious minorities in other parts of the Balkans. Most West European
countries, particularly the two most affected countries, Germany and
Austria, are now seeking to safeguard themselves against both kinds of
immigration by means of compulsory visas, more stringent border con-
trols, very restrictive asylum regulations, and troop deployment along
the common borders with East-Central Europe. The immigration waves
of so-called economic refugees from Eastern Europe, from Africa and
the Middle East, and also the case of displaced Croats, Bosnian Muslims,
and minority groups from Serbia have triggered discussions throughout
Europe on the proper meaning and handling of the right of asylum. Since
1992-93 countries like Austria, Germany, and Sweden once known for
their liberal asylum policies, do not accept applicants who had already
reached a "safe country" before entering Western Europe. The fact that
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Croa-
tia have signed the Geneva Convention and are therefore seen as "safe
countries" has at least one consequence. Nowadays people entering
Germany, Sweden, or Austria by land have almost no chance of being
recognized as refugees whatever their backgrounds.
1.1.3 Migration of elites
The least visible group of migrants are those who are neither unwel-
come nor seen as a problem by the receiving society. Migrants of this
category comprise businessmen, employees of multinational companies
and international organizations, artists, research personnel, students,
and retirees. In many of these cases there is a gradual transition from
intermittent stays for varying intervals to permanent migration. Quanti-
tatively, such migrants do not constitute a major element of immigration
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in Western Europe. Nevertheless, they are often important as gatekeep-
ers for other migrants. It is likely that the importance of these groups
will increase in the future.
1.2 Geographic Patterns of European Migration
The distribution ofWestern Europe's foreign resident population reflects
three migratory patterns (see Tables 1.2 and 1.3):
1. South-North migration. This pattern, reminiscent of similarly di-
rected internal migration in several countries, can be found in move-
ments from the southern to the northwestern part of Western Europe
and from North Africa/Middle East to Western Europe.
2. East-West migration. This migration was greatly reduced for 40
years due to the political division of Europe, or it was channeled
by means of bilateral political agreements (mainly between West
Germany and Poland, Romania, and the former Soviet Union in the
case of ethnic Germans).
3. Migration between the main countries of destination and their demo-
graphic hinterlands. European migration dearly shows "privileged"
relations between sending and receiving countries, linked by cultural,
economic, and/or political affinities rooted in history.
As to the third pattern, in many cases such privileged relations are
obvious. Even in the postcolonial era, the former colonial ties constitute
a major factor explaining migration. Immigration to former home coun-
tries is promoted by the fact that English, French, Dutch (Afrikaans),
and Portuguese are still used as linguae francae in the former colonies,
and that their economies, their transportation systems, and their cultures
are still oriented toward London, Paris, Amsterdam, and Lisbon. By
repatriating white settlers and importing labor from the Third World,
Europe also reimported some of the social and ethnic conflicts it had
created in earlier times in its colonies.
Germany, which had already lost its overseas colonies in 1914, has
been playing an analogous role by serving as destination of immigration
for millions of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and
Central Asia.
France enjoys privileged relations with Portugal and a number of
overseas countries. It also exemplifies South-North migration. As
shown in Table 1.3, which presents the distribution ofthe foreign resident
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population within the six largest immigration countries of continental
Western Europe by country or region of origin, almost all Algerians
living in these six countries (97%) reside in France. Seven out of eight
Tunisians and nearly four-fifths of all Portuguese registered in the six
countries live in France, as do three out of five Moroccans. Mainland
France is also the principal destination for migrants from the overseas
territories it still holds.[l8]
Germany, since the 1970s the European country with the largest
immigrant population, is home for the large majority of immigrants
from Central and Eastern Europe (see Table 1.3). Also, seven out of
eight Greeks (89%) living in the six major continental immigration
countries and nearly three-quarters of all former Yugoslavs and Turks
reside in Germany.
Similar patterns prevail in the UK. As of around 1990 most of the
Irish living in Europe outside Ireland, as well as almost all Indians,
Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and emigrants from the English-speaking West
Indies who migrated to Europe, were living in the UK.
Other small-scale patterns of "privileged" recruitment of migrants
are also discernible in Table 1.3. Most emigrants from Finland live
in Sweden, Dutch migrants can be found mainly in Belgium, Austrian
emigrants live predominantly in Germany. Also noteworthy is the high
percentage of Moroccan immigrants in Belgium and the Netherlands,
although the share of migrants from other North African countries is
very low there. Emigration from other European countries follows less
specific patterns. Migrants from Italy and Spain are distributed rather
evenly among several European host countries. Of the Italians living
abroad in Europe, more than one-third live in Germany, one-quarter in
Switzerland, and less than one-fifth each in France and in Belgium.
Around 1991-92, with the exception of the European mini-
states,[19] the highest percentage of foreigners was found in Switzer-
land (17.6%; see Table 1.1). Italian nationals alone accounted for 5.7%
of Switzerland's resident population. In comparison, the largest sin-
gle group of foreigners in Europe, the 1.9 million Turkish nationals
in Germany (1993), accounted for only 2.3% of Germany's resident
population.
When comparing the migration patterns of the 1950s and 1960s with
those between 1975 and 1990 one change is most obvious. With immi-
gration flows spreading to the northern, western, and more recently also
southern parts of Western Europe, the hinterland of this labor migration
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expanded geographically. In the decades immediately following World
War II, Italy was the most important recruitment area for labor migra-
tion to Europe's main receiving countries. For many Italians, to work
in West Germany, France, or Switzerland was an attractive alternative
to emigrating overseas to the USA, Canada, or Argentina. In the 1960s
Spain and Portugal had become the most important European emigration
countries, followed by Greece and former Yugoslavia. Non-European
countries and regions sending migrants to Western Europe were above
all Algeria, India, Pakistan, and the Caribbean. In the 1970s Turkey,
Morocco, and Tunisia became increasingly important countries of origin
for European immigration.
In the 1980s political conflicts, civil wars, and economic crises in the
Middle East, South America, and Africa generated new surges of immi-
gration to Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Some migrants profited
from the "green borders" along the Mediterranean, others reactivated the
Italian, Spanish, or Greek citizenship of their parents or grandparents
who had emigrated overseas. In the late 1980s and early 1990s new
refugee and migration movements originated both within the Balkans
and Eastern Europe and from the eastern part of Europe to the West.
So far, the main destinations have been Germany, Sweden, Switzerland,
Austria, but also Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia.
As noted above, in 1991-93 the war in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina created the largest single wave of European emigration
since the end of World War II. Of the 5 million people who were forced
to leave their home towns and villages, 700,000 were able to immigrate
to Western Europe and were tolerated there. It is likely that in the future
Scandinavian countries will also be the target of European East-West
migration, given their historical, ethnic, and geographic links with the
Baltic states and northwestern parts of Russia. [20]
1.3 Explaining the Patterns of West
European Migration
For the analysis of international migration patterns several approaches
are of explanatory value. First, migration between countries of origin
and destination can be understood as the result of geographic proximity.
In this case migration flows between neighboring states would be the
strongest. When looking at a map of Europe one finds, however, that in
the past geographic closeness mainly played a role in cases of privileged
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access of neighbors to the receiving country's labor market. Examples
are Finns and Danes in Sweden, the Irish in the UK, Dutch and French
in Belgium, Austrians and Poles in Germany, and to some extent also
Italians in Switzerland and France. In these cases cultural similarities,
language, and commuting opportunities also playa decisive role.
Some migration flows are determined by economic disparities be-
tween countries. In this case, countries with flourishing economies,
high demand for labor, and high wage levels become attractive for mi-
grants from countries with high unemployment rates, low wage levels,
and stagnating economies. While this approach explains why migration
starts, it does not explain why certain countries become preferred des-
tinations. For example, if economic indicators like wage differentials
were the only factor, Portuguese citizens would go to Germany rather
than to France. As citizens of the EU they can migrate legally to either
of these countries. But despite higher wage levels in the western part of
Germany, few Portuguese migrants live there. This means that cultural,
political, and historical links between the society of origin and the host
society can be of higher explanatory value than purely economic factors
such as wage differentials.
In recent years growing differences between the standards of living
prevailing in Eastern Europe as well as in North Africa and the Middle
East, on the one hand, and Western Europe, on the other, motivate peo-
ple to migrate even to areas with relatively well-saturated labor markets
or to areas with high unemployment. At the same time, regional dispar-
ities within Western Europe have declined. In Portugal, for example,
the demand for labor increased markedly when the country joined the
EU, and many emigrants returned home. Also traditional regions of
origin for European labor migration have lately become regions of im-
migration. Today southern regions of Italy and Spain are host to North
African harvesters, while Polish traders and construction workers find
employment in Greece.[21]
The diffusion of information on opportunities and problems existing
in the labor and housing markets of potential destinations also helps
to explain patterns of migration. This information is carried to geo-
graphically and culturally ever more distant regions by "gatekeepers"
(returnees, nationals on home leave) and the mass media. The knowl-
edge of a language and a specific educational background may - mainly
as a colonial heritage - greatly enhance migration to the former colonial
powers. With such knowledge, information on opportunities spreads
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more easily and turns many people who look for improvement in their
material circumstances into potential migrants. Existing ethnic and so-
cial networks also provide support for new immigrants that is often
decisive and facilitates their integration within host countries.
1.4 European Immigration Countries
During the last decade Europe's three most important immigration coun-
tries have been France, Germany, and the UK, although Belgium, Italy,
the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, and Spain also have
large foreign resident populations. For the three largest receiving coun-
tries the geographic patterns of origin ofmigrants are depicted in Figures
1.1, 1.2, and 1.3.[22]
1.4.1 The UK
Immigration to the UK clearly can be explained by the aforementioned
pattern of privileged relations. In 1992 about 60% of the UK's 1.9 mil-
lion foreign residents were immigrants from African or Asian countries
(all of them former dominions or colonies). Immigration to the UK from
other European countries is comparatively low; labor migration from
former Yugoslavia or Turkey, for example, has been practically nonex-
istent. Almost three-quarters of all European immigrants come from
Ireland, the oldest demographic hinterland of the UK. Similar patterns
of geographic origin are found among foreign-born British subjects.
In 1990 about 930,000 foreign nationals were working in the UK.
The labor force survey from which this statistic has been taken lists
both foreigners in the UK and ethnic and visible (nonwhite) minorities.
According to this survey, in 1989 some 2.6 million people, or 4.6% of
the population of the UK, belonged to ethnic minorities, most of them
of Indian, Pakistani, or Bangladeshi descent. With a share of 3.3% the
relative importance of foreigners in the UK is smaller than in most other
West European countries. However, the proportion of the foreign-born
population (foreigners and British subjects) is about 7%.
1.4.2 Germany
In the decade following World War II, Germany was the destination
of about 12 million displaced persons (see Reichling, 1986). Between
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Figure 1.1. Foreign resident population in the UK, by country of origin,
1990.
1949 and 1961 approximately 3.6 million citizens of East Germany (see
Bethlehem, 1981) moved to West Germany before the construction of
the Berlin Wall intercepted this migration flow. Between 1955 and 1960
the number of non-German immigrants to West Germany was relatively
small. After 1961 the first migrants came from Italy, Spain, Greece, and
Austria.
By 1975 the absolute numbers of Italians, Spaniards, and Greeks in
Germany was higher than in 1965; however, their share among the for-
eign resident population had declined sharply. The reason was a surge of
immigration from Turkey, former Yugoslavia, and other European and
non-European countries. Between 1985 and 1991 the number of immi-
grants from Poland, Romania, and Iran also had some impact. German
reunification in 1990 did not change this picture, for the share of the
foreign population in East Germany was below 1% (136,000 in 1990).
Since the mid-1980s a growing number of East-West migrants have
moved to (West) Germany: between 1985 and 1992 some 1.5 million
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Figure 1.2. Foreign resident population in Germany, by country of
origin, 1990.
ethnic Germans, more than I million asylum seekers, and more than 0.5
million new migrant workers from East-Central Europe (300,000 Poles
in 1991; 53,000 Romanians in 1990). Currently due to family reunifi-
cations and partly due to the war in Bosnia, the number of immigrants
from Turkey, former Yugoslavia, and Greece is still rising.
In 1993 the number of foreign nationals living in Germany was
6.8 million (8.4% of the total population of unified Germany);[23]
among them, as noted above, were 1.9 million Turkish nationals (in-
cluding some 400,000 of Kurdish origin). Some 2.3 million foreigners
were working legally, representing about 8% of the country's labor
force. There is also evidence of a growing proportion of illegal em-
ployment. In 1990 alone some 315,000 new cases were investigated
(OECD/SOPEMI, 1992).
With a net intake of more than 20 million (1945-91/92; see Section
1.1.2) displaced persons, refugees, other foreigners, and ethnic Germans,
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Figure 1.3. Foreign resident population in France, by country of origin,
1990.
western Germany is by far the largest country of immigration in Europe.
Today (1994) some 20% of Germany's population is foreign-born.
1.4.3 France
France is Europe's second most important country of immigration. In
the course of decolonization and the rapid postwar economic growth
more than 2 million French overseas residents came to the country.
Many of these, however, were neither listed nor treated as "foreign-
ers". Moreover, residents of former colonies were encouraged to come
to France, and emigration from Italy, Spain, and Portugal was also
welcomed. Whereas immigrants to West Germany originated mainly
from eastern and southern Europe, the recruitment area of French immi-
gration comprised the entire western Mediterranean: Portugal, Spain,
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Italy. The number of migrant workers
from Yugoslavia has always been low.
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The composition of the foreign resident population by country of
origin in France has changed little over time. Since the early 1980s,
however, the number of Moroccans, Turks, and immigrants from the
rest of the world (identified by the category "others" in Tables 1.2 and
1.3) residing in France has increased, while the number and share of
Portuguese, Algerians, Italians, and Spaniards have decreased, because
of both naturalization[24] and net return migration. In 1992 the number
of foreigners in France was 3.6 million (6.3% of the total population
of France). Some 1.6 million foreigners were part of the French labor
force. The proportion of the foreign-born population (foreigners and
French nationals) is about 9%.
1.4.4 Belgium and the Netherlands
Belgium and the Netherlands hold a position in European migration
similar to that of France. These countries have been the destination of
immigrants from the Mediterranean (Italians, Moroccans, and Turks in
Belgium; Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands), as well as from
neighboring countries (French and Dutch in Belgium; Germans and
UK citizens in the Netherlands). Both countries also had significant
immigration from their former colonies (Indonesia, Suriname, Zaire)
and from overseas territories (Dutch Antilles). There are, however, two
significant differences between Belgium and the Netherlands. One is the
large number of Italians in Belgium; the other is the increasing number
of Dutch citizens who live in Belgium (mainly due to tax reasons) but
work in the Netherlands.
A comparison over time shows that in Belgium and the Netherlands
the share of Moroccans, Turks, and other foreigners increased during
the 1980s. In Belgium, this phenomenon must also be attributed to the
expansion of international organizations (EU, NATO) with headquarters
in Brussels. In 1992 there were 918,000 foreigners in Belgium (or 9.2%
of the total population) and 728,000 in the Netherlands (or 4.8%). In
each of the two countries there were approximately 200,000 foreign
workers in the labor force.
1.4.5 Switzerland
Compared with other European countries, the distinctive features in
Switzerland are the highest share of foreign residents (besides the
Patterns and Trends of International Migration in Western Europe 23
European mini-states) and its restrictive immigration policy. Despite
this policy, of all European states with territories larger than that of
Luxembourg, Switzerland has the largest percentage of foreigners in
its resident population (17.6% in 1991). If seasonal workers and the
employees of international organizations are also taken into account the
percentage of foreigners reaches 20%.
More than one-third of the foreigners in Switzerland are ofItalian ori-
gin. A much smaller share comes from the other neighboring countries
(especially Germany and France). Foreign residents from other "tradi-
tional" countries of origin such as Spain, Portugal, former Yugoslavia,
and Turkey account for broadly similar shares of the foreign resident
population. With the exception of neighboring Italy, Switzerland has
no "privileged" demographic hinterland.
In 1992 some 1.2 million foreigners were permanently living in
Switzerland, of whom more than 700,000 were part of the labor force.
Another 122,000 foreigners had the status of "seasonal workers", and
some 180,000 foreigners were working but not living in Switzerland
(mainly commuters from localities just across the Swiss border).
1.4.6 Sweden
Sweden is the most important immigration country in northern Europe.
Immigrants come from a relatively large number of countries, including
former Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Chile. But the largest foreign resident
population is of Finnish origin. About 90% of all Finns living abroad
in Western Europe reside in Sweden. With a total number of 120,000
these immigrants account for roughly 25% of all foreigners in Sweden,
but their share is decreasing. Neighboring Norwegians, Danes, and
Icelanders account for another 14% of foreigners, bringing the share of
immigrants to Sweden from the common Nordic labor market to almost
40%. However, when comparing the periods 1955-65 and 1975-90 the
most important change has been the sharp increase in the number and
share of immigrants from outside this traditional area of origin.
In 1992 the number of foreigners in Sweden was 494,000 (or 5.7%
of the total population), of whom 260,000 were part of the labor force.
When naturalized citizens are included, the share of all foreign-born
residents in Sweden accounts for 7.8%.
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1.4.7 Austria
From the standpoint of the industrialized West European nations - and
of many Austrians themselves - Austria remains at the periphery of
the West. For them several Western countries - above all neighboring
Switzerland and Gennany - represent attractive labor markets charac-
terized by higher wage levels, more advanced production structures, and
often also more appealing working conditions. To some extent Austria is
therefore an emigration country. From the eastern point of view Austria
is the gateway to the West and is a potential immigration country.
Between 1945 and 1992 about 2.4 million people entered Austria
as expatriates, asylum seekers, or refugees. Of these some 700,000
have settled there pennanently, most of them from neighboring Central
and Eastern Europe. Another 1.2 million people went to Austria as
migrant workers or as family members. Most of them were recruited in
fonner Yugoslavia and in Turkey. Since 1989 a rapidly growing share
of foreign labor has come from Central Europe (Poland, Hungary, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania).
In 1992 the number of foreigners in Austria was somewhat above
560,000, or 7.1 % of the country's population.[25] Of these, 274,000
were part of the labor force. When all displaced persons, refugees, and
naturalized citizens are included, the share of Austria's foreign-born
popUlation rises to approximately 15%. The total immigrant population
of 1.2 million is counterbalanced by some 500,000 people of Austrian
origin living abroad, more than one-third of them in Gennany.
1.5 European Emigration Countries
The main countries of origin within the framework of European East-
West migration were the fonner GDR, Poland, fonner Yugoslavia, the
fonner Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Romania.
1.5.1 Former GDR
During the 12 years between the establishment of the two Gennan states
in 1949 and the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961, some 3.8 million
East Gennan citizens immigrated to the Federal Republic of Gennany,
while 475,000 West Gennans decided to settle in the GDR. During the
existence of the Wall 810,000 people managed to leave the GDR. Most
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of them were either retired persons (who were free to travel abroad)
or part of the 300,000 cases, including political prisoners, negotiated
individually between the two German governments. Between 1950 and
1990-92 more than 40% of the total European East-West migration
originated in the former GDR.
For the FRG this German-German migration was a strong argument
in support of the market economy model and the democratic system.
It was often claimed that emigrants were "voting with their feet". The
erection of the Berlin Wall was, after all, an attempt by the GDR to
avoid having to find a political solution to the problem by preventing
emigration as such. After 1961 the continuing East-West migration be-
came a financial matter. Both German states granted citizenship rights to
migrants from the other side. The FRG even offered generous financial
compensation for the release and emigration of prisoners (30,000 cases)
and other GDR citizens.
In 1989 the mass emigration of some 181,000 people before the fall
of the Berlin Wall and of another 218,000 thereafter largely contributed
to the collapse of Communist rule in East Germany and to German
reunification.
1.5.2 Poland
Between 1950 and 1992 about 17% of all European East-West migrants
were from Poland. In contrast to other countries of origin, Polish
emigration was ethnically heterogeneous. The largest group of migrants
comprised ethnic Germans and others who could claim West German
citizenship. The so-called resettlers (Aussiedler) came to the FRG in
several waves: 1956-57 (216,000), 1976-82 (about 242,000), and since
1987 (753,000 between 1987 and 1990). Until 1990 this migration was
actively supported or even promoted by the West German government
and was seen as a return favor for Western economic aid to Poland.
In the late 1960s, in reaction to the anti-Semitic campaign led by the
state itself, a large proportion of Jewish Polish citizens went to Western
Europe, Israel, and the USA. This exodus would not have occurred
without the strong practical support of Poland's ruling elite, the USA,
and Israel.
In 1980-81, however, the emigration of about 250,000 Poles fleeing
from the imposition of martial law to the West - especially to Austria and
Germany - was spontaneous. They were much less warmly received
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there than were the Czech and Slovak refugees in 1968, perhaps because
the Red Army did not intervene in Poland. In the following years about
half of the Polish emigrants of 1980-81 returned to their home country.
From 1986, when it again became possible to leave Poland and
emigrate, a larger number of Poles of non-German origin tried to gain
a foothold in the West. Between 1950 and 1990-91 about 2.1 million
people emigrated from Poland; more than 1 million of them in the second
half of the 1980s. Since then, however, about 60% of the non-ethnic
German immigrants to the West have returned to Poland.
1.5.3 Former Yugoslavia
In the 1950s and early 1960s emigration from Yugoslavia primarily
involved two groups: first, Muslims of Turkish origin and Bosnian
Muslims, the overwhelming majority of whom went to Turkey; and
second, political opponents of the Tito regime, who headed for Western
Europe and overseas. Data are available only for the first group. During
the 1950s some 300,000 ethnic Turks left Bosnia, Macedonia, and other
southeastern parts of Yugoslavia for Turkey.
From the mid-1960s Yugoslavia became the first Communist country
to allow almost all categories of citizens to emigrate. As a result,
the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria recruited 0.5 million
labor migrants, who were followed by an unknown number of family
dependents.
The wars in Croatia (1991-92) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-
93) and the repression of ethnic minorities in Vojvodina, Serbia, and
Kosovo led to the largest wave of European migration since L945-46.
Between 1991 and 1993 more than 5 million citizens of former Yu-
goslavia became refugees or displaced persons. Only 700,000 of them
came to Western Europe, of whom 355,000 to Germany, 80,000 to
Switzerland, 74,000 to Sweden, and 70,000 to Austria. In most cases
they were not recognized as political refugees but were tolerated as de
facto refugees. In 1993 most Western countries closed their borders to
the victims of war and ethnic cleansing from that part of the Balkans.
Thus 4.3 million refugees and displaced persons are still living in the
states that emerged from the break-up of Yugoslavia. In mid-1993
there were more than 690,000 of them in the parts of Croatia con-
trolled by the Zagreb government and another I 10,000 in the rest of
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the country controlled by Serbian militia, 560,000 in Serbia, 82,000 in
Montenegro, 45,000 in Slovenia, 27,000 in Macedonia, and 2.74 million
in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Today, with 2.3 million people, former Yugoslavia is a major sending
area of East-West migration (17%). Because of the political situation
in the Balkans, the substantial and growing economic gap with Western
Europe, and the prevailing ethnic conflicts, the successor states of former
Yugoslavia are likely to remain countries with a considerable emigration
potential.
1.5.4 Former Soviet Union
Between 1950 and 1992 about 12% of all European East-West migrants
came from the former Soviet Union. In the 1950s and 1960s it was
almost impossible to emigrate from the Soviet Union, but thereafter the
USA and some West European countries pressed for an easing of the
restrictive Soviet emigration policy. In 1973 the US Congress made this
a precondition for the removal of trade barriers. In the CSCE Treaty
(signed in Helsinki in 1976) the USA and Western Europe forced the
Eastern side to recognize the principles of freedom of travel and emi-
gration. As a consequence, during the 1970s (1973-80) some 340,000
people were in fact able to leave the Soviet Union. Following a brief
revival of the Cold War in the early 1980s (Afghanistan, SOl) a second
large wave of emigration took place from 1987 onward under Gor-
bachev. In all, some 1.5 million people emigrated from the Soviet
Union between 1950 and 1991.
As already stated, almost all the emigrants belonged to ethnic or
religious minorities. About half of them were Soviet Jews, almost all
of whom went to Israel or the USA. More than a third were ethnic
Germans whose emigration was made possible by the Federal Republic
of Germany.
By far the largest migration was not oriented toward the West but
took place after 1991 between the former Soviet republics that became
sovereign states (now CIS member countries and the Baltic states). In the
majority of cases ethnic Russians were returning from the peripheries of
the former Soviet Empire. The withdrawal of the Red Army, including
soldiers' family dependents, from Central and Eastern Europe also led
to substantial migration.
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1.5.5 Bulgaria
Another 1.2 million East-West migrants came from Romania and Bul-
garia, but to a smaller extent also from former Czechoslovakia and
Hungary. Between 1950 and 1952 some 155,000 ethnic Turks were
allowed to leave Bulgaria. Another wave of 39,000 followed in 1969-
73 under the provision of the 1968 agreement between Bulgaria and
Turkey, which granted the right of emigration to a total of 95,000 Bul-
garian citizens. The most recent wave began during the collapse of the
Communist regime in Sofia. In 1982-92 some 350,000 ethnic Turks
and Slavic Muslims fled from collective oppression, enforced "Bulgar-
ianization", and economic problems. Most of them made their way to
Turkey before the Turkish government closed the border with neighbor-
ing Bulgaria. Of these 150,000 people are reported to have remigrated
to Bulgaria. The closing of the Turkish border has led to higher numbers
of Bulgarian citizens trying to apply for asylum in Western Europe.
1.5.6 Romania
In 1945--46, the Romanian regime, in contrast with those in Yugoslavia,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, did not collectively expel ethnic
Germans living in the country. Nevertheless, from the 1970s the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany sought to organize ethnic German emigration
based on bilateral agreements with the Romanian authorities. Between
1970 and 1989 some 230,000 Romanians of German origin took advan-
tage of this opportunity to emigrate, in return for which the FRG gave
generous financial support to the Ceau~escu regime. Since the last wave
of large-scale migration organized in 1991, involving almost 200,000
people, there are hardly any ethnic Germans left in Romania who are
able and willing to emigrate.
Since 1987 about 60,000 members of the Hungarian minority have
left the country, most of them for Hungary. This is also a form of se-
lective East-West migration. Between 1990 and 1993 a further 240,000
Romanian citizens applied for asylum in Western Europe, most of them
of Gypsy origin. In spite of the obvious discrimination and casual
pogroms they are subjected to, many of them were turned back to Ro-
mania, which, in the view of most Western governments, now qualifies
as a "safe" country.
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Since 1945 West European labor markets have become increasingly
internationalized by attracting and integrating labor migrants from Eu-
rope's economic peripheries and from overseas. Historical analysis
shows that this increasing spatial mobility of individuals is not only a
postwar phenomenon. When Europe's industrial and service economies
encounter an inelastic labor supply, they always seek to expand the
recruitment areas of their labor markets, thus broadening their demo-
graphic hinterland. These tendencies can be traced back to the Industrial
Revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when
large cities as well as newly developed industrial and urban areas be-
came the destinations of migrants seeking employment. In Europe the
broadening of the hinterlands of migration occurred along two geo-
graphic axes: from the northwest to the east and to the south. Migratory
movements along these geographic axes have sometimes been inter-
rupted and sometimes accelerated in the course of this century by major
historical events (world wars, economic crises, and the political divi-
sion of Europe) or altered by migration surges related to those shocks
(such as mass movements of displaced persons and refugees). The dates
and origins of migration have exerted a major influence on migrants'
chances of being integrated into the labor markets of the receiving soci-
eties. In most cases displaced persons and refugees of the postwar era
enjoyed solidarity in Western Europe; the same held true for returnees
from former colonies. They were seen as victims either of the East-West
conflict or of decolonization. At the same time, the absorption of these
immigrants into the labor force constituted a major contribution to the
rapid postwar economic revival of Western Europe.
Refugees and return migrants of the early postwar years were soon
followed by migrants from the less developed regions of southern Eu-
rope, the Balkans, Turkey, and some former colonies. For almost two
decades these migrants were not regarded as "real immigrants", but as
a kind of transferable and temporarily transferred work force. It was
expected that these migrants would return home after a limited period
of employment, but in fact the majority of migrants wanted to stay for
long periods and often for the rest of their lives. The "guest workers"
became immigrants. The receiving societies had to face the problems
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of family reunions, integration of foreign-born children into their edu-
cational systems, and finally the demands for suffrage and citizenship
by immigrant workers and their relatives.
The revival of ethnocentrism, as well as the rise of xenophobia, in
Europe is a reflection of the inadequacy of the solutions for these and re-
lated problems. Thus the challenge of integration has become even more
acute in the 1990s than it was before. The cessation of labor recruit-
ment in the mid-1970s and the wide range of anti-immigration measures
introduced thereafter have not reduced the number of foreigners in the
main receiving countries of Western Europe. The countries bordering
on the northern Mediterranean are confronted with large numbers of
new immigrants from North Africa. Germany, Austria, and the Scandi-
navian countries have become much sought-after destination points for
legal and illegal immigration from Central and Eastern Europe, while
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary are - for the first
time since 1945-48 - also experiencing immigration. Wars and inter-
ethnic hostilities, acute or impending, in the successor states of former
Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union have added a new dimension
to international migration in Europe. For the first time since the early
postwar years, Europe has to cope with several million displaced per-
sons, victims of war, and de facto refugees, most of whom cannot claim
asylum in Western Europe under the terms of the Geneva Convention.
It seems certain that international migration will remain an essential
element responding to and affecting West European labor markets. The
coming decades are likely to witness the realization of an expanded
single EU market, the political and economic restructuring of the eastern
half of the continent, and a variety of ethno-political, ecological, and
demographic changes in the eastern half of Europe, in North Africa,
and in the successor states of the former Soviet Union. Some of these
changes are bound to generate new migration potentials and pressures.
Even if there is no longer a high demand for additional labor in
their labor markets, most West European countries are likely to remain
de facto immigration countries.[26] It is true, of course, that with the
disappearance of the Iron Curtain immigrants from the East no longer
have quasi-automatic access to the status of political refugee. But large
numbers of people living in these countries still have strong reasons to
migrate, such as to escape from economic deprivation, political insta-
bility, and ethnic violence. The syndrome is also found, often in more
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acute fonns, in North Africa, the Middle East, and in other parts of the
developing world.
Faced with this situation, West European countries must strive for
more than defensive crisis management. There is a pressing need to
develop active and farsighted migration policies that rest on sound le-
gal and institutional frameworks. Such policies must command wide
domestic public support, but they must also reflect the fact that Western
Europe is not an island isolated from the rest of the world.
Notes
[I] Neither category of citizen has any legal claim to the right of settlement in the UK.
[2] Between 1949 and 1990 immigration from East Germany was not even registered as
cross-border migration in West Germany, as the former German Democratic Republic
did not constitute a "foreign country" according to the legal viewpoint of the FRG.
[3J The analysis in this article is based on an evaluation of the SOPEMI statistics for
the years 1984--90, data published by the Council of Europe (1993), the 1989 UN
Demographic Yearbook, Eurostat population statistics for 1985 and 1990, and the
annual abstracts of statistics of individual countries: the Statistik Arsboks for 1970
and 1978 (in the case of Sweden), the Statistisches lahrbuch der Schweiz for 1955.
1970, 1975, and 1980 (Switzerland), and the Annuaire Statistique de la Belgique for
1973 and 1978 (Belgium). The SOPEMI database, which is the main source for
this chapter, is a continuous reporting system on migration organized by the OECD.
In most OECD member countries and some countries of East-Central Europe local
correspondents collect and interpret available data on international migration. The
aim of SOPEMI is to compile available national data, but there is no authority to
impose changes in the data collection procedure or to correct government statistics.
The quality of the SOPEMI data depends heavily on the quality of the national data
collection procedures. In general, we can assume that in countries such as Germany
or Switzerland, both of which have population registers for foreigners, the quality
of the data is higher than in countries such as Austria, where estimates are based on
special labor market data, work permits, and police registers (see OECD/SOPEMI,
1992: 123).
[4] The year 1982 was chosen (instead of 1980) as a reference because higher quality data
were available for this year.
[5J At that time approximately 350,000 refugees and displaced persons from neighboring
Central and Eastern Europe were living in Austria; the majority of them were stateless
or still citizens of their country of origin.
f6] In contrast to what was done in Austria, at the time most former citizens of the Third
Reich, ethnic Germans, and other refugees from the East had already been naturalized
in West Germany.
l7J These host countries are Belgium, France, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
and Spain.
[8] These areas include Germany (which sees itselfas home country for all ethnic Germans
in Eastern Europe and Central Asia), Finland (Karelians), Greece (Greeks from Turkey
and the former Soviet Union), Italy (Italians from Istria and Dalmatia), Poland (Poles
from Lithuania, Belarus, and the Ukraine), the Czech Republic (Czechs from Volhynia
and former Yugoslavia), Slovakia (Slovaks from Hungary and the Carpatho-Ukraine),
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and Hungary (Hungarians from Slovakia, Transylvania, the Carpatho-Ukraine, and
former Yugoslavia).
[9] This last category encompasses the significant North-South migration of older people
(e.g., Britons to Spain, Germans to Spain, Switzerland, and Italy), the international
migration of elites (employees of multinational companies, universities, research in-
stitutions, and international organizations), the return of descendants of overseas emi-
grants (of particular importance in Spain, Italy, and Greece), and the return of migrant
workers from elsewhere in Europe (a phenomenon that can only partly be explained
as retirement migration). As a rule, stationed foreign troops, including civilian staff
and relatives, are neither registered nor counted as immigrants or foreigners.
[10] In contrast to the situation in 1950, by 1970 all displaced persons and refugees from
1945 to 1950, as well as Hungarian refugees of 1956-57 who were still living in
Austria, had been naturalized by the government.
[II] Among them foreign-born children who joined their immigrant parents at a later stage
of the family life cycle and "second-generation" immigrants, that is, children born to
foreigners in the country of immigration. Because of the ius sanguinis regulations
prevailing in most European countries, the children are not foreign-born but remain
foreign citizens.
[12] Between 1840 and 1970 an estimated 30 million Italians emigrated, a large proportion
of these to such overseas destinations as South America and the USA.
[13] East-Central Europe (including the GDR), the Balkans, and the former Soviet Union
1950-92, approximately 13 million; among them from Poland, 2.1 million (ethnic
Germans, Germans-by-law, ethnic Poles); from Bulgaria, 630,000 (ethnic Turks and
Pomak Muslims); from Romania, 460,000 (ethnic Germans, Gypsies, some ethnic
Romanians; not including ethnic Hungarians to Hungary); from the former East
Germany (1949-June 1990),5.3 million; from former Yugoslavia (1965-91), approx-
imately 1.5 million (labor migrants, political refugees), since 1991,700,000 victims
of recent wars; from the former Soviet Union (1950-92), 1.8 million (Jews, ethnic
Germans, Armenians, ethnic Greeks) (see Bade, 1992; Basok and Brym, 1991; Ches-
nais, 1991 a,b; Okolski, 1991 b; Rudolph, Chapter 6, this volume; and Vishnevsky and
Zayonchkovskaya, Chapter 13, this volume).
[14] In 1984 the number of ethnic Germans migrating to West Germany was 36,500; in
1985,39,000; and in 1986,43,000. Since then the number has increased greatly, rising
from 78,500 in 1987 to 203,000 in 1988,377,000 in 1990, and 397,000 in 1991.
[15] The number of asylum applications dropped from 224,000 (January-June 1993) to
98,500 (July-December 1993).
[16] In 1992-93 some 600,000 people living in Eastern Europe and the CIS countries had
applied for German citizenship and for immigration to Germany.
[17] Displaced persons (1945-50), 8 million; refugees from East Germany (1949-90), 5.3
million; ethnic German resettlers from Eastern Europe (1950-92), 3 million; labor
migrants and their family members, 7 million; political refugees and asylum seekers,
I million (see Bade, 1992; Rudolph, Chapter 6, this volume).
[18] Such as the French Antilles, Guyana, Reunion, and Tahiti.
[19] Andorra, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, and the Vatican.
[20] The countries of East---eentral Europe, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and
Hungary are also preparing for a growing number of immigrants from the former
Soviet Union. In 1991 an estimated 30,000-70,000 former Soviet citizens were
already working in Poland (see Korcelli, Chapter 9, this volume).
[21] Despite high general unemployment in Greece, about 40,000 Poles were employed
there, one way or another, during the summer of 1990.
[22] The layout for the figures in this book was provided by Andreas Andiel (Vienna).
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[23] Meanwhile the number of foreigners in Germany has grown to 7 million.
[24] According to the 1990 census the proportion of naturalized French citizens was 3.1 %
of the total population. This proportion was 2.6% in 1982.
[25] In 1992 Austria accepted some 60,000 displaced persons from Bosnia-Herzegovina.
[26] The realization of the concept of the single market will also influence migration within
Western Europe. Legal migration barriers within the EU have been almost nonexistent
since the end of the 1960s, yet social, economic, linguistic, and a series of hidden
barriers still exist. These will gradually be eliminated in the future by such changes
as the mutual recognition of educational qualifications, more uniform social security
systems, and the opening of the public service sector of the individual EU and EFTA
countries to nationals of other EU and EFTA member countries.



Chapter 2
The United Kingdom and
International Migration:
A Changing Balance
David Coleman
2.1 British Migration History
Britain does not, and never has considered itself to be a "country of
immigration". Throughout its history it has exported population partic-
ularly to its English-speaking former colonial territories and dominions,
both those that broke away - the United States and the Republic of
South Africa - and those that remained within the Old Commonwealth
- Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Migration to the dominions
was encouraged in the nineteenth century initially to reduce the number
of poor people in Britain's rural areas and later to strengthen the Com-
monwealth as a multinational English-speaking power (see Table 2.1).
Such migration peaked in 1913. It was promoted by government policy
through the 1922 Empire Settlement Act and other measures in cooper-
ation with the dominions, initially for ex-servicemen, "to promote the
economic strength and the well-being of the Empire as whole and of the
United Kingdom in particular." That Act to promote emigration was
the basis of British emigration policy for over 30 years, being renewed
as late as 1952 for a further five years with the creation of the Oversea
Migration Board in 1953 (Oversea Migration Board, 1954).
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Table 2.1. British populations in overseas countries by birthplace or
nationality.
Population (10005) UK born UK born
Born All foreign Total as % of as % of
Country Year inUK born pop. foreign born of total pop.
Australia 1986 1,030.0 3,491.7 15,602.2 29.5 6.6
Belgium 1989 21.8 868.8 9,937.7 2.5 0.2
Canada 1986 793.1 3,908.2 25,022.0 20.3 3.2
Denmark 1989 10.0 142.0 5,131.6 7.0 0.2
France 1982 34.2 3,680.1 54,480.4 0.9 0.1
Germany 1989 85.7 4,845.9 62,104.1 1.8 0.1
Greece 1989 17.3 225.6 10,033.0 7.7 0.2
Ireland 1989 51.7 79.3 3,515.0 65.2 1.5
Italy 1989 19.1 433.6 57,540.6 4.4 O.D
Netherlands 1990 37.4 623.7 14,848.8 6.0 0.3
New Zealand 1991 235.2 527.3 3,373.9 44.6 7.0
Portugal 1989 7.8 101.0 10,320.8 7.7 0.1
South Africa 1991 217.9 1,796.1 30,040.5 12.1 0.7
Spain 1989 73.5 398.1 38,888.3 18.5 0.2
USA 1980 584.5 14,079.9 226,546.0 4.2 0.3
Total 3,219.2 35,201.3 567,384.9 9.1 0.6
Notes: In Belgium, Denmark. France. Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and
Spain the foreign populations are defined by their nationality and not by foreign birthplace.
Sources: Eurostat, 1991, Demographic Statistics, Tables B-19, H-I; National Statistical yearbooks:
Canada, 1986 census; France, 1982 census; USA, 1980 census: Australia, 1986 census; South Africa,
1991 census; New Zealand, 1991 census.
With one exception, there has never been an official immigration
policy to recruit or encourage immigrants, only to keep them out, starting
with the Aliens Act of 1905. The UK only once recruited workers on an
official basis for specific economic purposes. From 1947 to 1950, 75,000
"European Volunteer Workers" were recruited to work in sanatoria,
hospitals, and the cotton and other industries. Initially, most were female
BaIts from displaced persons camps; later, Ukrainian prisoners of war
and Germans, Austrians, and Italians of both sexes were recruited. Some
stayed and became naturalized, others returned at British government
expense (Tannahill, 1958). They and their descendants are now almost
completely "invisible" as social groups. Such recruitment as occurred
later was arranged privately by specific companies (British Railways,
the National Health Service) on a relatively small scale (primarily in
Barbados) and for a short time (from the mid-1950s to 1962). Less than
10% of the immigrants from the new Commonwealth who had arrived
by the time control was first imposed in 1962 had been directly recruited
(Jones and Smith, 1979; Peach, 1991). Large-scale immigration to
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Britain since World War II was a relative novelty. Except for movement
from Ireland (up to 1922 part of the UK) and ofEastem European Jewish
refugees after 1880, there had been little immigration pressure.
Events since World War II cannot be understood in terms of labor
recruitment; only 10% of immigrants came to a specific job. Fur-
thermore the economic revival in Britain, although earlier than that in
war-damaged Europe, was less dramatic. There was a general shortage
of labor in the 1950s which immigrants helped to fill (Peach, 1979),
but the scale of the demand was nothing like the same as that created
by economic growth in Germany and France in the 1960s. In Britain,
the migrants, most of whom were unskilled, found work in a variety
of manufacturing, service, and transport occupations, in manufacturing
especially in the obsolete mills and foundries of the north, many of
which were soon to close. There was no concentration in assembly-
line work such as was seen in Germany (Jones and Smith, 1979; Salt
and Clout, 1976). The conventional wisdom was that the immigrants
were mostly a "replacement" population to take the jobs the natives did
not want. Unlike Germany, unemployment rates of immigrants have
typically been higher than those of the native population. This immigra-
tion began much earlier than on the continent and was controlled much
earlier. Its end was not provoked by the 1973 oil price shock and it
was not impeded by any serious suggestion that the economy might be
damaged by stopping the immigrant flow. Instead, control was imposed
by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 and more effectively by
the Immigration Act of 1971 for social reasons: to avoid friction with
popUlations perceived as being difficult to assimilate because of differ-
ences in race, religion, language, and customs. Their concentration in
particular urban areas greatly accentuated the impact on public opinion
and the fear that the immigrants were putting unmanageable pressure on
housing and employment (see Peach, 1968; Jones, 1977).
Most of the immigrants did not come from the mainland of Europe,
not even from its poorer fringes. That is another contrast with the experi-
ence of most other West European countries. Instead, the migrants came
mostly from Ireland and even more from the "New Commonwealth",
that is, from colonies or former British colonies in the Third World
which, unlike Turkey or the Maghreb, are not even near-neighbors of
Europe.
This has to be understood in terms of the unique arrangements made
by the UK in relation to its former territories, in Ireland and former
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colonies overseas. Since the Middle Ages Ireland had always been
associated with Britain in one form or another. But it did not formally
become part of the UK until 1801. Irish separatist sentiment, backed by
political resistance and fighting, was never extinguished and in 1922,
26 of the 32 counties left the UK to found the Irish Free State, which
remained within the Commonwealth until 1948. Before 1922, residents
of Ireland, being British subjects, would not have been subject to any
immigration control. But even after 1922 citizens of the new Irish
state have never been subject to immigration control, except during
wartime, despite the fact that Irish citizens are technically "foreigners".
Such freedom of movement now applies to all passengers arriving from
Ireland.
Similar freedom of movement used to apply to all citizens of the
British Empire and Commonwealth. British subject status, conferring
the right of entry and other privileges, had been confirmed to all those
owing perpetual allegiance to the British monarch by virtue of birth in
the UK, a dominion, or a colony by the British Nationality and Status of
Aliens Act 1914. Its provisions were continued after World War II and
had effectively put an end to the dream of a multinational, decentralized
world state with a common citizenship, which had been discussed up to
the 1930s. In particular, the British Nationality Act 1948 continued the
privileges of free entry (and of subsequent voting in all elections) for the
citizens of former colonies which had become independent countries,
even if they became republics (e.g., India, Pakistan in 1947), unless they
actually left the Commonwealth (e.g., Burma in 1948, South Africa in
1964). In respect of these entitlements they remained British subjects or
"Commonwealth Citizens", exempted from the requirements for aliens.
The Act created a "citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies"
within the category of British subject. By 1977 these privileges applied
to about 950 million people (Home Office, 1977a). This meant that the
push factors of poverty and population growth in the sending countries,
and local disruptions which put people on the move, were likely to bring
them to Britain. The mobilization of these populations was greatly
helped by the temporary experience of wartime service of West Indians
in Britain, cheap sea travel, especially the rise of cheap air travel from
the 1950s, and, in the case of West Indians, the barrier to a preferred
closer destination created by the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, which
reduced the West Indian immigration quota to the USA to 100 until its
repeal in 1965 (Coleman and Salt, 1992).
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2.2 Peculiarities of British Migration Data
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This odd history has made data on migration to Britain and on migrants
to Britain, and their patterns and trends, difficult to relate to those of
continental countries (Coleman, 1987). The details are exceedingly
tedious but they must be described at least in outline; otherwise it is
impossible to understand even the limited messages the data can convey.
Acceptance for Settlement Statistics
Because there was no control, no official statistics were gathered on
migrants from the Irish Republic or (until 1962) of movements from
any Commonwealth country. Since 1914 foreigners wishing to enter
had been required to state the purpose of their journey and could not
enter without leave from an Immigration Officer. The grant of the right
of permanent residence - effectively "immigration" although the term
is not used in law - is called "acceptance for settlement" and can either
be granted on arrival or after the expiry of some time limit or condition
(four years in approved employment, marriage, etc.). Entry for purposes
of work does not of itself constitute "settlement" and requires a short-
or long-term work permit issued by the Board of Trade, latterly by its
successor the Department of Employment. These arrangements remain
in force for all foreigners and (since 1971) all Commonwealth citizens,
except citizens of EO countries. Because there are no controls on
exit, the statistics on "acceptances for settlement" refer to gross inward
movements only. These controls and the statistics generated from them
were only applied initially in a modified form to Commonwealth citizens
in 1962 and then in a form similar to those applied to foreigners since
1971; but never to movements from Ireland.
International Passenger Survey
In addition to that, data on inward and outward passenger movements,
first from shipping and then also from airlines, provided a nominally
complete picture of gross flows by the 1920s, including even the Re-
public of Ireland but without any details on the purpose of the journey
or characteristics of those entering or leaving. Such data have been
overwhelmed by the growth of international passenger movement (48.2
million persons of all citizenships, not counting those from Ireland,
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entered the UK in 1990) and are only used in rounded figures. In ad-
dition, Immigration Officers used to keep a count of persons entering
and leaving at ports of entry, which generated a theoretically complete
total of gross flows and consequently of net balances. By 1976 it was
becoming apparent that this procedure had become perfunctory, causing
among other things embarrassing political rows about lax immigration
control. Rather than reform the system, it was abandoned. For more
detailed purposes the use of passenger statistics has been replaced by
the International Passenger Survey, a voluntary survey of about 0.2% of
all passenger movements of persons of all citizenships to and from all
destinations (except Ireland).[ 1]
Citizenship Statistics
This strange history also causes problems for the enumeration of people
of foreign origin in the UK. The creation of a "Citizenship of the UK and
Colonies" together with the wider category of "Commonwealth citizen"
in combination with mass immigration from the Commonwealth, made
it impossible to use "citizenship" to distinguish between UK residents of
British origin and many immigrant residents who were not. The category
"foreigner" substantially underestimates the proportion of persons of
overseas origin, or holding overseas citizenships, in the UK, since it
applies to EU citizens, Americans, Japanese, etc., but to only a minority
of the 1.3 million UK residents born in the New Commonwealth or the
2.7 million of New Commonwealth ethnic origin. British law permits
the retention of dual nationality. Citizenship has in fact become so
confused and devalued a concept that a question about it has not been
asked in the census since 1961. The only routine source of data on the
nationality of the British population is the Labour Force Survey. In 1991,
for example, this survey estimated that there were 262,000 persons of
Indian, Pakistani, or Bangladeshi nationality resident in the UK (Salt,
1992, Table 20). Commonwealth citizens who were not citizens of the
UK and colonies were able until 1987 to acquire such citizenship by
the simple process of registration (application on demand after a year's
residence), as opposed to the more complex process of naturalization,
which requires evidence of ability to speak English and other tests
of suitability. In 1981 the British Nationality Act attempted to bring
this confused scene back into line with reality and with immigration
entitlement by defining a new, narrower British citizenship for those
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with some ancestral connection with the British Isles and for existing
naturalized and adopted citizens. There has been a last-minute rush to
make use of the registration procedures before they were ended, during
the transitional period up to 1987 (Table 2.2).
Data on Place ofBirth
Data on place of birth, however, have been recorded in the decennial
censuses since 1841 and also in relation to the mother on the registration
of births (Table 2.3), and also on the registration of deaths, and (together
with citizenship) in the large-scale annual Labour Force Survey, which
has a sample size of about 90,000 households.
Data on Ethnicity (Labour Force Survey)
Since 1981 this survey has also asked a question on "ethnicity", asking
respondents to classify themselves according to a short list of ethnic cat-
egories effectively corresponding to major national origins, irrespective
of birthplace (Table 2.4). This has its origins in the realization that New
Commonwealth immigrants were not assimilating quickly to British life
and that their UK-born children, otherwise statistically invisible (not be-
ing foreigners), remained a distinct group in society with special needs
and problems associated with ability to speak English, school provision,
unemployment and local authority expenditure.
On top of that, British race relations or "integration" policy has
become more and more focused on officially defined groups or "minori-
ties" on the American or Dutch mode and is increasingly using "targets"
and "positive action" directed at them to achieve the ends of its equal
opportunities policies. This puts an increased premium on data relating
to such minorities. The collection of such data is not appropriate in
the context of policies based on principles of individual equality which
do not recognize "minorities" (France) or which require foreigners to
retain foreign citizenship until they can show that they are fully assim-
ilated (Germany, Switzerland). Whatever the wisdom of these policies
(Coleman, in press a), the British ethnic categories make sociological
and anthropological sense. But they make British data, which are in-
creasingly being presented in this form, difficult to compare with those
on Third World immigrants in continental countries, most of whom
remain defined as "foreigners". Despite a decade of successful and un-
controversial use, this ethnic classification was replaced for the census
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Table 2.4. Ethnic minority populations by birthplace and ethnic origin
in the UK, 1987.
Number As% % born % born
Ethnic group (1000s) of total in UK abroad
West Indian 495 19.2 53 47
African 112 4.3 38 62
Indian 787 30.5 37 63
Pakistani 428 16.6 46 54
Bangladeshi 108 4.2 32 68
Chinese 125 4.9 26 74
Arab 73 2.8 14 86
Mixed 287 II.! 77 23
Other 163 6.3 36 64
All ethnic 2.577 100.0 45 55
White 51,470 96 4
Total 54,047 93 7
Source: Haskey (1990).
and the Labour Force Survey from 1991 by the new categories "Black-
Caribbean", "Black-African", and "Black-Other" and abolishes the
"Mixed" category, which was by far the most rapidly growing of ethnic
categories. These new usages reflect the preferences of some immigrant
and ethnic minority activists, as well as those of the general population.
2.3 Four Types of "Migration System"
It will be apparent from the account above that the UK today is the
focal point of four different migration systems defined on the basis of
geography and motivation.
1. A "settlement system" which strongly reflects old colonial ties and
is centered today on the Indian subcontinent. Almost all attention
is focused on this stream, which has mostly comprised nonwhite
people from rural low-skilled backgrounds with different languages
and religions from the host population.
2. A much smaller labor system which has been selective in the levels
of skill of those involved since 1920 and which is now dominated
by movements of highly skilled workers often moving between ad-
vanced economies in the EU, the USA, and Japan.
3. A refugee system, previously numerically trivial and now large,
which involves a small number of countries sending an increasing
number of asylum seekers to Britain.
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Figure 2.1. Population inflow, outflow, and net balance, UK, 1966-90
(based on the International Passenger Survey). Source: OPCS (1992,
17 Tables 2.2, 2.3, etc.).
4. Finally, overlapping with systems (1) and (3), there is an illegal mi-
gration system including physically illegal entry, false relationship
claims and overstaying from New Commonwealth citizens, and bo-
gus refugee applicants, many from non-Commonwealth countries
such as Sudan and Zaire, some of whom abscond when allowed to
remain in the country (see Coleman and Salt, 1992)
With this classification and with the severe limitations of the data in
mind, we look first at the trends of immigration since 1945. These can
be briefly summarized as follows:
• A general reduction in the gross flows of migrants into and out of the
UK until the mid-1980s, since when the outflow has changed little
and the inflow has increased.
• Continued net population loss by a negative migration balance (i.e.,
more emigrants than immigrants) from 1945 until the mid-1980s,
despite New Commonwealth immigration, except for the peak years
of inflow around 1962 to "beat the Immigration Bill" (Figure 2.1)
and that arising from the exodus of 23,000 Asian refugees from
Uganda in 1973.
• Most years since the mid-1980s have seen net population gains from
immigration which even the economic recession of the late 1980s
and the early 1990s has not ended. Since the 1960s the general trend
of the net balance figure from the International Passenger Survey is
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clearly gently upward. It may be that the 1980s finally saw the end
of the old British tradition of exporting population.
2.3.1 "Settlement" migration system
Regarding the former colonial stream, migration flows to and from
the Commonwealth, both Old and New, have weakened in favor of
migration involving foreign countries without historical ties with Great
Britain (Figure 2.1). Since the mid-1980s these have accounted for
about half of the movements in both directions, although the proportion
has changed a little in recent years. Net emigration to the old dominions
has fallen substantially, from 100,000 in the 1950s to about 30,000 in
the 1980s (Figure 2.2) and with actual net inflows from New Zealand
since the late 1980s. That outflow of British people to the dominions,
which has lasted for well over a century, appears now to be in its final
phases. Canada ended free access to British settlers in 1948 and the
assisted passenger scheme to Australia ended in 1983. For decades now
both countries have welcomed immigrants from all countries; more
than half of their new immigrants come from Third World countries.
In connection with these immigration policies, ambitious multicultural
policies have also been developed, partly to foster a new, non-British
national identity, although not without some domestic opposition (see
Citizens' Forum, 1991; Birrell and Birrell, 1990; Castles et al., 1990).
However, net migration to the USA, which may be regarded as part
of the same emigration stream, continues although at a low level. Its
outflow was temporarily reversed during the draft-dodger era toward
the end of the Vietnam War and also by the immigration of skilled US
personnel into the UK during the economic recovery of the mid-1980s.
In the past, South Africa was also a favored English-speaking des-
tination and migration from the UK continued to be encouraged by the
South African government. The reversal of the emigration from South
Africa, usually about 10,000 per year, in the 1970s and late 1980s,
corresponds with periods of unrest and disturbance.
Europe has never been a major destination or source of population in
the UK, except for about 100,000 poor Ashkenazi Jewish refugees from
1880 up to 1905 who were the ancestors of most of today's British Jews.
During most of the twentieth century, the net balance of migration with
Europe has been negative, generating a small net loss of population,
reflecting Britain's relative economic weakness and the existence of
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Figure 2.2. Net migration to the UK, 1963-90 (based on the Interna-
tional Passenger Survey). Source: OPCS (1992, Tables 2.2, 2.3, etc.).
traditional migration streams independent of mainland Europe. But
in the 1980s a new pattern emerged closer to a net balance with EU
countries (whose member states have of course increased in number). [2]
This is connected with the revival of the UK economy in the mid-1980s
and the scarcity of skilled labor in the southeast of England (where most
international migrants settle). It is not possible to say anything about the
detailed composition of such EU migrants, but the numbers are clearly
modest. Similar, higher-grade labor migration is behind the heightened
migration exchange with Japan and the narrowing gap with the USA.
Despite complaints about the"Arabization" of Knightsbridge and the
turning of Harrod's into an upmarket comer of the souk, net migration
has been to Arabia, not from it - mostly short-term highly skilled labor
migration. There is not much permanent settlement in either direction,
although male Arabs living in the UK have a particularly high propensity
to marry British women (Coleman, 1985). British expatriate workers in
the Gulf States, mostly highly skilled manual, professional, or technical
workers, on relatively short-term contracts, have become known as the
"new nomads" (Findlay and Stewart, 1985).
The longest running substantial migration stream, that from the Re-
public of Ireland, still escapes effective contact with official statistics.
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It is an invisible migration because the flow is neither controlled nor
directly measured. The relative lack of data and of controversy makes
Irish immigration one of the most neglected comers of British migration
study. It can be regarded partly as a component of the former colonial
stream and partly as an informal equivalent of the 1960s movement into
northwest European countries of workers from Spain, Portugal, Italy
and Finland. Many of the migrants would not be accepted if work per-
mits were required for entry; nonetheless Irish immigrants provide a
substantial proportion of building workers in Britain, especially in the
south, although people oflrish origin are widely distributed socially and
geographically. [3]
Enough can be assembled from the censuses of the UK and of Ireland,
the Labour Force Survey, National Insurance, and other sources to say
that migration from Ireland has been positive and substantial throughout
most of the period, notably in the 1950s and 1960s. The peak Irish-born
population (all parts) in England and Wales was 880,000 in 1966, 2%
of the population and a larger number than any New Commonwealth
group (O'Grada, 1985). Irish immigration still proceeded vigorously
when immigration from the New Commonwealth was restricted.
Irish migration in the 1950s was substantial. In the late 1970s Irish
economic growth, stimulated by EU membership and tax incentives,
during a time of deep economic crisis in the UK, reversed the flow
(Kirwan and Nairn, 1983). There was an annual net loss of 11,000 Irish
from the UK in 1974-79. The emigrants were mostly return migrants,
rather than UK citizens migrating to Ireland. By the early 1980s this
was all over. Ireland's youthful and growing population, once bravely
advertised as an asset to investors, is once again an economic embar-
rassment, and large-scale emigration to the outside industrial world has
re-established itself: to the UK, to other EU countries, and to the USA.
The rate of migration to the UK may be as high now as in the 1950s,
although other EU countries and the USA are preferred destinations.
New Commonwealth migration belongs almost entirely to the "for-
mer colonial" system. Net immigration has remained positive through-
out the period, with immigration exceeding emigration by a factor of
three or four (Figure 2.3).[4]
Even though mass primary labor migration has ended, the British
government remains committed to the reunification of families in
Britain. Thus, even after looser control of immigration was attempted
in 1962 and 1971, there has been an apparently never-ending stream of
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Figure 2.3. New Commonwealth work permit immigration, 1963-90.
Source: OPCS (1992, Tables 2.2, 2.3, etc.); Home Office (1991).
dependents, which has consistently exceeded all forecasts (Eversley and
Sukdeo, 1969).
Considering each region separately, only net migration from the
West Indies and from Africa has ever been negative, and that for a few
years only. The dominant countries of origin have shifted substantially:
first the West Indies, then Pakistan and India, the East African refugees
of the 1970s, and the increasing preponderance of Bangladeshis, now
the fastest-growing New Commonwealth immigrant minority. Labor
migration continued after the 1962 Act. Employment vouchers that
were not linked to specific jobs were still offered in limited numbers, but
were ended by the 1971 Immigration Act which required would-be labor
migrants from the New Commonwealth to satisfy the identified needs
of employers through the Department of Employment and acquire work
permits, on the same basis as workers from foreign countries. There
are now only a very few unrestricted categories (ministers of religion
and entertainers); those of dentist and medical doctor were abolished in
1985.
As in the rest of Europe, which dropped the shutters on Third World
labor migration a decade later in 1973, large-scale labor migration to
the UK has been replaced by equally substantial and continuing migra-
tion of dependents and of spouses, punctuated by occasional irruptions
of refugees and increasing pressure from asylum seekers and illegal
immigrants. The government can claim that uniformly applied work
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pennit rules make it impossible for New Commonwealth immigration
to threaten British employment prospects. It claims success in hav-
ing reduced overall New Commonwealth immigration to a minimum as
promised (this seems to be generally accepted, even if some may deplore
it), but in fact the restrictive immigration policy has only been partially
successful. There are several loopholes and exceptions; immigration
has hardly declined from the levels of the early 1970s. Most New
Commonwealth (NC) immigrants in the UK, especially from the Indian
subcontinent, and almost all Africans and Chinese, have arrived after
the ineffective controls of the 1962 Act thanks to its originally generous
employment voucher provisions and the broad definition of dependents
then adopted. Since the 1971 Act over 600,000 New Commonwealth
immigrants including the majority of Bangladeshi immigrants have been
accepted for settlement; marriage migrations due primarily to the pro-
visions for family reunification and exceptions made for refugees have
played a significant role. The cumulative net balance of immigration
from 1971 to 1987 calculated from the International Passenger Survey
(IPS) was almost 500,000, more than one-third of the total NC-born pop-
ulation. In confinnation of this the 1984 Labour Force Survey showed
that about 900,000 of 1.3 million NC-born residents entered after 1962,
and over 450,000 since 1971.[5]
2.3.2 Labor migration
Only one in seven - about 30,000 - of the 200,000 or so immigrants to
the UK each year enter to take up a specified job under the work pennit
system. This does not include EU workers, who do not require work per-
mits. This is the lowest number of organized labor migrants in the EU,
but it is also the most specialized; the jobs involved are predominantly
managerial and professional; more so than in any other OECD country
(Salt, 1991). Work permits were not required by Commonwealth labor
migrants before the 1971 Act (vouchers were required after the 1962
Act). Work pennits ceased to be necessary for EU migrants after ac-
cession in 1973 and of course the numbers of persons so exempted has
grown as the number of EU member states has increased, so trends are
not easy to analyze.
In 1969, the first year for which data are available, 75,405 pennits
were issued, falling to 52,699 in 1972. Rule changes account for a
large drop to 36,536 in 1973. Pennits declined progressively to a low
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Table 2.5. Long-term work permits and first permissions issued by
country, 1984-90, countries with over 500 issues in one year.
6,800 7,100 7,900 8,100 10,400 13,300 16,100
6,200 6,600 8,000 9,400 11,800 12,200 13,800
2,700 2,900 2,800 2,900 3,800 4,200 4,800
15,700 16,600 18,700 20,400 26,000 29,700 34,700
USA
Japan
Australia
Malaysia
Hong Kong (Br.)
India
Sweden
China
Canada
All long-term
permits
Short-term
permits
Trainees
Total
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
2,493 2,504 2,414 2,639 3,432 4,187
1,028 1,246 1,402 1,490 2,053 2,190
342 361 359 400 620 878
35 354 126 94 531 680
429 416 287 263 495 656
250 332 293 272 541 635
283 274 293 260 418 454
42 42 53 108 207 453
271 234 302 268 392 408
1990
4,998
2,583
1,007
678
840
816
473
616
511
Source: Salt (1991, Table 28).
point of 15,454 in 1982, from which they increased to 20,348 in 1987
and have since risen steeply by about 20% per year to 34,627 in 1990
(Table 2.5). Of these permits, 16,055 were for long-term work, 13,760
for short-term work, and 4,812 for trainees. Over 80% of the long-
term permits were for professional and managerial work. In 1987 the
majority were in insurance, banking, and finance (27%), professional
services (25%), metals manufacturing (15%), and other services (14%).
This migration involves much movement between the companies of
multinational corporations. Only 13% of the short-term permits fell
into these managerial categories, most of them (84%) were for literary,
art, and sports workers. Over 80% of these workers and their dependents
were from non-Commonwealth countries (Salt, 1991).[6]
However it can be seen that in aggregate, the percentages of migrants
in the two streams who are employed is converging. In 1977 some 50%
of immigrants were in employment, compared with 55% in 1990 (with
lower levels in all intervening years). In 1977, 61 % of emigrants were
employed compared with 57% in 1990. In recent years the proportion
of professional and managerial workers has grown both in inflows and
outflows. In 1990 they comprised 63% of employed immigrants and
57% of employed emigrants.
In 1990 therefore, and in half the years of the previous decade,
the UK gained through immigration more "professional and managerial
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Table 2.6. Occupational distribution of immigrants to and emigrants
from the UK, 1986 (thousands).
All persons
Professional/managerial
Manual/clerical
Students
Housewives
Others
Children
Source: OPCS (1988. Table 6).
Immigrants
250.3
76.2
46.1
47.1
28.5
4.3
48.2
Emigrants
213.4
76.8
38.5
28.2
23.3
8.3
38.2
Balance
+36.9
-D.6
+7.6
+18.8
+5.2
--4.0
+10.0
workers" than it lost by emigration (Table 2.6). Given the heterogeneity
of the categories the real balance of advantage may be different: the
category includes scientists, executives, schoolteachers, and managers.
Immigration also brings a surplus of students, wives, and children. Most
of the wives and children and less skilled workers were from the NC,
entering as spouses or dependents. This is counterbalanced by the highly
skilled streams, numerically smaller, from the USA and Japan and the
EU. Hardly any long-term work permits are issued to persons from New
Commonwealth countries (Table 2.5). They are not, of course, required
for entry by EU citizens in search of work or other purposes.
2.3.3 Refugees and asylum claimants
There has been a considerable increase in the number of applications
for refugee status or asylum, with a roughly corresponding increase
in the much smaller number of admissions. In 1979 there were only
1,563 applications to the UK from all sources. By 1985 there were
5,444, by 1990 22,000, who with their dependents number over 30,000
(Salt, 1991). The figure for 1991 was 44,745 (Home Office, 1991; Salt,
1992).[7]
Nationals of different countries have predominated in applications
to the UK in different years. Some of the increases have been linked
to specific political events: Iran (2,280 applications in 1982), Sri Lanka
(2,306 applications in 1985), and Poland (494 applications in 1982), but
others have shown a more progressive increase in the absence of any
dramatic new political developments (Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Pakistan,
and Uganda). In 1991 the biggest category of applicants was from Zaire
(3,650 applicants) followed by Angola (3,300); two countries with no
historical connections with the UK. There were 145 and 45 applicants
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Table 2.7. Applications received for refugee status or asylum, selected
countries, 1988-91 (more than 100 in one year).
Country 1988 1989 1990 1991
Afghanistan 25 85 200
Angola 45 220 1,030 3,300
Bangladesh 10 10 55
Bulgaria 5 30 130 240
Ivory Coasl 0 15 50 625
Ethiopia 225 560 1,840 1,035
Ghana 170 325 790 1,595
India 290 630 1,415 1,085
Iran 390 345 335 290
Iraq 165 210 915 465
Lebanon ISO 175 1,035 590
Nigeria 10 20 90
Uganda 410 1,240 1,895 1,110
Pakistan 330 245 1,295 1,830
Poland 70 45 20 20
Romania 10 IS 295 280
Somalia 305 1,845 1,850 1,225
Sudan 20 110 220 260
Ceylon 405 1,785 3,325 2,410
Turkey 335 2,360 1,100 1,260
USSR 5 30 93 115
Zaire 145 490 1,490 3,650
Others 465 720 >2,250 2,410
Total 3,755 11,280 >20,608 23,795
Dependents 1,715 5,070 >8,000
Overall total 5,700 16,580 >29,718
- No data available.
Source: Home Office (Salt, 1991, Table 12).
in 1988 from these countries, respectively, when the civil war in Angola
was still in full swing. There has been a general underlying increase in
applications from all parts of the world, beyond these exceptional cases
(Table 2.7). In demographic terms the impact on the UK population
is relatively small, but applications to other countries from 1984-87
amount to between 0.5% and 0.75% of the national population; over
400,000 to Europe as a whole in 1990.
Most applications to the UK are rejected. In 1979 only 525 grants
of refugee status or asylum were given, rising to a maximum of 1,727
in 1982 (mostly to Iranians). The total in 1989 was 2,220, Somalians
now being the biggest single contingent with 820 and Ethiopia next with
410. These figures are almost doubled when dependents are included.
In addition, a further 5,920 grants of exceptional leave to remain were
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given in 1989, a large increase on the 215 given in 1979. But in 1991
fewer grants of asylum were made (420), and a further 1860 were granted
"exceptional leave to remain" (49% of decisions); this is permission to
enter while asylum applications are sorted out. It is most unlikely that
these persons will ever leave. On top of that, very few of those who are
neither granted asylum nor exceptional leave to remain are repatriated
by force.
2.3.4 Dependents, fiancees, and spouses from the
Indian subcontinent
Early forecasts of the inflow of dependents, such as that made by Evers-
ley and Sukdeo (1969), have been substantially overtaken by events.[8]
The reduction in the numbers making entry clearance applications from
the Indian subcontinent, particularly the numbers of children (Figure
2.4), suggest that the pool of dependents is slowly being emptied. The
number of New Commonwealth children accepted for settlement rel-
ative to the number of wives has declined in recent years. That was
expected to occur because the number of work permits issued to Com-
monwealth citizens has fallen to just a few hundred per year by the early
1980s - 627 in 1980 to the whole Indian subcontinent (Home Affairs
Committee, 1982). But new sources of dependency are always arising.
An increasing proportion ofthe wives are recently married women with
no children who would previously have entered as fiancees.[9]
The sex/age structure of the New Commonwealth population made
from the Labour Force Survey shows sex ratios of 138 males per 100
females among persons born in Bangladesh, 126 for those born in the Far
East, and 122 for those born in Pakistan. This suggests that to produce
a balanced sex ratio from reunification of families would require further
substantial immigration. However, new applications for entry clearance
have declined since the 1970s for children but there is no clear downward
trend for wives in the 1980s.
Until the rise of asylum seekers in the late 1980s, the marriage
patterns of persons settled in the UK from the Indian subcontinent were
seen as a major potential threat to the policies of control. Arranged
marriages are customary in Asian society. Asian parents in Britain are
often keen to ensure that their children marry spouses from the correct
religion and caste (Jones and Shah, 1980). Pakistani Muslims strongly
prefer marriages between cousins. Many Asian parents do not approve
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Figure 2.4. Entry clearance applications from the Indian subcontinent,
1977-90. Source: Home Office (1991).
of British society, considering it to be immoral, so that they seek spouses
for their children in the country (often the village) of origin, where there
is much demand for spouses already settled in Britain as such a marriage
removes the barrier to immigration. Such marriages have maintained
primary migration for some years (Jones, 1982). Even under the existing
rules the rapidly expanding age structure of the UK Asian population
would, other things being equal, produce a corresponding increase in the
importation of fiancees and spouses from the Indian subcontinent. At the
moment there are about 40,000 South Asian females aged 20--25 born
outside the UK, and about 10,000 born in the UK. In 20 years' time these
will have changed to a couple of thousand and over 80,000 respectively.
A substantial proportion of the marriages of Asians resident in the UK
are thought still to be arranged and to involve intended spouses from the
country of origin.[l0]
Changes in the immigration rules which extended the right of settle-
ment to husbands of all female British citizens irrespective of birthplace
(1983) and then to husbands of all women settled in Britain irrespective
of citizenship (1985) has caused much discontinuity in the statistics.
Entries of husbands and male fiances have sharply increased. The in-
troduction of a requirement for a probationary year to elapse following
entry before settlement is granted greatly increased the category "given
limited leave to enter" (Figure 2.5). They would previously have been
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Figure 2.5. NC fiances, fiancees, husbands, and wives given limited
leave to enter, 1974-90. Source: Home Office (1991).
given settlement on arrival, and this category has correspondingly de-
clined. It is now more sensible for women, too, to apply as wives
rather than as fiancees, since that helps to satisfy the "primary purpose"
rule.[ll]
Despite these erratic trends there does not appear to have been a
dramatic increase in the numbers of fiancees and wives over the 1980s.
If the propensity of Asians in Britain to import fiancees or spouses from
Asia had remained constant, then the irregular age structure of the Asian
population would create a reduction of up to 10% in such spouses in
the 1980s followed by a similar increase in the early 1990s and a more
substantial increase at the end of the 1990s assuming marriage between
the ages of 20 and 24. Therefore if the number of such spouses re-
mains roughly constant in the early 1990s, marriage preferences must
be changing. Data on current marriages from the Labour Force Survey
suggest that in the 1980s a high proportion of UK-born Asians mar-
ried Asians of British origin and up to 20% married outside the Asian
communities altogether (Coleman, 1992b), but these are still a small
proportion of each marriage cohort.
2.4 British Immigration Policy
British immigration policy is simple. For 20 years or more it has been, in
the words of the Conservative party's manifesto of 1974 "to reduce and
keep new immigration to a small and inescapable minimum" subject
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to the rights of dependents and the needs of the economy dealt with
through the work permit system (p. 27). [12]
Minimizing immigration is thought to be essential for the successful
development of harmonious race relations. There is no disposition on
the part of the present Conservative government to change it; no likely
opposition dares to promise to do so. Even as early as 1950 the Labour
government under Attlee considered proposals to stop immigration from
the West Indies because of its supposed undesirable social consequences.
Such proposals were considered from time to time by the Conservative
government that succeeded Labour in 1951. No action was taken until
1962 after acrimonious debates between the parties and within Con-
servative ranks. Backbench MPs reported that their constituents were
strongly against continued immigration; others claimed the controls
were racist and betrayed the ideal of free movement in a multiracial
Commonwealth. Freedom of movement had long ceased to apply to
British people seeking to settle in most other Commonwealth countries.
Such was the strength of public opinion that the Labour party, although
it voted against the legislation, did not repeal it when they came to power
in 1964. Instead they strengthened it in 1965. In new legislation in 1968
the Labour government introduced additional immigration controls on
East African and Asian UK passport holders [13] and in 1969 required
persons seeking to enter as dependents from the Indian subcontinent to
apply for "entry clearance" from British officials there rather than on
arrival. An operational consensus has been reached but a consensus on
sentiment has not. In compensation, the Labour government introduced
a series of Race Relations Acts (1965, 1976) progressively outlawing
racial discrimination and paving the way for what has become in ef-
fect a minorities-based "multicultural" policy. This in turn has had to
be accepted by the Conservatives even though they originally opposed
it. Immigration controls are still opposed by the Left but not by the
Labour party, even though particular aspects of the laws are denounced
as racially discriminatory, a charge that the government strongly rejects.
Immigration policy in the UK has been defined by the 1971 Immi-
gration Act.[14] Since then it has been described by the government
as a "firm but fair" immigration policy, intended to "control immigra-
tion from all sources on the same basis as an essential prerequisite for
satisfactory race relations." Its explicit aim was to limit immigration,
particularly from the New Commonwealth, and to place the control of
Commonwealth and foreign migration on the same defensible footing.
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It established the same procedure for labor migration for all migrants, re-
gardless of origin. It enshrined the principle, established by the Labour
government's legislation in 1968, that the right of abode should be en-
joyed automatically only by persons who had a personal connection with
the UK ("patrials"). It took a further ten years before the wide-ranging
definition of British citizenship was reformed in 1981 to bring it into
line with the practices of immigration control.
The Labour governments of 1974-79 (Wilson, Callaghan), which
had opposed the 1971 Act, nonetheless did not repeal it. They did
not challenge its basic principles and passed no primary immigration
legislation of their own. But among a number of changes they did alter
the Immigration Rules on fiances (1974) and changed administrative
procedures. These speeded up entry clearance, accepted for settlement
persons resident on 1 January 1973 after five years' residence, and
increased the UKPH (UK passport holder) quota from 3,500 to 5,000.
This made the entry of fiances and husbands and other relatives easier,
with consequent increases in acceptances. But from 1977 newly married
husbands were no longer accepted for settlement on arrival, but instead
were given "limited leave to enter". That was intended to reduce illegal
immigration through bogus marriages of convenience.
Immigration policy is conceived in the context of a belief in a strong
"pressure to migrate" to the UK from the Third World. This provokes
a kind of hydraulic analogy, with constant repairs and additions being
made to a basically sound structure in order to stop water slopping over
the top or finding its way through new or previously undetected leaks.
On the whole, the government feels that the present policy is right and is
popular. It does not wish to change it. It will only impose new legislation
in order to protect the status quo from new threats or challenges, not to
change it. In these areas, governments want a quiet life.
That is the main reason why the government has never made any
effort to promote the return migration or "repatriation" provisions of
the 1971 Immigration Act. These operate on a trivial scale - about
100 per year - to provide a low level of highly conditional financial
help to immigrants who wish to return to their countries of origin. The
work is subcontracted to a private agency and receives no publicity.
Any emphasis given to it would be thought to prejudice "good race
relations". There is therefore no return migration program in the UK.
Britain acquired its Commonwealth immigrant population in a fit of
absence of mind. There was no plan to start the immigration and no
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intended purpose for it. Consequently there was no plan to return
it whence it came. Of course, as in all migration streams, there are
some return migrants, pennanent and temporary, who move at their
own initiative, whose numbers can be estimated from the International
Passenger Survey (IPS).
There is no measurable popular support for any increase in settlement
and general support for its further reduction. In the British Attitudes
Survey of 1984, 65% of respondents called for less settlement from the
New Commonwealth, as did up to 45% of ethnic minority respondents
(Airey, 1984). Most who favor free entry are moral and intellectual
critics from the churches and the Left, including some of the Black
and Asian voters who predominantly support the Labour party. They
denounce the immigration policy as racist. In fact its provisions apply
strictly to all persons, but the majority of those who are thereby ex-
cluded are nonwhite people from the Third World. That is where most
of the pressure for immigration comes from. So the government sees
itself as holding a neutral position, causing minimal political problems,
capable of being sustained indefinitely, reactive rather than part of any
national "immigration" plan, the lack of which often bemuses transat-
lantic and antipodean visitors accustomed to inhabiting a "country of
immigration".
During the 1980s immigration almost disappeared from view as a
topic of public controversy in Britain. Immigration was not an issue in
the 1983 general election nor in 1987, despite the Conservative party's
manifesto promise, amplified during the election, to tighten the existing
law limiting immigration. Neither was it prominent in the 1992 election.
In 1983 and 1985 only 5 and 11 motions on immigration were submitted
to the Conservative party conferences, for example, compared with 59
motions on social services. The Labour party manifesto for the 1987
general election even adopted the Conservatives' "finn but fair" slogan.
The National Front (extreme right wing, British National Party) declined
to field a single candidate.[15]
The 1988 Immigration Act - the first major legislation since 1971
- created little interest outside race relations circles. Most major chal-
lenges come from immigrant groups and race relations and civil liberties
interests. Government could point to the substantial decline in the num-
bers accepted for settlement from the New Commonwealth in the 1980s,
even though other figures show no trends for a decade. Control is felt to
be as tight as it can reasonably be made, even though many government
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supporters would like to see it tightened further. But in a policy of
containment, part of whose justification is better race relations, further
steps need new challenges. Such challenges have not been lacking since
the late 1980s - from refugees and illegal immigrants, especially from
Africa - and the resumption of the upward movement in New Common-
wealth immigration. The Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993
is the latest legislative response to the new pressure.
Press reports of court cases suggest that illegal immigration from
Nigeria and other African countries, using false passports, bogus mar-
riages, or illegal overstaying, is now organized on a large scale (in 1993
it was estimated that there were 100,000 illegal immigrants in the UK).
Such a problem is too difficult to quantify, but there has been (unofficial)
discussion of the desirability of identity cards and appropriate legisla-
tion, to deter the employment of illegal immigrants. There is no official
identity document in Britain.
A consensus therefore appears to have been established based on the
following propositions: Britain has no general need for more people
or for further immigration, but there is a pressure to emigrate from
areas of low wages and living standards to the UK and other countries.
The high rate of unemployment in the UK makes a labor market free-
for-all with low-wage countries unthinkable. Special labor needs can
easily be managed by the work permit system, and renewed large-scale
immigration would be unacceptable to the British people and would be
bad for race relations. Settlement should therefore be limited to those
with existing close personal connections with the UK, or who come for
clearly specified work purposes, or for defined family reasons such as
spouses or dependents. This restrictive immigration policy is shared,
more or less, with most other European industrialized countries.
2.5 Outlook
The increase in refugee claimants in recent years reflects pressures to
migrate and the easier mobilization of populations following the spread
of information about immigration control and refugee procedures and
how to use them to best advantage. The British government believes that
most of the new refugee pressure is conventional betterment migration
which cannot be met in other ways.[16]
The government's restrictive policy on asylum claimants attracts
much criticism from political opponents and the churches. In its defense,
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the government points to the 20,000 Vietnamese "boat people" accepted
since 1979. It points to the failure to substantiate claims that Tamils
returned to Sri Lanka, for example, are actually at risk. Contrary to
its own previous promises, it has extended the right of settlement to
50,000 Hong Kong heads of household in addition to the 15,000 British
passport holders already estimated to be in Hong Kong. Serious trouble
in South Africa may also spell serious trouble for British immigration
policy. It has been estimated that up to 800,000 people entitled to hold
UK passports live there.
Because of its mediocre economic growth Britain has not attracted
much migration from other EU countries (except Ireland), although there
is a long but little publicized postwar immigration stream of workers
from the Iberian peninsula for work in the holiday and catering ser-
vices. If the current economic differential remains, Irish emigration to
Britain and elsewhere will continue. There are no controls and there
are unlikely to be any. Even though the Irish birth rate is falling close
to the replacement rate, demographic inertia will ensure that cohort size
continues to increase for some years beyond the capacity of the Irish
economy to absorb it.
A radical increase in immigration to Britain from the poorer EU
countries is unlikely. British wages are still much lower than those in
Germany or the Netherlands, for example. Future labor demand will be
for the managerial and skilled occupations. For the present, unemploy-
ment is the dominant concern. Therefore the single European market
and further steps toward European integration are unlikely to make
much difference to movement of EU citizens across what is already a
fairly open labor frontier. But by making qualifications interchangeable,
and by stimulating economic growth, it should accelerate higher-level
manpower transfers, which are already the characteristic and dominant
feature of British work permit labor movement. The crucial point is
whether freedom of movement applies to non-EU residents in other EU
countries and whether entry into one EU country permits entry into
them all. The British government is determined to maintain its bor-
der controls, especially in the light of illegal immigration in southern
EU countries and the pressure to migrate from Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union. So far there has been little migration or asylum
application from Eastern Europe to the UK, although there has been an
increase, from a tiny base, in work permit applications.
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It has been suggested that a resumption of higher levels of immigra-
tion will be necessary in order to remedy the shortage of teenagers, to
provide the more youthful working population to support the growing
number of pensioners. In general this does not seem to be a serious op-
tion. First, the comparison of the present birth deficit is with the highly
unusual years of the baby boom. The low skills of most Third World
immigrants are not much in demand in modem economies, the level of
immigration needed to rectify age-structure imbalances would be sub-
stantially higher than that experienced in the past. Furthermore, there is
considerable capacity to expand the work force in Britain, as in the rest
of the EU by bringing work force participation rates up to the level of
the highest of the member states, and by retraining the unemployed. In
the UK, which in 1993 had over 2.4 million unemployed and one of the
highest birth rates in Europe, and whose population is not expected to
start to decline until 2030, there is little imminent need for such mea-
sures. But they are sometimes favored by liberal opinion as arguments
to relax immigration controls (see The Economist, 15 February 1992:
17-20). Meanwhile, British public opinion, and British policy, aims to
keep the doors closed and the windows shut for as long as possible.
Notes
[11 Almost from its beginning the IPS has applied to Commonwealth citizens, whose
entry began to be controlled after 1962. Most of the 200,000 interviews in each
direction are naturally of tourists and business visitors, but in 1990 1,510 intending
immigrants and 864 of intended emigrants were interviewed. Here the international
definition of migration is used, that of a person resident abroad for at least a year
who enters with the intention of staying for at least a year and vice versa. The
data are substantially incompatible with those derived from the Home Office Control
of Immigration procedures. The trivial sample size and voluntary nature of the
enquiry has been much criticized as leading to uncorrectable errors (Peach, 1981). For
example, for 1990 the 35 interviews with intended immigrants from the Caribbean
and the 19 interviews with intended emigrants were grossed up to estimated migrant
flows of 6,700 persons in and 3,800 out, with a net balance of 3,800, with a standard
error of 2,500 (OPCS, 1992, Table 3.17). Immigration estimates from the entire EU
were based on 127 interviews (grossed up to 65,900 persons).
[2] The data in Figure 2.2 exclude movements from Ireland.
[3] There have always been people from Ireland in Britain, although the numbers greatly
increased after the potato famine in 1845--46, which helped to institute a permanent
"emigration culture" that has continued more or less ever since. Most of the approxi-
mately five million Roman Catholics in Britain have at least some Irish ancestry.
[4] For clarity, the separate data from Home Office acceptance for settlement statistics
and from the International Passenger Survey are also presented separately.
[5] Certainly the government can no longer claim, as it frequently used to do, that immi-
gration from the New Commonwealth is rapidly declining. Even in the mid-1980s that
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claim depended on whether the Home Office (Britain's Ministry of the Interior) or IPS
figures were used to support the argument. The Home Office figures, used exclusively
in government speeches for obvious reasons, show a continuous decline from 1975 to
1985 but a sharp increase since then. The net IPS figures showed no downward trend
since the late I 960s and also show a sharp upward trend in the late 1980s. According
to IPS data, about 40% of the annual 5% increase in the NC ethnic group population
is still accounted for by immigration. The upturn in net NC migration measured by
the IPS and some categories in the Home Office data are partly due to changes in
the Immigration Rules in 1985 imposed by the European Court, which made family
reuni fication easier.
[6] The characteristics of the working population lost or gained by migration are poorly
known; this is a consequence of the very small sample size of the IPS as applied to
migrants, which precludes detailed employment categories for analysis; the negligible
official analyses of Home Office data; and the lack of any outflow counterpart to work
permit data, which of course only apply to the incoming high-level work force. This
means that it is almost impossible to answer the perennial question of the extent to
which Britain is suffering from a serious problem of "brain-drain". Unofficial sources
claim that it is (Royal Society, 1987), although these claims apply to senior people near
the tops of their professions, a flow that is never likely to be detectable in official routine
statistics. The crude occupational categories used in the published IPS data combine
all workers into either professional and managerial (including doctors, shopkeepers,
and smallholders) or "clerical and manual" (unskilled laborers and clerks).
[7] But this is still relatively small compared with the 256,000 applications to Germany
in 1991.
[8] Past Home Affairs Committee Reports have urged the creation of a register of de-
pendents (Home Office, I 977b) or of a quota system. The 1979 Conservative party
manifesto promised the introduction of both, a promise that has never been imple-
mented or repeated.
[9j Furthermore, following the Kessori Khatun case, from 1986 certain categories of
people, who formerly would have applied for entry clearance but who might in fact
have had the right of abode, now apply for certificates of entitlement to right of abode
and no longer appear in acceptance statistics as they are not subject to control. Some
of the post-1985 increase may follow from the new rules extending entry clearance to
"new" wives.
[10] Government statistical sources have so far been unable to give a figure to the Select
Committee on Race Relations and Immigration (SCORRI). In fact the number of
fiancees from South Asia did not increase much from 1975 to 1985, while the number
of fiances did increase. The requirement that fiances serve a probationary year and
satisfy the "primary purpose" test has made it more sensible for them to apply as
husbands. That makes it easier to satisfy the requirement that the couple must have
met before their marriage although they are still given "limited leave to enter" rather
than "accepted for settlement on arrival", being later "accepted on removal of time
limit". In 1992 4,690 fiances and husbands were given "limited leave to enter" from
the NC, 540 fiancees, and 6,290 wives. These are separate from the 20 husbands
and 430 wives "accepted on arrival" as dependents and the 5,980 husbands and 9,120
wives "accepted on removal of time limit" in 1992, having entered earlier for purposes
of marriage. While most of this movement is from South Asia, immigration through
marriage is increasing rapidly from African Commonwealth countries, a process in
which a certain degree of fraud is apparently involved.
[II] Applications from prospective spouses have dropped sharply - by about 2,000 appli-
cations per year. Instead, applications from recently married women have increased
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and are expected to mirror the loss of fiancees. The 1985 requirement that prospective
spouses obtain entry clearance before arrival has delayed the process and depressed
the figures dramatical1y from 4,200 female fiancees admitted in 1985 to 1,000 in 1986
and 540 in 1992.
[12] In rather more detail it can be stated as follows:
I. "To allow genuine visitors and students to enter the United Kingdom."
2. "To give effect to the free movement provisions of European Community law."
3. "Subject to the above, to restrict severely the numbers coming to live permanently
or to work in this country, but to continue to admit spouses and minor children
of those already settled here, provided they satisfy the requirements of the
Immigration rules."
4. "To maintain an effective and efficient system for dealing with applicants for
citizenship" (Home Office, 1991).
[131 These are Asians, original1y residents in Kenya and other East African Commonwealth
countries, who were given UK passports at the granting of independence to these
countries. Fears of large-scale immigration prompted the then Labour government in
1968 to impose an annual quota on their entry to the UK.
[14] The Home Secretary claimed that "The 1971 Act was the first comprehensive immi-
gration statute and established a new system of immigration control for both Common-
wealth and non-Commonwealth citizens. It sought to bring primary immigration by
heads of households down to a level which our crowded island could accommodate.
The Act was introduced in the belief that there is a limit to which a society can accept
large numbers of people from different cultures without unacceptable social tensions.
That remains our view" (Douglas Hurd, House of Commons, 16 November 1987).
[15] For many years UK immigration policy has attracted almost no attention from policy
journals such as Public Policy. Neither is it given much space in the journals of
demography and geography, not even those specializing in immigration such as the
International Migration Review.
[16] For example, Tim Renton, MP, former Minister of State at the Home Office, said in a
speech on IS April 1988 that "The government also has to tackle the new chal1enge
posed by abuse of the international agreements to protect refugees. Television, radio
and travel agents inform people in the Middle East or Far East that there are other
places, in Western Europe and North America, where life is more orderly and more
prosperous than in their homelands. Cheap international air travel makes it possible for
these 'economic refugees' to travel to Germany, or Canada, or Britain. We wil1 never
shirk our international obligations to shelter genuine refugees who have fled abroad
because of a well founded fear of persecution. But neither we nor our European
neighbors wil1 admit people who come simply because of their wish to enjoy a more
secure and richer life than was available at home. This wish is understandable enough,
but by itself it does not provide a passport to settlement in Western Europe."
Chapter 3
The French Debate: Legal and
Political Instruments to Promote
Integration
Catherine Wihtol de Wenden
3.1 Introduction
For a century and a half, France has been an immigration country, but
this demographic reality has not become an integral part of French
national identity and of the definition of citizenship Ii la fran(:aise.
Today immigration is one of the main topics of French political debate.
Gates of entry, illegal immigration, second-generation immigrants of
North African origin, and their concentration in neglected urban areas
are at the center of the controversies. The situation is characterized by
discrepancies between demographic realities and political perceptions
or common knowledge. Other dilemmas arise in the use of legal and
political instruments to promote the integration of immigrants: Equal
rights or positive discrimination? The right to be different or the right
to assimilate? A wider access to nationality and citizenship or a right to
retain collective identities based on ethnicity or religion? The choices
are not clear. This chapter examines the evolution of these debates and
of French policies and looks at the viewpoints of immigrants and their
children.
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3.2 From Foreign Workers to Populations of
Immigrant Origin
From 1850 to World War I France was confronted with several succes-
sive waves of immigration. The number of foreigners living in France
was first established in 1851, when the question of "citizenship" was
included in the census. This suggests that before 1850 citizenship and
immigration were not important issues. According to census results
380,000 foreigners were living in France in 1851. At the beginning of
the twentieth century the number had already reached 1 million.
During this period, France faced an influx of foreigners who were
employed in industrial development. Besides they also made up for
the falling birth rate. At the same time, the concept of nationality
was enlarged. Changes were made to the legal definition of nationality
in 1867 and 1889. The conflict at the time was between liberals and
protectionists. For the protectionists, the purpose was to reduce the
growing number of foreigners who could profit from economic growth
without having to serve in the army. In view of the worsening relations
with Germany, nationalist opinion was convinced that it was urgent
to increase the number of Frenchmen, whereas liberal economists and
industrial leaders were in favor of using the immigrants as a labor force
only. The political choice was to be made between depopulation or
denationalization.
The philosophy of assimilation prevailed, at both individual and
collective levels. In 1889 access to French nationality was made easier,
and in 1884 secular school became compulsory and free of charge.
The situation began to change with World War I. In 1916, in order to
replace industrial workers serving in the army France recruited colonial
workers from the Maghreb and from Asia. Most of them returned to
their regions of origin in 1918, but some stayed. The war casualties
also aggravated the labor shortage. New waves of Italians and Poles
arrived from 1918-20. In 1924, some industrial leaders decided to
transfer the recruitment of foreign workers to the "Societe Generale
d'lmmigration". The period was characterized by the lack of an explicit
immigration policy. In the meantime, assimilation by naturalization
continued: the law of 1927 enlarged access to French nationality. But
in 1929, when the world economic crisis started to hit France, the public
began to become more xenophobic. [1] In 1930 France had 3 million
foreigners. For the first time, a restrictive immigration law was adopted
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in 1932. It linked residence to employment and introduced a hierarchy
of residence permits. This system remained largely unchanged until
1980.
The period 1929-39 was characterized by the creation of the first
State Secretary for Immigration (1937) by the left-wing government of
Leon Blum. New waves of asylum seekers arrived from Spain, Italy
(juorusciti), Germany, and East-Central Europe, fleeing from fascism
and the Nazis. At the same time the right-wing press became extremely
racist. Some theories on race suggesting a hierarchy of nationalities
fueled the public debate on the social costs of immigrants, who were
viewed as a collective burden and a danger to the French nation (through
disease, delinquency, political threat, or social conflict). World War II
played a role in assisting assimilation: through their membership in trade
unions, the Communist party, and the French anti-Nazi movement, many
foreign workers acquired a new legitimacy after the war.
3.2.1 1945-74
In 1945 the Office National d'lmmigration (ONI), was created to recruit
foreign workers. In the same year a new law on citizenship was adopted
in the context of a liberal immigration policy, to determine which for-
eigners would be eligible for naturalization and which would remain
a temporary labor force. The public authorities tried to select "good"
immigrants and their families for permanent settlement and possible nat-
uralization. The Italians, who had not been very welcome between the
wars, had become desirable in terms of population policy, but because
they arrived in fewer numbers than expected other nationalities were
rapidly recruited: Spaniards in the 1950s, Portuguese in the 1960s,[2]
Yugoslavs in the 1960s and 1970s, Tunisians and Moroccans in the
1970s, as well as Turks and black Africans. The Algerians who had
settled in France since World War I began to bring in their families
around the end of the Franco-Algerian war in 1962. In fact the dynam-
ics of immigration were largely independent of the public authorities:
recruitment was managed by companies who directly employed forces,
rather than labor through the ONI. In 1968, the ONI scarcely recruited
18% of all entries. The other 82% entered as illegals and were legalized
in subsequent years.
In 1966 France unsuccessfully tried to give its immigration policy a
new institutional frame. A Directorate of Population and Migration was
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created in 1966 within the Ministry of Labor. In 1972 a first attempt
to haIt illegal entries was made by the Fontanet-Marcellin circular, by
refusing to legalize those who had entered France after 31 December
1971. In 1973, following racial riots in Marseilles, Algeria haIted labor
emigration and in July 1974 the new State Secretary for Immigration,
appointed by Valery Giscard d'Estaing, suspended further recruitment
of foreign workers.
In the mid-1970s, 3.4 million foreigners were living in France, one-
third from North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia), another third
from Portugal (the largest single immigration group) and Spain, and the
rest from Italy and other countries. During the 1980s this geographical
pattern of origins changed. The number of migrants from Portugal and
Spain fell sharply, while those from Morocco and Tunisia increased.
3.2.2 1974-81
The period 1974-81 was a turning point for immigration in France. A
population that was regarded as a labor force of single men, essentially
socially and politically marginalized workers, progressively became part
of French society. Because of the ban on new recruitments, the inflow
of foreign labor was replaced by family reunions. New questions arose
from the unexpected side effects of this measure. Conflicts arose from
the policy oflinking residence and employment. [3] The haIt of recruit-
ment and the shift to family reunions led to a new social phenomenon:
the "second-generation" immigrants. More and more illegals were de-
manding the legalization of their status in France. Despite the increasing
number of family reunions, two State Secretaries for Immigration, Paul
Dijoud and Lionel Stoleru, believed that repatriation would be effective.
In 1977, a policy providing lump sum payments for those willing to
return was implemented, inspired by the West Gennan model, but this
policy failed except in the case of some Spaniards and Portuguese. The
overwhelming majority of Algerians refused the offer.
At the same time, the concept of integration, while safeguarding
the links with the countries of origin, became more popular while the
model of total assimilation lost its appeal. The economic and social
costs and benefits of immigration were discussed at the highest level
(Le Pors report, 1976). The links of immigrants with their countries of
origin were officially recognized by transferring the responsibility for
teaching the languages and cultures of these countries in French schools
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Table 3.1. Stock offoreign resident populations in France by nationality
(thousands).
1975 1982 1990
Portugal 758.9 767.3 645.6
Algeria 710.7 805.1 619.9
Morocco 260.0 441.3 584.7
Italy 462.9 340.3 253.7
Spain 497.5 327.2 216.0
Tunisia 139.7 190.8 207.5
Turkey 50.9 122.3 201.5
Poland 93.7 64.8 46.3
Yugoslavia 70.3 62.5 51.7
Other countries 397.8 592.6 780.7
Total 3,442.4 3,714.2 3,607.6
Of which ED 1,869.9 1,594.8 1,308.9
to representatives from the countries themselves. That decision raised
many debates on the legitimacy of this practice.
But the demand for equal rights was increasing: equal social rights
for industrial workers were obtained in 1972 (representation within
firms) and in 1975 (union representation). The law of 1972 condemned
racism in public life. Another law, adopted in 1980 (the Bonnet law),
further restricted entries and the periods of residence offoreigners. This
law ended a long period (1945-80) in which immigration "policy" had
been implemented as part of administrative measures.
3.2.3 1981 to present
The inflow of foreigners to France peaked in 1982, but then began to
diminish. In 1986 only 38,000 regular immigrants came to France.
By 1993 their number was increasing again to 63,000. However, the
number of asylum seekers has continued to increase: from 18,800 per
year in the early 1980s to around 50,000 per year in the early 1990s,
but since 1992 it has decreased (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Some of this
decrease was due to changes in statistical calculations. But there has
also been a political shift reducing the number of asylum seekers.
The years 1981-86 were characterized by a change in the status
of the issue. The increasing centrality of the issue of immigration in
French politics led decision makers to insist on the symbolic dimension
of legislation and on the enunciative effect of the measures adopted.
Until 1981, the emphasis had been on laws dealing with labor, and later
with the equal treatment for foreigners and French nationals, but in the
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Table 3.2. Stock and inflow of foreign population (thousands),
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
Stock of foreign
population
3,714.2
3,607.6
Annual inflow
of foreign
population
59.4
75.0
144.4
64.2
51.4
43.4
38.3
39.0
44.0
53.2
63.1
Annual
inflow of
asylum seekers
18.8
19.8
22.5
22.3
21.6
28.8
26.2
27.6
34.3
61.4
54.7
50.0
first years of the Socialist Mitterrand government (1981-83) the empha-
sis shifted to human rights: expulsions of young immigrants illegally
living in France were suspended and the rights to family reunification
and freedom of association for foreigners were reaffirmed. The main
measures took the form oflaws to encourage the self-expression of first-
and second-generation immigrants. This policy had two dimensions,
the second conditional upon the first: to limit illegal immigration and to
improve the living conditions of legal immigrants already established in
the country. Such aims were not without contradictions, and had some
unanticipated effects: the moves to control the flows of immigrants
degenerated into increased policing of frontiers (with limited success).
And the regularization of illegals in 1982-83 simply attracted more new
arrivals. These matters are still far from being resolved. What has
changed in the political debate in France during 1981-83 is the signifi-
cance of immigration in the social imagination and political mythology:
the success of the extreme right-wing National Front in the March 1983
local elections revealed to what extent immigration had become a central
political issue.
In 1983 stricter border controls and internal controls were introduced
to convince the public that the repression of illegal immigrants was given
high priority. Other measures adopted in 1984 against illegal migrants
involved family reunifications and asylum seekers.
At the same time, various social movements (such as the marches of
1983 and 1984), encouraged by the freedom of association granted to
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foreigners in 1981, gave an impetus to new forms of political participa-
tion and intervention on the part of the second-generation immigrants
in French society. A ten-year residence card was introduced in 1984,
renewable automatically, thus severing the link between employment
and residence. As a result of their successful integration some activists
entered the professions and gained access to the middle class. Others
started to participate in local politics. New "elites" emerged and be-
came mediators between their ethnic or immigrant group and elected
politicians.
In 1986, the change of majority in the National Assembly (from Mit-
terrand's Socialists to allied Liberals and Conservatives) led to several
important changes partly inspired by proposals made by the extreme
right. The "Pasqua law" of September 1986 (which dealt with the en-
try and residence of foreigners), the expulsion of 101 Malians (which
received wide media attention), the emphasis placed on French identity,
security, and the so-called threat of Islam. The proposed reforms to the
Law on Citizenship concerned the right to acquire French nationality by
children (foreign nationals) who were born in France and who were liv-
ing on French territory. These children automatically acquired French
nationality at age 18 if they had been living in France for the preced-
ing five years. Both the Conservatives and the extreme Right wanted
to withdraw this possibility, arguing that such people were French on
paper only, or even French by default. lt was also argued that the
so-called Franco-Maghrebis (immigrants from Algeria, Morocco, and
Tunisia and their children) did not deserve to become French (because
of their adherence to Islam, memories of the Algerian war, but also
because of suspicions about their civic behavior and their motives for
acquiring French citizenship). Therefore the proposed reforms sought
to reject the principle that citizenship depends on place of birth (ius
soli), which had been an important tool of integration since the end of
the nineteenth century. Consequently, the debate on immigration was
transformed into one on nationality and came to focus on complex legal
arguments that were of little interest to the public, not least because they
were not understood. A special commission, appointed in June 1987,
recommended that the Law on Citizenship should not be changed. At
the end of 1987 the reforms were postponed, and the question of immi-
gration was avoided during the presidential campaign of 1988, except
when Fran~ois Mitterrand stated that he was not hostile to extending
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voting rights to foreigners at the local level. Following Mitterrand's re-
election, the Pasqua law (1986) was abolished after certain hesitation. In
1989 the "scarves affair" rapidly turned into a national debate on secular-
ity and multiculturalism, and was resolved by the Constitutional Court
(Conseil d'Etat), the Ministry of National Education, and a speech by
the king of Morocco on French television. A new policy of integration
was implemented with the appointment of Hubert Prevot as chairman
of a new High Council on Immigration (Haut Conseil a l'Integration,
1990) consisting of nine personalities. At the same time nine "sages"
appointed in 1990, with a Muslim representative structure (the Corif)
was installed. The government also decided to tighten measures against
illegal entries and to promote local integration of immigrant populations
living in neglected suburbs. In late 1990 and early 1991, the Gulf War
raised new questions of allegiance and legitimacy, illustrated by debates
about the place and loyalty of Franco-Maghrebis and other Muslims
serving in the army. With the changes of prime minister in 1991 and
1992, integration policy tended to become more concerned with the
social problems leading to ethnic tension, conflicts, and riots. In 1993
allied Liberals and Conservatives won the parliamentary election and
formed a government led by Prime Minister Edouard Balladur. In early
1994 this government established a new administrative body in charge
of immigration and the control of illegals (DICILEC).
3.3 Immigrants or Citizens?
During the past few years French political debate on immigration has
mainly been dealing with the discrepancies between images of immi-
grants in public opinion (focused on the beurs - slang for Arabs or
second-generation immigrants of North African origin - who are viewed
as delinquents, drug dealers, a reserve army for urban violence, illegals,
asylum seekers, and Islamic terrorists) and the socioeconomic, cultural,
and demographic reality. This reality was and is marked by integration
in daily life, by an immigrant population which is French by birth or
becoming so by naturalization, by middle-class immigrants and asylum
seekers from the south, by the structural need for illegal workers in
some sectors, by the competition between migrants from the south and
the east, and by the public demand for stricter controls. The politi-
cal decision makers tend to fear those in their constituencies who fear
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immigrants. Thus political decisions became heavily influenced by an
agenda set by the extreme Right.
The debate on integration centered on unemployment, the reasser-
tion of collective identities (which sometimes resemble tribalism), and
the need to build a secure Europe that excludes non-Europeans. The
stronger the exclusion of foreigners, the stronger the claims for exclusive
identities, either ethnic or religious. The proclamation of integration as
an official political goal led to some controversial questions, such as the
enforcement of equal rights or positive discrimination by law. But the
question at the core of this debate is still that of citizenship.
3.3.1 The debate on citizenship
In recent years, the presence of long-term residents of immigrant origin
in France has provoked new political debates. As a result, discussion
within French society has focused on questions such as the definition
of the social contract and dual citizenship, which has arisen from the
political demands of second-generation Franco-Maghrebis. These de-
mands include the negotiation of collective identities and the unlinking
of nationality, citizenship, and local voting rights.
The classical definition of the citizen refers to membership in a state,
and is expressed in terms of political rights and duties. Today citizenship
ala fran(:aise is on trial alongside immigration. Among the three terms
defining the achievements of the French revolution, Liberte, Egalite,
Fraternite, it is the last, brotherhood, that best defines the French con-
cept of citizenship. In the present context of de-industrialization, the
weakening of the working class, unemployment, and the large number of
foreigners and persons with dual citizenship, this concept is questioned
through the changes within the French population and society. While
the classical idea of citizenship is mainly linked to universalism and
to the national framework, the new idea of citizenship that emerged in
1986 proposed other criteria for political membership and participation.
This new idea was initiated largely by those who are more or less at
the periphery of the French political system - namely, the beurs - who
aim to dissociate citizenship and nationality at the local level to claim
voting rights for their parents' generation. The new idea of citizenship
is viewed as an answer to the crisis of participation, and is based more
on local than on national life, and on residence rather than on nationality
and affiliation within an emerging multicultural society where all those
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who live together can be citizens. The rise of the so-called association
movement, which received considerable impetus among the beurs with
the law of October 1981 (which granted foreigners freedom of associ-
ation) played an important role in the new claims. In 1987 the legal
definition of nationality was changed again. Groups mobilized around
the theme of a citizenship based on residence, participation in local life,
socialization through the French education system, and integration into
daily life. Since then, however, each year has brought new suspicions
about the allegiances and citizenship of people from North Africa. Such
debates arose around the Salman Rushdie affair, the scarves affair, and
the Gulf War.
All of these affairs have brought the issues of French nationality
and European identity to the center of the political discussions among
Franco-Maghrebis. As they have to prove each day that they are inte-
grated (an integration that increasingly looks like individual assimila-
tion), they try to present an image of themselves as good French citizens
and good Europeans while using the traditional tools of collective sol-
idarity and clientelism to do so; the 200 beurs elected mainly on an
ethnic ticket in the 1989 municipal elections are an example of such
contradiction.
Official French political discourse is not so clear. On the one hand,
the three reports of the High Council on Integration (Haut Conseil a
l' Integration, created by Prime Minister Michel Rocard in March 1990)
of February 1991, November 1991, and February 1992 insisted that "the
logic of equality (among citizens) must prevail over that of (protection
and special treatment of) minorities." Although the three reports of
the High Council on Integration officially eliminated the concept of a
multiracial and multicultural society, thus ending 20 years of promotion
of the "right to be different", both the political language and local policies
show that "minorities", "ethnic communities", "cultural mediations",
and "ethnicity", are still more in line with public opinion than the old
assimilationist and individualist model of Ernest Renan (the "contrat
d'integration" hinted at in the third report of February 1992).
Another question about citizenship is raised by urban life. In the
context of the declining class-based society that has defined citizenship
in France for a century, many traditional social links have collapsed.
Political, economic, and social involvements were simply the tools of
integration. Today it is more at the local level (district, town, or region)
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that citizenship can be expressed, but at the risk of creating new ex-
clusive identities that will be hostile to changes within the population.
Another contradiction exists among Franco-Maghrebis. For most of
them, identities are rebuilt or shaped in France. Nationality has ceased
to be the main formal dividing line between socioeconomic exclusion
and promotion. At the same time the countries of origin no longer offer
a possible future. "Localism" has served as an identification point for
many immigrants, and has been the base for political, social, and cultural
actions, although the young generation now faces a crisis of involve-
ment, high unemployment, and a larger degree of marginalization than
their parents.
3.3.2 Legal promotion
Since the mid-1980s integration policy has both matured and become
more contradictory in France. Most beurs' associations and political
decision makers are conscious of the risks of promoting the right to
be different. This right can be seen as a prerequisite of preserving
cultural or religious identities but also as a means to exclude immigrants
from the main stream of society. In the recent past more emphasis was
put on political action against ethnic segregation, e.g., by preventing
urban ghettos (a Ministry of Towns was created in 1991), by defining
70 pilot areas for integration in 1991, by taking action against school
closures (zones d'education prioritaire), and by improving the chances
of immigrants and their children to become professionals.
Such positive discrimination to achieve equality of rights raises a
number of questions. First, for the 3.7 million inhabitants of France
who do not have French nationality, there is no equal legal status with
those who have acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Even
if discriminations are very few in the social sector, this does not go for the
political sphere and everyday life. Foreigners not coming from another
EU member country are still excluded from voting and other rights
considered traditional attributes of citizenship, such as access to the civil
service and the right to participate in the exercise of justice. But some
rights that were formerly regarded as "political" have progressively
come to be viewed as social rights (such as trade union representation
in industry in 1975), so there is no basis for denying them to foreigners.
Another such example is the right to be appointed at universities or
research institutions.
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We can expect that rights already granted to EU citizens will have an
influence on the future rights of non-EU foreigners in France, such as
access to employment in the civil service. The new role of the highest
administrative court (the Conseil d'Etat) and of the constitutional court
(the Conseil Constitutionnel) will also tend to enlarge the rights granted
to non-EU citizens living in France. But the European single market also
introduced a new hierarchy among EU citizens, citizens of other West
European EFTA countries, and others. For the last group the rights to
acquire work and residence permits are restricted which makes it more
difficult for them to take up certain jobs that require mobility.
Second, one may believe that equality of rights must be coupled with
equal duties, such as respect for secularism, the priority of individual-
ism, universality of collective goods, and the limitation of cultural and
religious traditions in the private sphere. But this debate is far from
settled.
The report of the High Council on Integration (February 1992) il-
lustrates such debates on legal promotion. Devoted to the theme of the
legal and cultural conditions of integration, it focuses on conflicts be-
tween law and cultures (questions of personal status, polygamy, sexual
equality, military service which in France should include males with
dual citizenship, contrary to some bilateral agreements, e.g., between
France and Algeria of December 1983). If more social equality can be
achieved by measures of positive discrimination (consisting mainly in
fighting against the marginalization of immigrants and the emergence of
ethnic "ghettos") this sometimes reduces the discourse on immigration
to problems of the urban poor. A good example of this is the fact that
in the official documents of France's state planning commission (the
Commissariat au Plan) the chapter on "Immigration" has been replaced
by chapters on marginalization and urban life.
3.3.3 Political promotion
For immigrants and their children, the suburbs of Paris, Lyons, and
Marseilles have become new political arenas. Since 1981, these suburbs
have been characterized by lower than average rates of participation in
local and national elections, the rise of an extreme right-wing party (the
National Front), the formation of new neighborhoods shared by French
families and immigrant families, and sometimes a cultural vacuum.
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During the 1980s, these urban suburbs served as a birthplace for Franco-
Maghrebian identity. But the political and social forces having their
bases in the suburbs now face a crisis.
For the actors who gained legitimacy in local life, and also in the rapid
popularization through the media, are confronted with some contradic-
tions rooted in the game they played. These include the reassertion of the
symbols of the French revolution (citizenship, equality, and democracy)
but with an accent on collective values of the immigrant groups repre-
sented, such as being Muslims in France, ambiguous feelings toward
Europe and the Mediterranean (particularly if the single European mar-
ket means a closure to the south), identification with the American way
of life while being proud of the Arab heritage, and mediation with the
authorities while building local collective identities as means of protest.
At the same time, ethnicity - not just Arab - becomes an unavoidable
category in the French political game. One can see a lack of overall
enthusiasm for integration into French society and political life. It
is not even clear whether the elected and other representatives of the
immigrants still represent the political interests of the second generation.
3.4 Conclusions
Which integration are we dealing with? The French model was built with
reference to the state and to citizenship, but today this model must deal
with a lack of networks, of leaders, of integrative social structures, and
of local mediators. It seems important to create these and to include new
citizens, even if they are not nationals, because the lines that were used to
distinguish between nationals and foreigners, immigrants, and refugees
have now become blurred. But such a dynamization of integration
through citizenship cannot be achieved without a very strong political
commitment.
Integration has little to do with the new migratory waves, with asylum
seekers and illegals, or with the all-European debates. In the French
model, the object is mostly a population that is or will become French,
and for whom the legal instruments appear to be more useful long-
term tools than do the promotion of collective identities within French
politics, where there is no room for ethnic votes or for long-term political
strategies built on partial identities.
80 Catherine WihtoJ de Wenden
New internal frontiers are appearing. Since summer 1993 there has
been a new legal framework (the law on nationality of June 1993 and on
residence and entry - the Pasqua law - of July 1993), under which the
access of Franco-Maghrebis to French nationality has been restricted to:
• Children born in France after I January 1963 to parents born in
Algeria before that date (when parts of Algeria had the same status
as mainland France) who benefit from the so-called dual ius soli, if
their parents had been living in France for five years prior to their
birth.
• Children of harkis (Algerians serving as volunteers in the French
armed forces between 1954 and 1962) and of other Muslims repa-
triated to France since 1962 and whose parents were already French
or had the right to apply for French citizenship until 1967.
• Other foreigners (i.e., Tunisians and Moroccans) if they were born
in France and resided there without interruption between the ages of
13 and 18. Since June 1993, they can only become French citizens
if they willingly apply for French nationality between the ages of 16
and 21; however, this is denied if they have received prison sentences
of more than six months.
In the French situation one can presume that such measures corre-
spond more to imaginary frontiers in French minds than to socioeco-
nomic realities and urgent administrative needs. The effects of the new
laws are therefore largely symbolic.
Notes
[1] Especially against Italians, Poles, Jews from Central Europe, and refugees from the
empires that had collapsed at the end of World War I.
[2] The Portuguese came particularly in 1968-74 to escape from the military service and
colonial wars.
[3] The most famous one was a strike between 1976 and 1980 in the office of housing for
foreign workers.
Chapter 4
Social and Economic Aspects of
Foreign Immigration to Italy
Odo Barsotti and Laura Lecchini
4.1 Italy as a Country of Immigration
Since the mid-1970s most Western European countries have halted or
restricted labor recruitment from the Mediterranean countries. At the
same time, Italy, then Spain, Greece, and Portugal started to become
immigration countries as some of those who had been recruited during
the 1950 and 1960s or who had settled in Latin America remigrated.
These countries also became destinations for an increasing number of
immigrants from Africa and the Middle East. This shift in European
migration patterns partly reflects a gradual improvement in the economic
situation and the living conditions in Europe's southern peripheries, but
it is also an unintended side effect of the restrictive measures taken
by the UK, France, Germany, and Switzerland. While those countries
closed their doors to non-EU citizens, southern Europe - which was not
expecting any mass immigration - only started to regulate this process
in the late 1980s.
Recent estimates indicate that a total of about 1.5 million non-EU
immigrants are living in Italy (ISTAT, 1990). In relative terms, the
number of foreigners living in Italy (less than 5% of total population) is
still less than in most other West European countries, yet immigration
from Eastern Europe and the Third World to Italy has become a public
issue and a source ofconcern. While in the past many Italians themselves
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Table 4.1. Foreigners in Italy from developing and East European
countries (the 20 most important flows).
Countries 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
North Africa
Morocco 2,634 2,903 15,705 23,549 26,752 77,971
Algeria 1,331 1,403 1,899 2,190 1,757 4,241
Tunisia 4,352 4,928 11,953 14,596 14,145 41,239
Libya 4,030 4,033 5,223 5,510 2,196 2,604
Egypt 6,958 7,183 11,016 12,585 10,209 19,614
Sub-Saharan Africa
Ethiopia 7,196 7,479 10,528 12,150 7,900 11,946
Somalia 1,843 2,012 3,361 4,211 3,744 9,443
Nigeria 3,844 3,995 3,851 5,298 3,575 6,855
Senegal 316 335 5,719 7,397 8,191 25,107
Cape Verde 3,528 3,614 4,924 5,224 3,814 4,991
Middle East
Iran 13,025 13,317 16,581 18,023 11,827 14,630
Iraq 1,917 1,939 2,516 2,586 1,594 2,062
Asia
India 5,307 5,698 7,997 9,142 7,168 11,282
Sri Lanka 2,540 2,372 4,337 5,392 5,117 11,454
China 1,618 1,824 5,382 7,761 8,531 18,665
Philippines 7,621 8,064 15,050 18,075 16,131 34,328
Latin America
Brazil 4,670 5,347 7,581 9,702 8,716 14,293
Argentina 5,267 5,645 7,018 8,270 6,980 12,839
Eastern Europe 43,432
Poland 10,303 14,005 16,874 10,091
Yugoslavia 13,862 14,525 19,018 21,839 17,124
Total 102,162 110,621 176,533 203,591 165,471 366,996
Notes: These data are based on residence permits (1985-90). The 1989 data show a noticeable
decrease connected more with a rearrangement of the archives than to an effective decrease on
these permits. The noticeable increase in the 1990 data is in part a consequence of the ex lege
regularizations of 1989.
Sources: CENSIS (1990), for 1985-89 data; Ferruzza and Ricci (1991), for 1990 data.
took the opportunity to emigrate, a growing share of Italian society now
fears that immigrants might compete with the national labor force and
that the already fragile social and infrastructural systems might not be
able to cope with the additional task of integrating the new arrivals.
The analysis of recent immigrant flows shows the difference between
this relatively new phenomenon and traditional labor migration toward
northern Europe (see Table 4.1):
• The immigrants come not only from the geographic vicinity and from
countries with which Italy has maintained "privileged" relationships
in the past (former colonies such as Libya, Eritrea, and Somalia), but
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also from areas which until now have been only slightly involved in
immigration to Europe (e.g., sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia).
• Female immigrants no longer come as dependents but as actors in
the migratory process.
• The new migrants use a number of strategies to enter local labor
markets or rather they are able to interact with local labor markets
that appear to have no apparent need for them. They are frequently
adept at inventing work while awaiting better opportunities.
When not taking remigrants and retired ED citizens into account we
can clearly see that immigration to Italy is still at the stage where the
labor force component prevails. Therefore the average age of the new
immigrants falls distinctly within the first categories of active age, and
the composition according to sex is definitely asymmetrical within the
different national groups, with a varying predominance of males and
females (Table 4.2) according to the occupational fields and the gender-
specific structure of the Italian labor market. So far, only a marginal
proportion of all migrants consists of entire family groups; the process
of the family reunions is still at the embryonic stage.
Nevertheless the mechanisms ofethnic bridgeheads and chain migra-
tion are already becoming visible. Networks of families and friendships
appear to be fundamental in promoting the migratory phenomenon, and
are even more important than they were for previous immigrants to Eu-
rope. The demands of the labor force, in fact, no longer playa direct role
in international migrations by means of the direct recruitment of labor
in the sending countries. Nowadays, however, the decision to migrate
appears to be linked more than before with the migrant's access to in-
formation and the backing of some relative or friend who has emigrated
before him.
Immigration to Italy seems to be based on individual rather than on
collective (e.g., family or clan) decisions (Barsotti, 1988). However,
before their departure about 90% of the immigrants obtained some kind
of information regarding work possibilities, living arrangements, and
how they would be received by the Italians.
If migration from the Third World to Italy is interpreted as labor
migration, then part of it might be temporary. It is likely that the
original intentions of many migrants, particularly when there is a large
distance, physically and culturally, between the country of destination
and that of origin, were to stay only for a short time in Italy and to save
money for a new start back home. But such biographical intentions may
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Table 4.2. Composition by sex and age of the 20 most important flows
of foreigners in Italy from developing and East European countries, on
the basis of residence permits (1990).
Countries % Female % <30 years old % >60 years old
North Africa
Morocco 9.4 46.6 0.7
Algeria 18.2 47.6 0.4
Tunisia 11.0 67.0 0.3
Libya 24.0 25.8 13.1
Egypt 14.1 32.6 1.4
Sub-Saharan Africa
Ethiopia 59.2 41.4 2.7
Somalia 57.5 55.0 1.2
Nigeria 36.0 41.4 0.2
Senegal 3.1 47.5 0.1
Cape Verde 87.5 32.1 0.8
Middle East
Iran 30.0 22.1 5.1
Iraq 16.5 27.0 2.0
Asia
India 42.0 38.6 2.0
Sri Lanka 32.9 39.7 0.6
China 37.1 45.2 1.1
Philippines 69.7 36.3 0.6
Latin America
Brazil 66.8 50.9 3.5
Argentina 49.5 39.0 7.9
Eastern Europe 56.0 38.4 9.0
Total 42.8 40.4 8.0
Source: Ferruzza and Ricci (1991).
fail or undergo transformation. In any case Italy's economic system has
reacted to and has tried to glean advantages from the new situation.
4.2 Types of Immigration
4.2.1 Seasonal immigration
Seasonal immigrants come to Italy to join the work force during periods
of peak demand, generally in the agricultural sector during harvesting.
These are usually male migrants from North Africa, particularly from
Morocco and Tunisia. They often hold similar jobs in the opposite
seasons in their country of origin. The migration is naturally temporary,
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repeated from season to season, with the aim of supplementing incomes
in the home country from jobs held there during the remainder of the
year. For these migrants there is little intention to integrate.
This immigration is extremely useful to the Mediterranean type of
agriculture practiced in the south of Italy, which requires a low level
of technology, and which may be performed with large numbers of un-
skilled and highly flexible workers. To a certain extent this agricultural
system is part of Italy's hidden economy. The conjunction of this supply
of seasonal labor and this particular demand produces a form of immi-
gration that might be called "invisible", since it rarely tends to become
explicit on the labor market. Socially it is also scarcely visible, since it
is confined to the countryside, it does not touch the social services, and
public opinion only becomes aware of it when there are documented acts
of violence or disputes among immigrants and Italian workers who are
part of the irregular labor market. This type of immigration is hard to
control. The provisions made by immigration policies have little effect
on it.
4.2.2 Temporary immigration
The "invisible" migration mainly involves people for whom the main
purpose of their stay in Italy is to accumulate as much capital as possible
in order to reinvest it in activities or to finance the subsistence of family
networks in their respective home countries. These immigrants, usually
males from sub-Saharan countries, remain strongly attached to their
countries of origin, which they left to escape from poverty and long-
term unemployment. Many of these migrants show little interest in
settling permanently in Italy as they feel distant from both a cultural
and a religious point of view. By taking advantage of their skills as
merchants and of the solid networks of relatives and friends which, due
to the effect of the migratory chain, they have gradually formed in Italy,
they have invented their own jobs and found their economic niches.
In some cases "street-selling" has become a definite choice, whereas
in others it is only accepted while awaiting other situations that the
market might offer. In effect, the demand in certain industrial sectors
has very quickly adapted to the availability of an increasing mass of
young unskilled workers to fill jobs that the local labor force has either
snubbed or avoided.
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This process of professional mobility toward more stable and guar-
anteed occupations at the fringes of the formal labor market lays the
ground for the stabilization of this foreign labor in Italy and for a differ-
ent model of integration with the receiving society. Several attempts to
regularize the status of these immigrants have contributed to this change.
In this process many migrants have modified their original intentions.
4.2.3 Temporary immigration that becomes permanent
Female migrants from the Philippines provide a good example of this
process. The migratory intentions of such women, whether married or
not, are almost always "family" oriented, primarily to contribute to the
"income pooling" of the family at home. Back in the Philippines, the
family of the female migrant, which actively participated in her decision
to migrate, takes on the burden of rearing her children; in exchange they
expect regular transfers of money. This financial backing is used for
everyday needs to save the family from poverty and in some cases it
even helps the family reach levels of consumption similar to those in
the West. Most of the Filipino women in Italy, just like the majority of
female immigrants, do full-time domestic work in family homes; 40%
of them already had the job before arriving in Italy.
The fact that these female migrants maintain strong ties with their
families back home and choose to interrupt their roles as wives and moth-
ers, would suggest that this migration could be classified as temporary.
But soon after arrival in Italy most of these women seem to abandon
ideas of a quick return to their country of origin, for two reasons:
I. Because many of the traditional channels for Filipino male labor
migration (such as the Persian Gulf) have been closed, many of
these women became indispensable to their families. In countries
like Italy, the types of jobs traditionally given to women in the
personal and social services sector seem to be on the increase.
2. Although such work entails a waste of the educational qualifications
these women acquired at home (60% have had at least 12 years of
education), it provides them with relatively stable jobs and, because
they live in their employers' homes, allows for greater savings.
In this situation the final return to the home country is often postponed,
and instead at least some of the family are brought to Italy. In this
respect the migration intention gradually loses its temporary character,
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and the Filipinas (and other foreigners living and working under similar
conditions) become long-term immigrants.
4.2.4 Structured immigration
Structured immigration concerns those who are already established in
stable social environments in Italy. The majority of Iranian and Chinese
migrants belong to this category.
Iranian immigrants are among the least recent. The first Iranians
arrived in the early 1970s as either political exiles or students, and many
of them have received either high school or university education in Italy.
Their forced stay in Italy, together with the relative tolerance of their
host society at a time when it was not yet suffering from an immigration
"invasion", led to a great number of Iranians settling down. Evidence
of this stable immigration intention may be seen in the number of mixed
marriages, estimated at around 25% of all Iranian marriages in Italy,
and in the dynamic social and professional mobility that allowed many
of these immigrants to acquire positions appropriate to their level of
education. After Khomeini's Islamic revolution this group served as a
bridgehead for the next wave of immigrants from Iran.
Chinese immigration is linked even closer to ethnic and other busi-
ness and economic niches. Unlike other groups, however, Chinese
immigrants usually come with their entire families. In most cases this
feature also indicates a stable decision to stay and remain in Italy.
4.3 The Labor Market and Immigration
4.3.1 Workers employed in production sectors
In the areas where the Mediterranean type of intensive agriculture is
practiced, there is a high demand for large numbers of workers dur-
ing the harvesting and crop-picking seasons. Farmers and agricultural
entrepreneurs are thus forced to rely periodically on immigrant work-
ers. For farmers it is a good bargain. Immigrants, especially if they
are working illegally, have to accept both salaries that are well below
official contract levels and unattractive working conditions.
On the other hand, the work itself does not "need long periods
of training" nor does "the employer look for signs of continuity or
professional upgrading" (Bruni and Pinto, 1990). The entrepreneur finds
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it more convenient, therefore, to choose foreign labor rather than local,
since he can easily avoid restrictions, state regulations, and trades union
control over working conditions, and thus manages to have extremely
flexible and elastic production.
Undoubtedly, this choice could lead to competitive situations in the
labor market, particularly in areas with high levels of unemployment,
such as southern Italy. However, competition has only rarely caused
direct friction between immigrants and local workers competing for the
same jobs. As Calvanese (1989) has pointed out, in southern Italy plenty
of noncontract, irregular, and underpaid work is also carried out by
Italian citizens, and regular and fully paid work is rare for both foreigners
and nationals alike. In areas where salaries are normally low and where
many locals are already being forced to accept poor working conditions
(Pugliese, 1990), the presence of many foreign workers causes salaries
and working conditions to deteriorate even further and the younger
local workers to abandon agriculture; the latter are no longer willing
to accept "indecent" working conditions, even in temporary jobs. For
many of them internal migration to northern Italy has become the main
alternative. A generation ago immigration to Germany, France, or
Switzerland was also common.
Fisheries is another sector which, in some areas at least, employs
large numbers of immigrants. It is well known that the number of
Tunisian immigrants in this sector is particularly high in western Sicily
(Vizzini, 1983; Vaccina, 1983) and in the ports of the Marche and Puglia
regions (Vicarelli, 1990; Oi Comite et at., 1985). In this manner, the
demand side has at its disposal a labor force that is not only cheaper
than the locals, but which is also "well trained" to this work under even
harder conditions in the country of origin.
In contrast with the agricultural and fisheries sectors, the process
of absorption of immigrant labor into industry has only begun to take
effect since the late 1980s. This is because it was not directly activated
by demand, but was rather the result of the fact that entrepreneurs and
firms in the industrial and service sectors have only recently begun to
take advantage of the labor force available for particularly heavy, dirty,
and underpaid jobs. The integration of foreigners into the industrial pro-
duction and services sectors is now reaching considerable proportions
in the more developed areas in central and northern Italy and appears
to be very dynamic. Employment opportunities have opened up for
immigrants in those sectors where there is high demand for unskilled
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work, such as the tanning industries in the Veneto and Tuscany regions,
the foundries, the steel, resin, and ceramic works, and the agro-industry
in Emilia-Romagna, Lombardy, and Piedmont.
Considering the degree to which the immigrant workers have been
absorbed into the vast area of the hidden economy, it may be said that
they play a role in the transformation of productive processes, since
they seem to slow down structural change (Venturini, 1990). Illegal
immigration might cause capital to shift toward the informal sectors of
the economy (Dell' Aringa and Neri, 1987), it might bring support to
hidden activities, helping them to spread, and it might lower the level
of technology (Furcht, 1989; Bruni and Pinto, 1990). The informal
economy, "encouraged" by immigrants, might give rise to an element
of pressure against the local labor force and supplant Italian nationals
working in the formal sector of the economy. On the other hand, when
immigrants are given jobs with regular contracts and they officially
become employed, as happens in certain sectors in northern Italy, then
their role in the jobs market might be complementary to that of the
locals and of immigrants from southern Italy. In situations where there
are gaps between labor demand and supply, foreigners are employed at
short notice to overcome bottlenecks in the production process. They
therefore contribute to increases in the level of production and allow
local workers to enter or to shift toward higher professional qualifications
or hierarchical positions.
The largest share of foreign workers are employed in the labor-
intensive, underpaid, and low-prestige segments of the tertiary sector
(e.g., small trading businesses, restaurants and hotels, domestic ser-
vices). In regions with high levels of unemployment and widespread
concealed activities, the immigrants might find themselves not only in
competition but also in conflict with the local labor force over jobs;
whereas in areas with a highly structured labor market and a decidedly
seasonal demand for additional labor the role of the immigrants might
be considered complementary, especially in regions with low levels of
local unemployment.
4.3.2 Domestic workers
Large numbers of immigrants are absorbed by Italy's households. In
most cases jobs in domestic services cannot be filled by Italian nationals
or would not even be offered, if minimum wages had to be paid. Thus it
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appears that these jobs were created specifically for the immigrants. As
long as the situation remains this way, the role of the immigrant labor
force will add to rather than compete with the Italian labor force.
4.3.3 Self-employed workers
As already mentioned, a large number of immigrants from developing
countries have established themselves in Italy as self-employed street
vendors. Most of them are Maghrebi and Senegalese who take this
opportunity while trying to obtain better positions. In this case, the
migrants create their own jobs. They are therefore additional jobs which,
at the macroeconomic level, can scarcely be considered competitive
with similar jobs done by locals. This does not exclude the possibility,
however, that the work of these non-EU workers might be seen as a
form of unfair competition by people who do not have to bear the same
financial and fiscal burdens as the locals.
Although the street vendor is the most common type of self-employed
worker and a sort of emblem of the non-EU immigrant, in specific dis-
tricts and in the larger urban areas in central and northern Italy, more
independent and structured activities are taking root. Three examples
are: the import and sale of carpets by the Iranians, the production of
leather goods, and restaurant-keeping, the two last activities by the Chi-
nese. These forms of business have developed from a favorable mixture
of the specific talents of the immigrants themselves, the characteristics
of the Italian socioeconomic environment, the possibility of using priv-
ileged channels of supply in their home country, and their particular
family or group organization.
Several Iranians have managed to create a sort of "slot" for them-
selves in the production and service market by selling, promoting, and
dealing in Persian rugs, a role considered natural and suitable for orien-
tal immigrants by the receiving society. They are therefore appreciated
and are only marginally considered to be undesirable competitors.
The businesses run by the Chinese are organized in extremely ef-
ficient productive units, based on a burden of work that is shared by
the entire family, and which in many cases can be considered as a form
of self-exploitation. They have therefore become highly competitive
with local entrepreneurs and with noninstitutional forms of work. In
some parts of the country, such as on the outskirts of Florence, the
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production of leather goods even seems to have been "monopolized" by
some Chinese.
4.4 Outlook: The Growing Foreign Population
Recent estimates indicate that a total of about 1.5 million non-EU na-
tionals have immigrated to Italy. In comparison with immigration levels
to other European countries this number is relatively low, yet the phe-
nomenon is a source of concern. It occurs in an economic system that
is already undergoing immense structural modifications, in which the
role of the industrial system is being reassessed, and there is a strong
tendency toward tertiary sector growth. The Italian economy is also
experiencing a chronic excess of labor supply, an increasing qualitative
imbalance between labor demand and supply, plus a deterioration in the
traditional gap (in terms of employment) between the north and south
of the country.
The ability of many migrants to establish themselves in Italy will in
the near future encourage an influx of family members and will therefore
lead to a change from labor migration to migration settlement. There
is no doubt that there will be an increase in the stock of immigrants
because of family reunions.
As far as the arrival of new labor forces is concerned, recent regu-
lations in Italy, which conform with EU migration policies, have been
introduced to ensure that the flows are planned and regulated according
to market requirements and in relation to the strength and capacity of
the social system. We shall have to see, however, whether this policy of
restricting arrivals will be effective or whether it will increase clandes-
tine and thus unregulated immigration. Such an increase in clandestine
arrivals certainly cannot be excluded, because of three factors:
• The deterioration in the balance in terms of differential demographic
pressure between the southern and eastern shores of the Mediter-
ranean and the northern shores.
• The particular geographical position of Italy within the Mediter-
ranean and the impossibility of controlling all its frontiers and shores.
• The interaction between the informal economy and immigration,
particularly of clandestines.
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Although there is no doubt that the first two factors will cause the
influx of immigrants to continue, the influence of the informal economy
on migration flows is not so evident. One wonders whether the informal
economy - which is an ancient practice in the Italian economic system
- will grow in the near future as a response of the productive sectors
to Italy's structural crisis or whether, due to the crisis itself, it will be
reduced.
Second, one must determine whether the informal economic sector
as the first area entered by immigrants is also a first step to entry into
the formal economy. If so, then the hidden economy might function as
a pull factor to attract new immigrants to fill the gaps left by successful
old immigrants (Tapinos, 1991). Such substitution might be aided by
the mobility of immigrants from the south of Italy, where the concealed
economy is widespread, to the industrial areas of the center and north
- where the immigrants might find employment in formal sectors of
production.
As a likely combined effect of these three factors, we believe that
clandestine immigration from Third World countries is likely to increase.
Forecasts for 1991-95 made by EUROSTAT (Muus and Cruijsen, 1991)
show that of all EU countries, Italy, behind Germany, will have the
second highest net immigration.
Chapter 5
Shifting Paradigms: An Appraisal
of Immigration in the Netherlands
Han Entzinger
5.1 An Overview of Dutch Immigration History
The Netherlands has a long history of both immigration and emigration.
Its geographic location, its maritime tradition, its colonial past, as well
as its open borders with neighboring countries, have all shaped this
history. During the past few centuries inward and outward flows have
alternated, but, above all, the country has been a safe haven for refugees
from all over Europe, persecuted because of their religious beliefs. On
the other hand, part of the Dutch population left to settle in the colonies
or in the New World. In 1700 some 40% of the population of the city
of Amsterdam were foreign born, compared with only 25% today (see
Table 5.1). Overviews of old and new immigration to the Netherlands
can be found in Entzinger (1985), Lucassen and Penninx (1986), Social
and Cultural Planning Office (1986), and Entzinger and Stijnen (1990).
It was only during the first half of the twentieth century that mi-
gration in both directions was relatively unimportant. As a result of
this, popular belief in the Netherlands sees immigration and emigra-
tion as exceptions rather than the rule. After World War II, migration
again gained momentum. The independence ofIndonesia in 1949, until
then the most important Dutch colony, led to the departure of between
250,000 and 300,000 Dutch citizens, colonizers of European descent,
as well as people of mixed origin. Most of them settled in the "mother
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Table 5.1. Non-Dutch residents in the Netherlands, in absolute numbers
and as a percentage of the population, 1899-1992 (selected years, 1
January, except for 1899-1971).
1899
1930
1947
1960
1971
1976
1981
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
Total
population
5,104,100
7,935,600
9,625.500
11,462,000
13,060,100
13,733,600
14,208,600
14,529,400
14,615,100
14,714,900
14,804,300
14,891,900
15,010,400
15,138,100
Non-Dutch
residents
53,000
175,200
103,900
117,600
254,800
350,500
520,900
552,500
568.000
591,800
623,700
640,600
692,400
732,900
Non-Dutch residents
as percentage of the
total population
In
~2
1.1
1.0
2n
2.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
4n
4.2
4.3
4.6
4.8
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, The Netherlands.
country", which many had never visited before. In that same period
about 400,000 Dutch citizens left their country to settle in immigration
countries such as Canada and Australia. It was not until 1961 that
the migratory balance of the Netherlands became positive for the first
time, later than in most other West European countries. Since then the
migration surplus has continued; the year 1967 is the only exception.
Like elsewhere in Northern and Western Europe, during the 1960s
and early 1970s unskilled workers were recruited from a number of
countries around the Mediterranean. The Netherlands had a rather late
start, and this is why relatively few foreign workers came from south-
ern Europe and rather more from more distant countries, particularly
Turkey and Morocco. The share of foreign workers in the labor force in
this century has never been as high as in neighboring countries, largely
because there is little heavy industry and no coal mining in the Nether-
lands. Moreover, the relatively high birth rates of those days kept the
domestic labor force at a satisfactory level. As in other European coun-
tries, and contrary to the original idea, many foreign workers did not
return to their home countries, but remained in the Netherlands and in
many cases they have been joined by their families.
This immigration flow has continued up to the present (see also Table
5.2). Many members of the so-called second generation now find their
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Table 5.2. Non-Dutch residents in the Netherlands, by selected cate-
gories, 1976-92 (I January, selected years).
EUa Turkey Morocco
Total No. % No. % No. %
1976 350,500 112,700 32.2 76,500 21.8 42,200 12.0
1981 520,900 134,000 25.7 138,500 26.6 83,400 16.0
1986 552,500 135,000 24.4 156,400 28.3 116,400 21.1
1991 692,400 168,400 24.3 203,500 29.4 156,900 22.7
1992 732,900 176,200 24.0 214,800 29.3 163,700 22.3
aEU member states: Belgium, Denmark, France, (West) Germany, Greece (from 1986), Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal (from 1991), Spain (from 1991), and the UK.
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, The Netherlands.
marriage partners in the country from which their parents came. This
phenomenon is particularly evident among Turks and Moroccans who,
with 230,000 and 190,000 members, respectively (citizens plus nat-
uralized Dutch born in Turkey or Morocco), constitute the two largest
immigrant communities. In 1991 alone, about 22,000 Turks and Moroc-
cans settled in the Netherlands. Return migration to these two countries
is almost negligible, and acquiring Dutch citizenship has become more
popular in recent years. The number of Turkish and Moroccan citizens
residing in the Netherlands is now growing more slowly than the number
of those whose ethnic origins lie in these countries.
A third major immigration flow of the last decades stems from the
Caribbean. For a long time there had been limited migration between
the Netherlands and its overseas territories of Suriname and the Dutch
Antilles. In the past two decades, however, Suriname, which was a part
of the kingdom until it acquired independence in 1975, has seen more
than one-third of its population leave for the Netherlands. At present, the
number of people of Surinamese descent in the Netherlands is estimated
at 240,000, nearly all of whom hold Dutch citizenship. There are also
about 80,000 people from the Dutch Antilles (Curarrao and some smaller
islands) and Aruba living in the Netherlands. These two small states
are autonomous parts of the kingdom; their inhabitants all have Dutch
citizenship and are free to settle in the Netherlands.
5.2 Recent Developments
In the early 1980s immigration stagnated for a short period, probably
because of the economic situation, but since then it has been rising again.
In 1991 immigration of foreign citizens reached a peak of almost 85,000.
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Table 5.3. Arrivals and departures of non-Dutch citizens in the Nether-
lands, 1980-91.
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
Arrivals
79,820
50,416
40,930
36,441
37,291
46,166
52,802
60,855
58,262
65,385
81,264
84,337
Departures
23,633
24,979
28,094
27,974
27,030
24,206
23,563
20,872
21,388
21,489
20,595
21,330
Balance
56,187
25,437
12,836
8,467
10,261
21,960
29,239
39,983
36,874
43,896
60,669
63,007
Corrected
balance"
+50,600
+14,200
-1,100
+2,600
+4,600
+20,200
+26,500
+35,400
+27,800
+17,300
+48,700
+50,000
"This column represents the migration balance minus the administrative corrections that relate to
non-Dutch citizens (mostly departures that have not been formally registered).
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, The Netherlands.
The migration balance in that year stood at 63,000 (50,000 if the so-
called administrative corrections are accounted for; see also Table 5.3).
A major difference from previous periods is the greater heterogeneity
of the countries of origin, even though one-third of all new arrivals
still come from only three countries: Turkey, Morocco, and Suriname,
countries with substantial established immigrant communities in the
Netherlands. Another important distinction from previous periods is
that only a small proportion ofthe new arrivals find employment shortly
after they arrive. Many of the current immigrants are family members
of those who have been residents for some time and they are not always
sufficiently qualified for the Dutch labor market.
As in many other European countries, the number of asylum seekers
has been increasing sharply, although in the last three years it has stag-
nated at some 20,000 per annum. Only a small percentage of these are
actually granted the status of refugee under the Geneva Convention. A
considerable number, however, succeed in obtaining another residential
status. The category of "tolerated people" created in 1992 includes asy-
lum seekers whose claims have been rejected, but who will not be sent
back to their countries (non-refoulement). After a waiting period they
are allowed to attend courses and take up employment. It is estimated
that roughly half of all asylum seekers eventually succeed in acquiring
some formal status and subsequently remain in the Netherlands. Of the
other half, some may stay illegally. Recent estimates put the number
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of illegal immigrants at roughly 100,000. They are concentrated in a
few sectors of the economy (horticulture, catering, cleaning, clothing
industry), where they do the least attractive work for which no other
workers appear to be available.
At the opposite end of the labor market there has been a slow,
but gradual increase in immigrants from other EU member states. At
present, 175,000 citizens of other EU countries reside in the Netherlands,
which is relatively few in comparison with most other member states.
The largest single groups are the Germans (47,000) and British (41,000).
In general, these are people with high qualifications, many of whom
are professional workers, and their families. In public opinion these
immigrants, and those from other Western countries, are clearly seen
as distinct from the other immigrant communities because their social
situations and cultural backgrounds are similar to those of the original
population of the Netherlands.
5.3 Some Questions of Terminology
The observations given in Section 5.2 already refer to some rather com-
plicated questions of terminology and definition that emerge from any
international comparison of migration and its social and political effects.
In the Netherlands, immigrants are seldom referred to as foreigners or
as foreign citizens, as is the case, for instance, in Germany, Switzer-
land, or Austria. A major reason for this is that, mainly as a result of
the colonial past, there is a substantial number of Dutch citizens from
overseas among those who take up residence in the country. The term
immigrant, although mentioned frequently in this article, is also rarely
used in common Dutch vocabulary in this field. This is in contrast to
what is the case in, for instance, France. In the Netherlands, most people
of immigrant origin are referred to as ethnic minorities, in line with the
Anglo-American use of this term. The concept of ethnic minority not
only reflects the minority situation of many immigrants, numerically as
well as socially, but it also refers to the fact that their ethnic origins lie
outside the Netherlands. More than in most other continental European
countries, the public perceives immigrants on the basis of their social,
economic, cultural and religious characteristics rather than in legal terms
that would reflect their relationship with the state.
The significance of this distinctive approach may be illustrated with
some statistical data (see also Table 5.4). On 1January 1990, the number
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Table 5.4. Major immigrant groups in the Netherlands, by country of
origin and by different criteria, 1 January 1990.
Citizenship! Non-Dutch Foreign-born
country of birth citizens Dutch citizens Total"
Belgium 23,300 42,000 132,400
Germany 41,900 127,500 444,000
Indonesia 7,900 187,700 472,600
Morocco 143,700 115,500 168,600
Dutch Antilles!Arubi 56,100 84,400
Suriname 16,200 157,100 244,200
Turkey 185,500 141,300 207,000
Total immigrants 641,918 1,166,803 2,232,000
"This column includes all persons who fulfil at least one of the following three criteria: non-Dutch
citizens. born outside the Netherlands, one or both parents born outside the Netherlands.
bThe Dutch Antilles and Aruba are autonomous parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands: their
inhabitants are Dutch citizens.
Source: Prins (1991).
of non-Dutch residents in the Netherlands stood at 642,000. By mid-
1992 it had increased to 750,000, corresponding to almost 5% of the
population of 15.2 million. In early 1990, almost 1.2 million citizens,
however, or another 8% of the population had been born abroad, and
would therefore logically qualify as immigrants. Many of these were
foreign citizens who had become naturalized; others originated from the
(former) overseas territories. Finally, around 2.25 million inhabitants
either were foreign citizens or had themselves been born outside the
Netherlands or had at least one parent for whom this had been the case.
No new data have become available since 1990, but in view of the trend
in immigration statistics one may assume that at present roughly one
out of every six persons (around 18%) living in the Netherlands has
direct roots in another country. Who said that the Netherlands was not
a country of immigration?
5.4 The Multicultural Approach to
"Temporary" Immigration
In spite of substantial immigration, until 1980 official public policy was
characterized by the idea that the Netherlands was not a country of
immigration. A major argument put forward to support this approach
was the country's already dense population. Besides, many immigrants
themselves were convinced that one day they would return home. Rota-
tion, in fact, was the idea behind the foreign worker policy as adopted by
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the Netherlands and other West European countries. Also, for those who
had come from (former) colonies - with the exception of most migrants
from Indonesia - the principle of return remained valid, often upon
completion of their basic education in the "mother country". In reality,
growing numbers of the latter were no longer coming for educational
purposes, while the former often postponed their return indefinitely. It
took a while before the Dutch, including the government, understood
that in immigration the return myth might have an important ideological
function for immigrant communities, but that it might always remain a
myth.
Although the Netherlands did not consider itself a country of immi-
gration until 1980, a policy was designed that aimed at promoting the
"well being" of the "temporary guests". As in many other countries,
the 1960s and 1970s were years of rapid expansion of the social secu-
rity system and years of professionalization of social work and social
services. Social work agencies, fully subsidized by the state, played the
most important role in the reception and counseling of immigrants. In
line with the idea of temporariness, migrants were cared for in accor-
dance with rules and habits of their own culture. It was expected that
this would facilitate their reintegration upon return. With this same idea
in mind, mother tongue teaching was introduced in primary education
in 1974, when family reunification had begun to gain momentum.
These efforts to preserve the immigrants' cultural heritage reflect
the tradition of the Netherlands as a multicultural society with its in-
stitutionalized social and religious diversity. Since the late nineteenth
century this has been an important Dutch characteristic. All major cul-
tural and religious communities have had their own associations, trade
unions, political parties, schools, and other institutions such as hospitals,
housing corporations, social work agencies, and even broadcasting as-
sociations for radio and television. This variety of institutions enabled
the members of each community to spend most of their lives among
themselves, cooperating only at the public level. None of the major
communities - Roman Catholics, several Protestant denominations, and
Socialists - would ever reach majority status, so they needed each other
for legitimate democratic decision making.
When describing this typically Dutch system the metaphor of a clas-
sic Greek temple is often used. The public sector is its roof, which
is supported jointly by the pillars that represent the various religious
and cultural communities. Although this "pillarization" system has lost
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some of its rigidity since the secularization process that started in the
1960s, it is still easy to distinguish pluralist structures with long-standing
traditions in the Netherlands. The Dutch are used to thinking in terms
of cultural heterogeneity. They are not unfamiliar with the phenomenon
of minorities getting together to work out a compromise that reflects a
variety of interests (the classic study of pillarization is Lijphart, 1975).
It is against the background of this tradition of pillarization that
Dutch efforts to cope with immigration and its social effects should be
interpreted. For a long time, many Dutch, as well as the authorities,
held the view that immigration would lead to the establishment of yet
another pillar, or rather a number of very small pillars, in a traditionally
multicultural society. Thus, public policy was based on the idea that
the temporary immigrants' cultural identity should be preserved inside
their own, relatively closed institutions.
As the 1970s came to an end, it became increasingly clear that a
substantial number of immigrants would not return to their countries
of origin. A political debate on forced return migration was quickly
abandoned with the argument that immigrant workers had contributed
so significantly to the development of the Dutch economy that it would
be immoral to send them home against their will. Those who had come
from former colonies could not be forced to return either, not only
because of their Dutch citizenship, but also because of some feelings
of guilt shared by many Dutch over the colonial past. During this
same period there was a clear increase in the number of immigrants,
primarily as a result of family reunification, and immigrants became
more visible in daily life. More or less simultaneously, their labor
market situation deteriorated. As a result of economic restructuring and
selective dismissals, unemployment among immigrants rose much more
steeply than among the native population. Moreover, some terrorist
acts, including two train hijackings carried out by young Moluccans,
a relatively small group from the former Dutch East Indies, forced
the authorities to take immigration and its social consequences more
seriously.
In 1979 the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), an
independent advisory body to the Prime Minister, recommended that
the fiction of temporary residence should be abandoned and that an
integration policy on behalf of the immigrants be developed (WRR,
1979). The aim of such a policy would be to promote their participation
in social and economic life, as well as to develop good interethnic
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relations. The council believed that promoting equal opportunity and
avoiding discrimination should be the basis of any integration policy. In
Dutch history, the concept of egalitarianism has played as predominant
a role as the concept of multiculturalism, although at times the two may
seem contradictory.
5.5 Minority Policy
The report of the Scientific Council marked an important change in the
way of thinking concerning immigration, not only in public opinion, but
also in official policy. In 1980 the government formally admitted that
the idea that most immigrants would return should be abandoned, and
a stricter admission policy was announced. Moreover, the government
set up a coordinated policy for the ethnic minorities. It was at that time
that this concept began to enter into public speech, although the new
"minority policy" was not formally launched until 1983. The Minister of
the Interior was given special coordinating competence for this policy,
even though all ministers remained responsible for its application in
their own respective fields (Minderhedennota, 1983).
In official usage, the concept of ethnic minority is a synonym nei-
ther for immigrant nor for foreigner. Minority policy, according to the
government, applies to those immigrant groups "for whose presence the
government feels a special responsibility [because of the colonial past
or because they had been recruited by the authorities], and who find
themselves in a minority situation" (Minderhedennota, 1983: 12). The
following groups are affected by minority policy: Surinamese, Antil-
leans and Arubans, Moluccans, Turks, Moroccans, Italians, Spaniards,
Portuguese, Greeks, (former) Yugoslavs, Tunisians, Cape Verdians,
Gypsies, recognized political refugees, and tinkers (an indigenous semi-
nomadic group that had already been subject to special government
policy for many years). When the minority policy was designed in 1980
these groups together totaled 450,000 people; since then their number
has roughly doubled.
The main elements of minority policy are only partly in line with
the recommendations of the Scientific Council. Rather, they represent
a mixture of the Council's vision and the multicultural approach of the
1970s:
• Promoting multiculturalism as well as emancipation of ethnic
communities.
102 Han Entzinger
• Promoting equality before the law.
• Overcoming social deprivation by improving the minorities' eco-
nomic and social situation.
Thus, the situation ofthe ethnic minorities was defined simultaneously in
social, economic, cultural, and legal terms. The attempt to improve their
situation should take all these aspects into account, while a group level
approach seems to have been preferred over an individual approach.
Minority policy does not apply to those immigrants or foreigners who
do not belong to any of the groups mentioned, with the exception of
certain legal measures that apply to all non-Dutch citizens residing in
the Netherlands.
5.5.1 Multiculturalism
It is this first element in particular that emphasizes the group rather
than the individual approach in Dutch minority policy. Initially, the
policy of the 1970s, which aimed at preserving and developing migrant
cultures, was continued. Mother tongue teaching, for instance, was
given a legal basis and was intensified in both private and public schools.
More recently, however, as doubts have grown about its effectiveness,
its emphasis has been slightly reduced again (Lucassen and Kubben,
1992).
It should be mentioned that, irrespective of minority policy, Dutch
law allows for the setting up of private schools of any religious denom-
ination, entirely subsidized with public money. In the past five years
about 20 Muslim schools have been established in various parts of the
country on the basis of this law, as well as some Hindu schools. Their
status is equal to that of Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish schools.
In those schools, all of which are of primary level, teaching is in Dutch
and the curriculum is in accordance with the directives prescribed by the
authorities. It should be noted that only a small minority of Muslim and
Hindu immigrants (the latter mainly from Suriname) send their children
to these schools.
Another relevant measure in this context is the establishment of con-
sultative councils for each major ethnic minority. Such councils have
been created at the national level, by the Ministry of the Interior, as well
as at the local level, particularly in cities with substantial immigrant
concentrations. Like almost everywhere else in Europe, the largest im-
migrant concentrations are to be found in the metropolitan areas: 45%
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Table 5.5. Ethnic breakdown of the populations of the four major cities
of the Netherlands, 1 January 1991.
Amsterdam Rotterdam The Hague Utrecht
All inhabitants (A) 702,731 582,242 444,181 231,570
Turkish citizens 24,128 28,449 16,798 7,840
Moroccan citizens 33,902 17,202 12,950 13,101
All non-Dutch
citizens (B) 108,861 72,579 53,609 27,869
Origins in Suriname/
Dutch Antilles/Aruba (C) 61,679 45,533 34,564 6,876
Bas % of A 15.5 12.5 12.1 13.4
(B+C) as % of A 24.3 20.3 19.9 15.0
Source: Muus (1991: 29).
of all ethnic minorities live in the four major cities (Amsterdam, Rotter-
dam, the Hague, and Utrecht), against a mere 13% within the population
as a whole (Muus, 1991; see also Table 5.5). The members of these
consultative councils are delegates of the main immigrant associations.
The authorities are obliged to consult them on any measure that affects
the minorities.
In more general terms, the authorities attempt to promote the cre-
ation of ethnic associations and organizations at the local, regional, and
national levels. Such associations may pursue a variety of aims, rang-
ing from sports activities, social counseling, language courses (both
Dutch and mother tongue), to the production of radio and television
programs. Subsidizing religious activities is legally forbidden. Certain
publicly subsidized activities, however, such as language courses, may
take place in mosques.
5.5.2 Equality before the law
An important part of this second element of minority policy is to combat
racism and discrimination, for which the penal code has been amended
and reinforced. In the Netherlands there is no specific legislation that
aims to promote better interethnic relations, as is the case in the UK,
the USA, and some other countries. The impression is that existing
antidiscrimination legislation is adequate, although not always easy to
apply in concrete cases.
A more characteristic element of Dutch minority policy, where it
aims to achieve equality before the law, is to grant to all foreign citizens
with residence records the same rights and obligations that apply to
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Dutch citizens. In the 1980s a number of rights for non-Dutch citizens
were gradually extended. First, several pieces of legislation relating to
cultural and religious practices were altered to be able to accommodate
certain non-Christian or non-Jewish rites, e.g., in funerals or in slaugh-
tering. Foreign residents are now also allowed to enter Dutch public
service (with some minor exceptions such as the police and the armed
forces).
Perhaps the most interesting example is the granting of active and
passive voting rights to foreign residents with residence records of at
least five years. The right to vote and to be elected, however, is limited
to the municipal and, in some of the larger cities, to the district levels.
Participation in provincial and national elections is reserved for Dutch
citizens. In the 1986 and 1990 local elections a few dozen foreigners
were elected to municipal councils, particularly in the larger cities and
in border regions. In both years the participation rate among foreign-
ers remained below the overall average. The large majority of those
who voted did so for one of the established Dutch parties and not for
immigrant parties.
It is interesting to note that, in spite of this policy of promoting equal
treatment of Dutch and foreign citizens, the number of naturalizations
has risen substantially in recent years. In 1991, 30,000 foreign citizens
obtained Dutch citizenship, corresponding to 4% of the entire foreign
population of the country. Many foreign citizens have a rather practi-
cal reason for their applications: a Dutch passport generally guarantees
uncomplicated travel in Europe and other parts of the world. The natu-
ralization procedure is relatively uncomplicated and not very expensive
(ECD 170 as a maximum). The main requirement is five years of un-
interrupted stay in the Netherlands; less strict requirements apply to
spouses and partners of Dutch citizens. Recently, the government de-
cided to allow dual citizenship, which means that foreigners who have
become naturalized no longer have to abandon their old citizenship.
5.5.3 Improving the economic and social situation
This third element of minority policy, to combat social and economic
deprivation, has been considerably less successful than the two others.
The aim is to promote the minorities' participation in the principal fields
and institutions of society up to a level that corresponds to their share
in the total population, at the local, regional, or national levels. This
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idea of proportional representation reflects the typically Dutch idea that
ethnic origin, culture, or religion should not affect the possibility of
participating in economic and social life. Here multiculturalism and
egalitarianism find themselves united!
In reality, developments have been a lot more varied, and also rather
differentiated by sector and by minority group. In the field of housing,
for instance, the situation of most immigrants has improved substantially
over the past ten years. The quality of minority housing is now practi-
cally the same as that for the Dutch population of a similar social and
economic background. This improvement has been enhanced by the
essentially non-discriminatory distribution system for social housing,
which in the largest cities includes the majority of all housing.
In education and employment the situation is much less positive. Al-
though school achievements for the second generation are considerably
better than they were for the first - in particular for the Surinamese, An-
tilleans, and Moluccans - the gap between minority and other children
remains wide. High school dropout rates, an insufficient knowledge of
Dutch, as well as discriminatory practices by employers, constitute ma-
jor obstacles to the successful entrance of these youngsters to the labor
market. It is precisely in the labor market where the situation is worst.
The unemployment rate among Turks and Moroccans (depending on the
definition chosen) stands at between 21 and 36% of the labor force. For
the Surinamese and the Antilleans the corresponding figure is between
17 and 31 %, whereas only 7% of the nonimmigrant population is unem-
ployed (Social and Cultural Planning Office, 1992: 66). In recent years,
the last number has gradually declined, while minority percentages have
remained high, despite numerous efforts to promote integration into the
labor market.
Obviously, this difference between minorities and the majority is
explained partly by differences in the average level of training and
education. It is interesting to note that this aspect of different starting
positions is sometimes overlooked by the authorities when they compare
the social situation of different communities (Delcroix, 1991). Never-
theless, even when the statistics are corrected for such differences, the
employment rate of ethnic minorities remains well below that of the
Dutch with corresponding educational levels. More than ten years of
minority policy have not led to any improvement in this crucial area,
even though this can partly be seen as a result of continuing immigration
of people who are insufficiently qualified for the Dutch labor market. It
106 Han Entzinger
must be concluded, however, that instruments such as improved voca-
tional training, intensified employment services, special job programs,
etc., have not been very successful. Moreover, in the past ten years the
number of unskilled jobs has diminished as a result of a fundamental
restructuring of the Dutch economy. Most minority groups are faced
with a wide gap between supply and demand in the labor market, and
their employment prospects are not very hopeful.
5.6 The New Thrn: More Emphasis on Integration
For a long time, the negative long-term social effects of persistent high
unemployment among ethnic minorities have been insufficiently ac-
knowledged. The minorities' full entitlement to social security benefits
was considered an acceptable alternative that enabled those affected by
unemployment to live a decent life. As in the 1970s, many Dutch still
see minorities as objects of welfare-state care rather than as a labor-
market potential. Only in recent years has awareness grown that such
an approach is not only paternalistic, but that it may also encourage
the process of marginalization among certain minority communities.
A considerable number of immigrants, for instance, still do not speak
Dutch, even after 20 years of residence. Many have hardly ever met
a Dutch person, and withdraw into their own communities. Many are
not in a position to structure their lives, because the daily routine that
a regular job imposes upon the individual is lacking. Under such cir-
cumstances the challenges offered by fundamentalism or by crime may
serve as substitutes in cases where there are no other opportunities that
would enable ethnic minority members to familiarize themselves with
the society that surrounds them.
At the same time, this surrounding society is not always aware of
the cultural bias that is inherent in any system through which goods and
services are distributed. The school system, the labor market, and social
and cultural services all tend to disadvantage those members of a soci-
ety who are less familiar with the rules and regulations that govern such
institutions and their functioning. In the literature, this phenomenon is
known as discrimination. A distinction can be made between conscious
or deliberate discrimination, on the one hand, where differential treat-
ment and disadvantaging of certain groups or individuals is an explicit
aim, and nondeliberate discrimination, on the other. Here, differential
treatment is not an aim, but an effect of the application of existing rules.
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There is growing awareness in Dutch society, as well as among the
authorities, that the cumulated effects of nondeliberate discrimination
against ethnic minorities can be quite strong, and that this accounts to
a large extent for the persistent unemployment. Therefore, it is now
felt that the search for policy measures to counter these effects must be
intensified.
This rather gloomy analysis of the situation of ethnic minorities is
largely based on the second report of the Scientific Council for Govern-
ment Policy to the government in 1989, ten years after the Council's first
report (WRR, 1989). In this second report the Council argued that not
only the immigrants' presence would be permanent, but also immigra-
tion itself had become a permanent feature in West European societies.
Immigration, according to the Council, would continue as long as the
gap between the poor and the rich persists at the global level. Besides,
immigration is enhanced by the presence of substantial immigrant com-
munities in Europe. In the Council's view, introducing more restrictions
in immigration policy would have only a marginal effect.
As regards future minority policy, the Scientific Council recom-
mended putting more emphasis on economic and social integration,
particularly in the labor market, in education, and in vocational training.
A country that admits immigrants should also offer them an opportunity
to further develop their capacities, so that they can be self-supporting,
rather than rely on the social-security system for the remainder of their
potential professional lives. To achieve this aim, the Council proposed
a number of policy instruments, including, for instance, a major in-
tensification of language training (in some cases even compulsory), a
"welcome policy" for newly arrived immigrants, as well as an improve-
ment of teaching methods of Dutch as a second language in primary
education.
The Council also recommended the introduction of certain forms
of positive action in the labor market, including a legal obligation for
employers to report publicly on their efforts to recruit members of ethnic
minority groups. Such a law would be similar to the Canadian Employ-
ment Equity Law introduced in the mid-1980s, which does not prescribe
quotas; it is meant to encourage employers to be more conscious about
the possible negative effects for ethnic minorities of their traditional
recruitment practices and personnel policies. The Council suggested
that changing some of their procedures and making some additional
effort would give them better access to the immigrant potential in the
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labor market. If this potential is neglected, the general employment
situation will worsen, particularly among the large numbers of young
people of immigrant origin in the larger cities. Positive action should be
distinguished from positive discrimination: entry requirements should
never be lowered, as this will soon backfire to all members of the group
concerned.
There can be little doubt that, during the three years since the pub-
lication of the Scientific Council's second report, the appreciation of
immigration and the political discourse in this area have changed (Ned-
erlands Gesprek Centrum, 1992). Some of the measures proposed by
the Council have already been implemented, although mostly in an ex-
perimental fonn. At present, no less than two bills on employment
equity are on the parliamentary agenda, one proposed by the coalition
government and one by the opposition.
A review of the three elements of minority policy indicates that
there has been a general shift toward the third element, the promotion
of social and economic integration. All major measures to improve the
immigrants' legal position have already been put into practice. It is the
multicultural aspect of public policy that has lost some of its importance
over the past ten years. In fact, subsidies for social and cultural activities
of ethnic minorities have been reduced or discontinued, mother tongue
teaching has become more disputed, and establishing ethnic and immi-
grant organizations as well as encouraging other initiatives among these
communities is now largely seen as the responsibility of the immigrants
themselves, and no longer of the authorities.
Since the autumn of 1991 the public debate on immigration and the
future ofethnic minorities has intensified. The issues are much higher on
the political agenda than ever before. The debate was provoked by Frits
Bolkestein, parliamentary leader of the VVD, the Conservative-Liberal
party (Bolkestein, 1991). He made some comments on the subject with-
out the usual reserve, which, until then, had been so typical of the public
debate in this field full of taboos. Since then, attitudes toward immigra-
tion and minority cultures appear to have become harsher - some would
say more realistic - among certain segments of the population. The
tone of the public discussion on illegal immigrants that took place in
the aftennath of the Amsterdam air crash in October 1992 reflected
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a degree of xenophobia that had hitherto been almost unknown in the
Netherlands.
Yet, it would be an exaggeration to argue that the tone of the debate
on immigration in the Netherlands is now similar to those in countries
like France, Germany, or Belgium, all of which have strong right-wing
anti-immigrant movements. The Netherlands also has its anti-immigrant
party (the Center-Democrats) that has occupied one seat out of 150 in
parliament for most of the past ten years and that also has a few seats on
the largest city councils. Yet, with the exception of some regrettable, but
relatively minor attacks against homes for asylum seekers and Muslim
institutions, there have been no violent clashes so far between minorities
and the majority or between minorities and the police.
It is evident that the immigration issue and, above all, the future of
multi-ethnicity are currently being re-evaluated. To most observers and
politicians it is clear now that a strategy of achieving equality before the
law and respect for immigrant cultures has not prevented processes of
social marginalization from taking place. The provisions of the welfare
state, traditionally well developed in the Netherlands, have prevented
"ghettoization" and large-scale poverty among immigrants. At the same
time, however, these provisions have enhanced their dependency on the
state, and have discouraged them from familiarizing themselves with
the demands of modem Dutch society.
Today, as in 1980, the Netherlands is confronted with a change in
the approach to the integration of its immigrants. It appears that the
"minority model" is slowly being replaced by the "integration model",
at least in public policy. It is beyond doubt that ethnic and religious
pluralism, insofar as it remains within the limits imposed by the law, will
continue to be recognized in the future, as it has been recognized in the
past. For historical reasons the degree of pluralism that the law permits
(in education or in broadcasting, for example) is greater than in most
other European countries. It seems likely, however, that future appeals
on such facilities for institutionalized pluralism will have to come from
the ethnic communities themselves, rather than from public authorities,
as has often been the case until now. The title of a recent publication
that summarizes the recent debate, Opinions on Immigrant Compatriots:
Integration or Assimilation? (Meningen over Medelanders, 1992), is
indicative of this trend.
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5.7 Conclusions
For a long time, the Dutch approach to immigration was based on the
assumption that most of the immigrants would eventually return to their
countries of origin. Since 1980 official policy has acknowledged that
the immigrants are here to stay. Nevertheless, despite an immigration
surplus of over 60,000 in 1991, and its continuing upward trend, the
Netherlands still does not consider itself a country of immigration. In
this respect, past and current Dutch immigration policy can be compared
with those in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria.
A second characteristic of the Dutch approach is its strong reliance
on welfare-state provisions as a means of accommodating immigration.
This should be seen as an attempt to promote equal opportunity, irre-
spective of an individual's legal situation and of the actual contribution
of that individual to the economy. The idea has been that immigrants
should not be treated as second-class citizens, an approach that is also
characteristic of the Scandinavian countries, especially Sweden, which
is often regarded as a model for the welfare state. In recent years, how-
ever, this approach has hardened somewhat, mainly because of a more
general reappraisal of the role of the state in social and economic life.
The third and final characteristic of Dutch policy is cultural plural-
ism. This characteristic stands in sharp contrast to the assimilationist
approach in France, while there are certain similarities with the UK
and Sweden. The tradition of pluralism in the Netherlands, however, is
stronger than in the latter two countries, and it is against the background
of that tradition that Dutch multiculturalism in the field of immigration
as well as the concept of "ethnic minority" should be understood. In this
field too, however, certain changes are taking place. Public awareness is
growing that equal opportunity and multiculturalism cannot be pursued
simultaneously in all circumstances.
Do these recent shifts imply the end of the ethnic minority concept?
The answer to this question is both yes and no. No, because any
policy that aims to integrate immigrants into a new society is doomed to
failure if it does not take sufficient account of different cultural, legal,
linguistic, and other conditions. In the "reception policy" for newly
arrived immigrants that is currently being developed, this awareness
has certainly been preserved. On the other hand, it should be noted
that implementing a multiculturalist policy becomes more difficult, if
not more archaic, as the immigrants become better integrated into the
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main sectors of society. It is not always easy to determine what a
third-generation Surinamese immigrant has in common with one who
arrived only yesterday. Current policy, however, denies the relevance
of such differences. Schools, for example, receive an additional subsidy
for every student who belongs to one of the recognized ethnic minority
groups, without taking into account individual and group differences.
Such a policy does not account for the rather rapid changes that often
occur in the cultural orientation of immigrants. Even under conditions
that favor the recognition and acceptance of immigrant cultures, such
as those in the Netherlands, the third generation has little in common
with the first, as is shown in the rich immigration history of the USA.
Besides, the growing importance of intermarriage, a classic sign of
integration, makes it more difficult for the authorities to define the
criteria for minority membership.
It should also be remembered that, even at the moment of arrival, the
immigrant population is much more heterogeneous than the receiving
society may think. Authorities tend above all to see what immigrants
have in common and what distinguishes them from the rest of the popu-
lation: their immigrant status, their unfamiliarity with the new country
and its language, and sometimes their religion. On that basis they are
defined as one ethnic or national community. They often see themselves
forced to overcome old political, regional, or other attitudes which they
have brought with them from their country of origin. As time goes by,
the immigrant population becomes more, rather than less diverse, par-
ticularly in the second and third generations. The relevance of a shared
parental origin decreases, whereas other criteria for social classification
may become more important.
It is still uncertain whether what has just been said about shifting
criteria for classification is also valid for the role of religion. For certain
members of the second generation, in the Netherlands and elsewhere in
Western Europe, religious affiliation tends to replace ethnic or national
origin as a criterion for organization. It is interesting to note that, even in
the Netherlands, where minorities are traditionally classified by country
of origin, the role of Islam is now slowly gaining importance, not only
as a basis for institutionalization of certain initiatives among people of
immigrant origin, but also in the public debate on immigration. Other
members of the second generation, however, are going through a process
of secularization and are distancing themselves from the religious beliefs
of their parents.
112 Han Entzinger
We may conclude that the current shift of public policy in the Nether-
lands will leave less room for multiculturalism, and put more emphasis
on the need for integration, particularly in social and economic life.
The predominant role of the concept of "ethnic minority" in the Dutch
approach to immigration in the past two decades will slowly disappear.
Nevertheless, given the long Dutch tradition of multiculturalism and the
degree to which pluralism has been institutionalized in Dutch society, it
can be expected that the forces of assimilation in the Netherlands will
remain less strong than those in most other countries in Western Europe.
Chapter 6
Dynamics of Immigration in a
Nonimmigrant Country: Germany
Hedwig Rudolph
6.1 Germany as a Country of Immigration?
Gennany has a long history of considerable influx of both foreigners
and foreign-born people. Most political and scientific discussions dif-
ferentiate between foreign labor, refugees, asylum seekers, and people
of "Gennan origin" living abroad. As a rule people in the last category
are not regarded as migrants. However, the last group has by far out-
numbered the others in the period since World War II. Although more
than 20 million people have come to the country during these 46 years
(see Fassmann and Miinz, Chapter 1, this volume), Gennany insists
on defining itself as a nonimmigrant country. No immigration law ex-
ists. The basic pattern of Gennan political discourse strongly defends
the nation-state and a concept of nationality based on ius sanguinis.
The contradiction between the demands of economic rationality and
the ideological position remained the characteristic feature of Gennan
nonimmigration policies.
As early as 1880, political regulations and administrative institutions
were introduced to recruit labor from neighboring countries (Herbert,
1986). During the following decades the figures and structure of for-
eign labor in Gennany clearly reflected which economic branches were
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experiencing difficulties in attracting an adequate work force under
prevailing conditions, especially wage rates.
Over time, a set of instruments and regulations was developed that
allowed a fairly flexible use of foreign labor. The basic "invention"
has been the legal concept of a "foreigner", that is, a person who can
claim only limited civil rights and whose right to stay and access to
gainful employment are restricted (Dohse, 1981). The main aspects of
the weaker status for foreigners are:
• The principle of priority for Germans over foreigners concerning
access to the labor market.
• Temporally limited employment permits for foreigners.
• Restricted regional mobility for foreigners.
• Additional systematic discrimination against foreign women.
Obviously, the room for maneuver by the labor market authorities is
considerably increased if part of the work force has to accept a marginal
status as it is characterized by these restrictions. The existence of some
type of "reserve army" improves the functioning of the labor market
without too much strain on the incentive system - especially the level
and structure of wages.
The situation becomes more complex to the extent that a country
wants or has to come up to the norms of civil society. This would
demand striving for a balance between national economic needs, on the
one hand, and civil as well as social rights of foreign labor, on the other
(Hollifield, 1992). West German politics entered this stage in the early
1970s indicated by legal improvements concerning permits to stay for
foreign labor.
For decades, the German labor market took advantage of the fact
that levels of economic activity were lower in neighboring countries.
This gap in the structure of opportunities provided plenty of volunteers
looking for employment even in hard, relatively low-paying, contingent
jobs. During World War II, economic incentives were replaced by
repressive measures and violence. Large numbers of people from the
countries occupied by the German army were forced to work in German
industry and agriculture. In the summer of 1944, this compulsory foreign
work force amounted to 5.7 million, one-third of them women. It need
not be stressed that no one ever regarded them as migrants.
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6.2 German Refugees, Ubersiedler, and Aussiedler
115
After 1945, the huge migration flows to and within Germany made clear
how fundamentally the war had changed the geopolitical landscape
and the balance of power in Europe. The majority of these migrants
were German citizens who had been expelled from the former Eastern
provinces of the country and ethnic Germans from countries in Central
and Eastern Europe. The forced exodus of millions of Germans had been
decided by the allied powers as a collective punishment. Moreover,
the expulsion seemed to be justified by a logic of ethnic segregation
that was expected to solve once and for all the nationality quarrels in
these countries. Three subgroups of postwar migration to Germany
corresponding to three periods can be differentiated.
Between 1945 and 1950, 12.5 million refugees arrived in Germany.
Most of them (60%, or about 8 million) settled in the western part of
Germany (the later FRG), 40% (or 4.6 million) in the Soviet military
zone (the later GDR). An unknown number of German refugees in
the GDR became part of the migration from the GDR to the FRG in
the following decades (Vbersiedler).[I] Between 1950 and 1961 the
migration flows between the FRG and the GDR were quite asymmetrical:
3.6 million going West, 0.5 million going East. After the Berlin Wall
was built, the migration flow from the GDR did not stop completely;
between 1961 and 1989 the net migration flow comprised more than
600,000 people (see Table 6.1). The number of German refugees from
the GDR outnumbered those from Eastern Europe between 1950 and
1960. At the end ofthis period almost one out of four German inhabitants
in the FRG was a refugee. In the period 1950-92, 2.9 million people of
German origin (Aussiedler) settled in Germany; 50% from Poland.
At the time when the "guest-worker" policy was officially ended
political initiatives had already been taken that secured an additional
influx of people into Germany from the East. Early in the 1970s, bi-
lateral treaties were signed by the federal government with Central and
East European countries as part of the "new policy" vis-a-vis the East.
An important issue was to achieve freedom of exit for the minorities
of "ethnic Germans" who could expect special support in the FRG: fi-
nancial aid, priority for housing, (re-)training programs, and language
courses. However, the treaties did not have a substantial impact on the
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Table 6.1. Migration between the FRG and the GDR (thousands).
Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Total 1950-90
GDRto FRG
302.8
251.3
214.4
518.9
334.3
439.5
448.1
418.6
259.8
182.7
247.8
236.4
21.5
47.1
39.3
29.5
24.3
20.7
18.6
20.6
20.7
19.9
19.7
17.3
16.2
20.3
17.1
13.9
14.4
15.4
15.8
18.3
15.5
13.4
42.3
28.4
29.5
22.8
43.3
399.4
395.4
5,275.2
FRGto GDR
40.0
29.3
25.3
22.1
43.3
42.5
40.4
47.0
33.1
32.1
25.4
19.7
8.8
4.7
4.9
5.6
4.3
3.6
2.9
2.5
2.1
1.8
1.8
1.7
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.7
1.5
1.3
1.6
2.0
2.6
2.4
2.5
5.1
36.2
511.4
Net flow
262.8
222.0
189.2
496.8
291.0
397.0
407.7
371.6
226.7
150.6
222.3
216.7
12.7
42.4
34.4
23.9
20.1
17.0
15.7
18.1
18.6
18.0
18.0
15.6
14.6
18.9
15.8
12.7
13.2
14.0
14.2
16.5
14.0
12.1
40.7
26.4
26.8
20.4
40.8
383.3
359.2
4,752.5
Note: The numbers of migrants between 1950 and 1956 do not include migration to and from the
Saarland. The numbers of migrants for J950 and 1951 do not include migration between the two
halves of Berlin. Due to rounding errors the net flow may differ from influx minus outflow.
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt; Bundesverwaltungsamt; Bundesinstitut fiir Bevolkerungsfor-
schung.
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number of Aussiedler before the second half of the 1970s; a kind of
explosion took place late in the 1980s. Another 1.4 million arrived in
1988-92. Table 6.2 illustrates the correlation of the size and structure
of the influx with periods of political crisis in the countries of origin.
There was a drastic reorientation of the policies concerning ethnic
Germans in mid-1990. Priority was going to be given to improving
the economic, social, and political situation of ethnic German minori-
ties in their East European home countries. The political intention to
"persuade" them to stay was enforced by changes in administrative pro-
cedures and financial regulations that made the transfer to Germany
much more cumbersome and less attractive. This reappraisal of policies
was influenced by increasing problems of economic and social integra-
tion of the ethnic Germans in the united Germany. Even after a decade
a gap concerning social status and economic standards between resident
Germans and ethnic Germans could not be ignored (Malchov et al.,
1990); female ethnic Germans were even more disadvantaged (Elzner
et al., 1992). Being Germans, the ethnic Germans could not simply be
relegated to the lowest segments of the labor market where vacancies
persisted. On the other hand, the structure and level of their vocational
skills as well as their poor German language abilities were consider-
able handicaps to employment. The decisive event that triggered a
change was the process of German unification and the perspective that
the necessary restructuring of the East German economy would create
a considerable internal "reserve army".
The revisions of the judicial specification of "German origin" and
of the privileges attached to it illustrate that the concept of nationality
is politically constructed and can be reshaped under varying political or
economic circumstances.
The successful integration of millions of refugees from the East dur-
ing the first decade after World War II has sometimes been referred to
as the genuine economic miracle of Germany. However, there was no
magic at all. The specific framework for this growth scenario was a per-
fect matching of the structure of opportunities and economic incentives,
on the one hand, with the skills and attitudes of individuals, on the other.
In contrast to popular views, the production capacity of West German
industry that had been enlarged enormously during the war was only
marginally reduced by bombs. The most serious bottleneck in the early
postwar period was labor, and in this situation the German refugees were
an important economic resource. Because they had lost most, if not all,
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Table 6.2. Aussiedler returning to the FRG, 1950-92 (thousands).
Former
Former Czecho- Former
Year Total USSR Poland slovakia Hungary Romania Yugoslavia
1950 47.2 0.0 31.8 13.3 0.0 0.0 0.2
1951 21.1 1.7 10.8 3.5 0.2 1.0 3.7
1952 4.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 3.4
1953 8.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 8.0
1954 10.4 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 9.5
1955 13.2 0.2 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.0 11.8
1956 25.3 1.0 15.7 1.0 0.2 0.2 7.3
1957 107.7 0.9 98.3 0.8 2.2 0.4 5.1
1958 129.7 4.1 117.6 0.7 1.2 1.4 4.7
1959 27.1 5.6 16.3 0.6 0.5 0.4 3.8
1960 18.2 3.3 7.7 1.4 0.3 2.1 3.3
1961 16.4 0.3 9.3 1.2 0.2 3.3 2.1
1962 15.7 0.9 9.7 1.2 0.3 1.7 2.0
1963 14.9 0.2 9.5 1.0 0.3 1.3 2.5
1964 20.1 0.2 13.6 2.7 0.4 0.8 2.3
1965 23.9 0.4 14.6 3.2 0.7 2.7 2.2
1966 27.8 1.3 17.3 5.9 0.6 0.6 2.1
1967 26.2 1.1 10.9 11.6 0.3 0.4 1.9
1968 23.2 0.6 8.4 11.9 0.3 0.6 1.4
1969 29.9 0.3 9.5 15.6 0.4 2.7 1.3
1970 19.1 0.3 5.6 4.7 0.5 6.5 1.4
1971 33.2 1.1 25.2 2.3 0.5 2.8 1.2
1972 23.6 3.4 13.5 0.9 0.5 4.4 0.9
1973 22.7 4.5 8.9 0.5 0.4 7.6 0.9
1974 24.3 6.5 7.8 0.4 0.4 8.5 0.6
1975 19.3 6.0 7.0 0.5 0.3 5.1 0.4
1976 44.2 9.7 29.4 0.8 0.2 3.8 0.3
1977 54.2 9.3 32.9 0.6 0.2 11.0 0.3
1978 58.1 8.5 36.1 0.9 0.3 12.1 0.2
1979 54.8 7.2 36.3 1.1 0.4 9.7 0.2
1980 52.0 7.0 26.6 1.7 0.6 15.8 0.3
1981 69.3 3.8 51.0 1.6 0.7 12.0 0.2
1982 48.0 2.1 30.4 1.8 0.6 13.0 0.2
1983 37.8 1.4 19.1 1.2 0.5 15.5 0.1
1984 36.4 0.9 17.5 1.0 0.3 16.5 0.2
1985 38.9 0.5 22.1 0.8 0.5 14.9 0.2
1986 42.7 0.8 27.2 0.9 0.6 13.1 0.2
1987 78.5 14.5 48.4 0.8 0.6 14.0 0.2
1988 202.6 47.6 140.2 0.9 0.8 12.9 0.2
1989 377.0 98.1 250.3 2.0 1.6 23.4 1.5
1990 397.1 148.0 133.9 1.7 1.3 111.2 1.0
1991 222.0 147.3 40.1 0.9 1.0 32.2 0.5
1992 230.5 195.6 17.7 0.5 0.4 16.1 0.2
Total
1950-92 2,796.8 746.2 J,430.0 104.7 21.3 401.8 89.7
in % 100.0 26.7 51.1 3.7 0.8 14.4 3.2
Note: Between 1950 and 1991, 3036 resettlers came from "other" regions and 52,550 resettlers traveled to
Germany via foreign countries.
Source: Bundesverwaltungsamt, Cologne.
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of their property (many of them having been farmers in the East) they
had to make their living in salaried employment.
Although many social tensions are reported to have built up - the
local Germans articulated fears of being marginalized - the refugees
were quickly integrated. They participated in the economic takeoff that
they had made possible. Not only did they accept partial compensation
for the loss of their property (on average 22%; Neuhoff, 1979), but they
were also prepared to take jobs below their skill standards and to move
to regions where work was offered (Komer, 1976). Working hard was
their main chance to improve their social status. For female refugees
access to gainful employment was limited by the supply of adequate jobs
in the regions where they had to stay (in view of housing capacities) or
where they had to move (in view of their partner's job). The experience
of the war as a national and individual disaster had generated attitudes of
humility that made these German refugees from the East hard workers.
6.3 Guest Workers
As early as 1955, when the unemployment rate was down to 5% and
the number of registered unemployed equaled that of job vacancies, the
German federal ministry of commerce took the initiative to systemat-
ically recruit foreign labor. The political preference for this way of
supporting the flexibility of the labor market was openly confirmed and
shared by the trades unions. The alternative, namely, to increase the
female employment rate, was discarded as too costly and conflicting
with the traditional family ideology (Dohse, 1981: 56; Herbert, 1986:
192).
Eight bilateral contracts (Italy 1955, Spain and Greece 1960, Turkey
1961, Morocco 1963, Tunisia 1965, Portugal 1964, Yugoslavia 1968)
provided the basis for a rapidly increasing - although not steady -
influx of guest workers. Table 6.3 shows the growing numbers of the
respective foreign workers after the dates of the contracts. The table
also reflects the mild reduction due to the economic recession in 1967-
68, the stronger cuts after the ending of recruitment in 1973, and the
effects of financial incentives for foreign workers to return to their home
countries which were temporarily introduced in 1984.
The national contracts were implemented by an elaborate bureau-
cratic procedure for recruitment. No foreigner could simply come to
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Table 6.3. Foreign inhabitants and foreign labor in western Germany
(including West Berlin) by selected nationalities, 1954-91 (thousands).
Foreign Employed persons
Foreign labor Spani- Fonner
Year population total Italians ards Greeks Turks Yugoslavs
1954 481.9 72.9 6.5 0.4 0.5 - 1.8
1955 484.8 79.6 7.5 0.5 0.6 2.1
1956 98.8 18.6 0.7 1.0 - 2.3
1957 - 108.2 19.1 1.0 1.8 2.8
1958 127.1 25.6 1.5 2.8 4.8
1959 166.8 48.8 2.2 4.1 7.3
1960 - 329.4 144.2 16.5 20.8 2.5 8.8
1961 686.1 548.9 224.6 61.8 52.3
1962 711.5 276.8 94.0 80.7 18.6 23.6
1963 828.7 287.0 119.6 116.9 33.0 44.4
1964 985.6 296.1 151.1 154.8 85.2 53.1
1965 1,216.8 372.2 182.8 187.2 132.8 64.1
1966 1,313.5 391.3 178.2 194.6 161.0 96.7
1967 1,806.7 991.3 266.8 118.0 140.3 131.3 95.7
1968 1,924.2 1,089.9 304.0 115.9 144.7 152.9 119.1
1969 2,381.1 1,501.4 349.0 143.1 191.2 244.3 265.0
1970 2,976.5 1,949.0 381.8 171.7 242.2 353.9 423.2
1971 3,438.7 2,240.8 408.0 186.6 268.7 453.1 478.3
1972 3,526.6 2,352.4 426.4 184.2 270.1 511.1 474.9
1973 3,966.2 2,595.0 450.0 190.0 250.0 605.0 535.0
1974 4,127.4 2,286.6 331.5 149.7 229.2 606.8 466.7
1975 4,089.6 2,038.8 292.4 124.5 196.2 543.3 415.9
1976 3,948.3 1,920.9 279.1 107.6 173.1 521.0 387.2
1977 3,948.3 1,888.6 281.2 100.3 162.5 517.5 377.2
1978 3,981.1 1,869.3 288.6 92.6 146.8 514.7 369.5
1979 4,143.8 1,933.6 300.4 89.9 140.1 540.4 367.3
1980 4,450.0 2,070.0 309.2 86.5 132.9 591.8 357.4
1981 4,629.7 1,929.7 291.1 81.8 123.8 580.9 340.6
1982 4,666.9 1,809.0 261.0 76.8 116.4 564.6 320.3
1983 4,534.9 1,713.6 238.9 72.3 108.8 540.5 305.9
1984 4,363.6 1,592.6 214.1 67.4 98.0 499.9 288.8
1985 4,378.9 1,583.9 202.4 67.4 102.9 499.3 293.5
1986 4,512.7 1,591.5 193.4 65.9 101.6 513.1 294.8
1987 4,240.5 1,588.9 181.7 64.0 100.9 518.4 292.1
1988 4,489.1 1,624.1 178.0 63.1 98.8 533.8 295.5
1989 4,845.9 1,689.3 178.9 61.6 101.7 561.8 300.9
1990 5,241.8 1,782.6 175.2 61.3 105.5 594.6 313.0
1991 1,898.5 171.8 60.7 105.2 632.3 325.3
1992 2,036.2 165.0 54.9 102.8 652.1 375.1
Sources: Herbert (1986:188-9, Table 16); Statistisches Bundesamt, Jahresberichle; Bundesanstalt
fUr Arbeit (1991).
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Germany and look for a job. German employers had to take the ini-
tiative using two alternative official channels - both via the German
labor market authorities - to hire foreign workers. Because there was
no general scarcity but only structural deficits of labor, the recruitment
of foreign workers operated quite selectively. Although some firms
tried to hire people with specific skills, the most important criteria used
by the officials of the German employment services established in the
respective countries were: expected productivity, health, and political
clearance (Dohse, 1981: 188f).
As a rule, a permit to work and stay in Germany was granted for
one year only and was restricted to a specific job and local community.
The administration had considerable powers of discretion on whether
or not to extend a permit. Because of increased flexibility, time limits
were gradually relaxed: the principle of forced rotation after two years'
stay (included in the contract with Turkey) was abandoned as early as
1964. In addition, in 1971 foreigners who worked in Germany for more
than five years were able to claim special work permits (valid for a
further five years). These steps considerably diminished the regulatory
power of the guest-worker concept and may be interpreted as a political
compromise to take into account the gradual adaptation of the foreign
workers' attitudes and aspirations to "indigenous" standards after several
years in Germany (Dohse, 1981: 305).
The ending of recruitment abroad - decided in 1973 in view of the
growing labor market crisis in Germany - did not lead to an exodus of
the guest workers, as the figures in Table 6.3 indicate. It is not surprising
that most of the foreign workers did not "go home" even when financial
incentives were offered in 1983. The economic and social prospects
in their countries of origin were not too bright. In fact, the ending
of recruitment contributed to clarifying the biographical intentions of
foreign workers in Germany, many of whom then decided to resettle
other family members from their country of origin.
In retrospect, the guest-worker policy turned out to be a mixed
blessing. The existence of a docile and cheap work force from abroad
kept the German wage levels in some branches fairly low and reduced
the necessity to rearrange the structure of wages. Foreign labor allowed
the continuation of poor working conditions, and to some extent even
a deterioration in conditions, such as in factories with assembly-line
work, piece work, shift work, and night work (Dohse, 1981: 226). In
other words, the guest-worker policy supported growth but delayed the
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Table 6.4. Foreign and German employees according to skill status,
1989 (%).
Unskilled workers
Semiskilled workers
Skilled workers; supervisors
Clerks
Self-employed
Public servants
Source: Seifert (1991: Table I).
Foreigners
21
43
23
9
4
Germans
4
12
16
46
12
10
modernization of the structure of industries, especially a quicker shift to
a service economy. With respect to social dimensions, foreign workers
- by filling the lowest strata of the employment spectrum - assisted
the indirect upward mobility of their German colleagues. Despite some
progress to the benefit of foreigners the segmented labor market was still
reflected in the statistics of the late 1980s, as Table 6.4 demonstrates.
Moreover, the detrimental aspects concerning the development of
female participation in employment cannot be overlooked. The recruit-
ment of foreign labor substituted for an increase in gainfully employed
German women (as mentioned above), thus helping to preserve existing
family structures.
More than 25 years after the introduction of the guest-worker policy,
the foreign labor force is now fairly well integrated both economically
and socially. Some 50% of the foreign labor force comes from other EU
member states (Spain, Italy, Greece, etc.), which means they have the
right to stay and work. The situation of the two largest groups, the labor
migrants from Turkey (33%) and former Yugoslavia (13%), is worst,
even though many of them have stayed in Germany long enough to
claim a better protected status in terms of employment, social security,
and residence.
6.4 Asylum Seekers
For several years the most heated public debates in Germany concerning
migration have focused on asylum seekers. The number of asylum
seekers increased considerably in the late 1980s: from 103,000 in 1988
to 438,000 in 1992. The reasons for this development are complex:
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• The constitution of the FRG contained a very liberal provision con-
cerning the right to asylum. Germany is attractive because it has one
of the most prosperous economies in Europe.
• After the ending of the guest-worker policy in 1973, there has been
(until recently) no other "ticket" to enter the German labor market.
• Some centers of recent political crisis are located close to Germany
so that the country is more directly affected by the human victims.
In 1991, for example, almost 30% of asylum seekers were former
Yugoslavs.
Even when the constitutional phrasing of the right to asylum was
rather liberal the administrative procedures were highly restrictive, with
the result that less than 10% of the applicants were successful. The
majority of those whose claims were refused could stay in the country,
but for several years (until the legislation was changed in 1991) they were
not allowed to take up paid work. This exclusion was introduced with
the aim of discouraging so-called economic refugees and of protecting
the German labor force. As a consequence, all these people had to
rely on social welfare, which placed a heavy burden on the communal
budgets that had to provide the resources. Furthermore, this regulation
had a negative impact on the attitudes of German locals toward the
asylum seekers.
In view of the large numbers of Aussiedler and of new guest workers
actively recruited from Central and Eastern Europe (see Section 6.5), the
heated public discussion on the right to asylum can be interpreted as one
of evasion. But the 1992 figure also indicates that there might be a ca-
pacity problem. In 1993 mounting public pressure led to an amendment
of the German constitution to restrict the chances of successful appli-
cations for asylum. In practice, those who enter the country by land
are no longer entitled to claim asylum, since they must have crossed at
least one neighboring country. All neighboring countries are regarded
as "safe countries" since they are signatories to the Geneva Convention.
In addition, a so-called "positive list" has been drawn up of all countries
where human rights appear to be respected. Thus would-be refugees
from either a country on the positive list or another "safe" country are
denied access to the formal asylum procedure.
Much less public attention has been focused on another recent change
concerning the status of asylum seekers: they may now apply for work
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pennits directly upon arrival. This amendment reflects the experience
that blocking access to the official labor market results in the growth of
illegal employment. Moreover, the structural mismatches in the labor
market were regarded or expected to be serious enough to allow for
additional labor with few demands on working conditions.
6.5 New Guest Workers
Another indication that German labor market authorities are looking for
additional flexible labor is the "new" guest-worker policy. [2] Starting in
the late 1980s and more systematically pursued since 1990, the German
Labor Administration has signed contracts with East European countries
that open up three channels for limited access of foreign workers to the
German labor market. All three are based on the principle of forced
rotation, but have different target groups; two of the contracts fix quotas.
• Project-tied employment: This is the legal basis for foreign subcon-
tractors. Maximum numbers per year for (as a rule skilled) workers
are set and work permits are given for two years. The German
standards concerning wages and social security are obligatory. In
October 1992, 70% of the 116,000 foreign workers who entered
Germany with this "ticket" were employed in the building sector.
About half of the foreign employees who entered under project-tied
employment arrangements came from Poland.
• Guest-worker contracts: The aim is to further the vocational and
linguistic competences of workers from East European countries and
workers from Germany wishing to work in East European countries.
The length of stay is limited to one year. The annual quotas set at
500 to 1,000 (depending on the country) have not been used fully,
except for Hungary. Not a single German has applied so far. Until
October 1992 a total of 4,543 contracts had been signed, 40% in
construction and 30% in the metal industry.
• Seasonal workers: Foreign workers can receive German work per-
mits for up to three months at the initiative of a German employer.
The working conditions (wages, insurance) must meet local stan-
dards and housing facilities must be adequate. In 1992, 212,000
work pennits were issued (mainly in agriculture, hotels and restau-
rants, show business, and the building sector). The fact that 98%
of the applications were made for specific individuals indicates that
this was mainly a way of legalizing formerly illegal workers.
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Altogether, about 330,000 new foreign workers entered the German
labor market using these three regulations in 1992. This development
went practically unnoticed until recently. The stage on which the new
guest-worker policy is set differs substantially from the old one, and not
only with regard to the principle of forced rotation. More fundamen-
tally, the whole political and economic landscape has changed. After the
collapse of the socialist regimes and in the context of painful economil:
restructuring processes in Middle and Eastern Europe, considerable mi-
gratory movements were anticipated, so that opening up "doors" to the
German labor market seems to be a good tactic in a number of respects.
Vis-a-vis the East European countries it may be interpreted as a sign of
good intentions, while at home, it is a kind of symbolic policy pretend-
ing that even radical international transformations can be successfully
managed by small adjustments.
6.6 Socioeconomic Crisis, Control Strategies,
and Xenophobia
Starting in 1990 but sharply increasing since 1991, a wave of aggressive
acts of racism has emerged in Germany in both the old and new Lander.
Politicians and "conventional wisdom" argue that there is a direct cor-
relation between the number of inflowing foreigners and xenophobia.
However, there is no direct relationship; empirical research gives ev-
idence that racism can develop even without a single foreigner in the
country. Xenophobia is a social dynamic that is generated in times of
social and/or political crisis. People are eager to find and accept simple
relations of cause and effect that lie beyond their own responsibility.
Such stereotyping produces both underdogs and the illusion that the
crisis can be easily managed.
Germany is facing enormous political, economic, and social prob-
lems. Irrespective of political unification, there are still two societies.
Apart from the enormous task of economic restructuring, the processes
of social integration are painful - and unexpectedly so. These problems
are too delicate to be handled openly, so the tensions are covered and are
projected onto "others": foreigners in general and the asylum seekers in
particular.
Representatives of all parties have condemned the aggression against
foreigners, but the lengthy and acrimonious public debate on how to
restrict the constitutional right to asylum has undoubtedly contributed
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to the xenophobia. The message has been that if it is legitimate to assign
an inferior legal status to "foreigners", then more general discrimination
may be justified. A nation in economic and social crisis looks for
scapegoats.
6.7 Conclusions
Germany has benefited enormously from the influx of labor for almost
five decades since the end of World War II. German political author-
ities have created the institutions and regulations necessary to use the
newcomers as a flexible reserve, alleviating or preventing political, eco-
nomic, and social tensions. This was fairly easy as far as people of
different nationality were concerned because Germany could resort to
a long tradition with the political concept of "foreigner". During some
periods ethnic Germans from East European countries were used as
functional equivalents. Giving the different waves of inflowing workers
different labels - and never calling them immigrants - is part of the
political power play in which Germany is and always has been one of
the most potent actors. The declaration to be and to remain a nonim-
migrant country indicates that Germany shuts its eyes to the demands
of the global transformations. Using the labor resources of other coun-
tries at low wages and offering small concessions in return will not
work forever, however. Tactics are no longer enough; strategies are
needed. Even generous migration policies will be inadequate to cope
successfully with the challenges of the future. Attempts to continue
with restrictive control strategies or even to sharpen them will hardly be
successful but may provoke unintended results, such as the recent rise
of xenophobia.
Notes
[1] By definition, Gennan emigrants from the former GDR were called Obersiedler, while
ethnic Gennans from outside Germany (both the FRG and the former GDR) are called
Aussiedler (resettlers). The Aussiedlerstatus, defined by the German constitution on the
basis of historical and ethnic considerations, can be claimed by all persons (as well as
their descendants and close family members) who lived within the borders of Germany
before 1938--45, by those who were German citizens in 1939--45 but lived outside these
borders, and by other ethnic Germans living in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the
former Soviet Union.
[2] I wish to thank Andrea Fischer who contributed careful information and comments full
of insight to Section 6.5.
Chapter 7
Economic and Social Aspects of
Immigration into Switzerland
Thomas Straubhaar and Peter A. Fischer
7.1 Historical Background
Until the end of the nineteenth century Switzerland was fairly poor and
underdeveloped, and a country of emigration.[l] But things changed
rapidly at the tum of the century, when the process of industrializa-
tion and building a basic infrastructure turned out to be highly labor-
intensive. The construction of the long railway tunnels through the Alps
was not only a challenge to engineers at that time, but also one of the
first occasions where workers were recruited abroad.[2]
During World War II, the foreign population in Switzerland fell
sharply to reach its lowest point in 1941 with 224,000 foreigners or 5.2%
of the population. But after the war, while all surrounding countries
suffered serious economic postwar consequences, Switzerland's rela-
tively unaffected economy recovered quickly. Moreover, the country's
advanced financial markets, political stability, legislation safeguarding
investors, and the Swiss propensity to save ensured an extensive and
cheap supply of capital. Switzerland has long been known for its low
real interest rates, a feature that is still valid in part today (GEeD, 199Ia).
Switzerland has a highly capital-oriented economy with corresponding
high labor productivity and a structural shortage of domestic labor.[3]
The share of foreigners living in Switzerland has risen quickly since
1945. In the early 1960s, the number of foreign nationals living in
127
128 Thomas Straubhaar and Peter A. Fischer
Switzerland approached 1 million (equaling 16.7% of the total popula-
tion in 1965) and fears that that the country would be "flooded" with
immigrants started to manifest themselves in strong political pressure.
At the end of the 1960s, six public referendums were held on proposals
by xenophobic groups to change the Swiss constitution to drastically
reduce the number of foreigners living in Switzerland.[4] Although all
of the proposals were rejected by an increasing majority ofSwiss voters,
the political pressure they created exerted a decisive influence on the
development of Swiss migration policy.
7.2 Migration to Switzerland: Trends and Features
In 1963 Switzerland started to introduce a restrictive immigration pol-
icy, but the number of foreigners continued to increase steadily until it
reached a first maximum in 1973, when 1.25 million foreign nationals
were living in Switzerland. After the first oil price shock Switzerland,
like all other Western countries, was hit by a severe economic crisis. For-
eign employment fell by 251,000 (28%) within four years from 894,000
in 1973 to 643,000 in 1977. From 1979 on it started rising again at a
moderate pace, increasing in speed during the the economic boom in the
late 1980s. Although, as elsewhere, the economic climate has worsened
in Switzerland, most recent data on foreign employment available still
show an increasing tendency. In August 1991, 1,284,928 foreigners
(including so-called seasonal workers) were living in Switzerland, and
the number of foreign employees amounted to 989,457 or 27.8% of the
labor force. Actually, this share for the first time passed the former
peak of 1972, when foreign employment amounted to 27.4% of total
employment (and afterward decreased to 21.2% in 1977).
Another feature is the changing composition of foreigners living
in Switzerland by type of permit (Figure 7.1). In 1965, 19.4% of all
foreign nationals were permanent residents and 58.5% held one-year
residence permits. In 1979, the ratio was just about reversed: 62.7%
were permanent residents, and only 19.6% held one-year permits. Of all
others (short permits for special objectives excluded), 9% were seasonal
workers, 8.5% commuters living in neighboring countries, and only
0.2% of all foreign nationals or 1,882 were asylum seekers. In 1990,
the share of asylum seekers had risen to 2.5% (35,836 persons), that of
frontier workers to 12.5%, and the foreign workers' share had remained
about constant at 8.5%. The majority of denizens or de facto denizens
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Figure 7.1. Foreigners and foreign labor in Switzerland 1965-91.
Sources: Bundesamt fUr Statistik (1990); Federal Aliens Office; Federal
Office for Refugee Questions, Bern; DECO, various publications and
personal communication.
still consisted of permanent residents (57.7%), and only 18.8% were
one-year permit holders.[5] No data are available on the number of
short-term permits that were issued in 1990.
There are various explanations for the change in the structure of
foreigners. One hypothesis is that, with the introduction of the first
restrictions, the possibility of entering Switzerland after once having
left it became increasingly uncertain, so that many preferred to stay and
become permanent residents (in general, after five years of uninterrupted
residence). The same could be observed with the increasing number
of seasonal workers trying to obtain one-year permits. The second
hypothesis is that, until recently, Switzerland handled its naturalization
policy very restrictively. Thus, the "natural" decrease in the stock of
foreigners with permanent residence (denizens) from naturalization was
almost negligible (l.l % in 1988). A third hypothesis is that the fall in
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Figure 7.2. Origins of foreign labor in Switzerland, 1991.
foreign employment due to the oil price shock affected mainly one-year
permit holders and seasonal workers.
The relative stability of the size of foreign population affected the
average age structure, in that it approached the age structure of natives.
As a matter of fact, new immigrant workers showed a much more favor-
able age distribution (i.e., a strong bias toward youth) than foreigners
already living in Switzerland, who showed features very similar to those
of Swiss nationals. Due to this, the foreign population in Switzerland
lost one key feature (the bias toward youth and healthy persons) regarded
as one of the most positive effects of migration in traditional literature.
As far as the origin of the foreign population in Switzerland is con-
cerned, a majority of foreign nationals in Switzerland were and still are
citizens of the European Union. The distribution by nationality shows
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the regional patterns clearly (see Figure 7.2). Most foreign workers
emigrated from neighboring countries, particularly from Italy: in 1980,
42% of all foreign workers were Italians and about four out of five were
EU citizens. The corresponding share of EFTA countries was 4.3%,
mostly Austrians. Until 1991, the picture changed only slightly. As
Italy enjoyed more favorable economic development, new workers for
simple jobs were no longer found in Italy, but in the southern European
countries such as Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and former Yugoslavia. Nev-
ertheless, in 1991 still 72.6% of all foreigners in Switzerland were EU
citizens, the share of EFTA citizens remained constant at 4.3%, while
the share of workers from Turkey and former Yugoslavia increased from
13.8% in 1980 to 18.7%. From the previous section we know that immi-
gration from outside (Western) Europe was in principle not accepted, so
this is the most important explanation for the low share ofnon-EUlEFTA
citizens.
Some 70% of all employed foreign nationals were males. Differ-
ences can be found according to the type of employment (see Figure
7.3). While in 1970 some 40% of all working denizens were female
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(34.2% in 1991), the corresponding share among seasonal workers was
only 10% (18% in 1991). Even more significant are the sex differ-
ences according to branches of employment. While in 1991 96% of all
foreigners employed in domestic work and 74% in public health were
female, 98% of all foreign construction workers were men.
The majority of foreigners in Switzerland still work in poorly quali-
fied jobs. In 1991 the majority of foreign employment was concentrated
in the metal industry (19%), construction (16%), the hotel and restaurant
business (11 %), public health (6%), and textiles and clothing manufac-
turing (3%). From 1970 to 1991, a shift from industry and trade to the
service sector could be observed. In 1970, 63% of foreign employment
was in industry and 31 % in services, compared with 51 % and 47%,
respectively, in 1991.
7.3 Swiss Immigration Policy:
Design and Development
In Switzerland, immigration was and still is perceived mainly as a
tool of labor-market policy, to recruit foreign labor demanded by the
Swiss labor market. Foreigners were regarded as guests coming to
Switzerland to work for money on a temporary basis only. The basic
assumption underlying the Swiss (labor) immigration policy was the
rotation principle. Intensive immigration flows were expected to ensure
that the foreigners living in Switzerland would be adaptable to changing
labor-market demands, thus increasing overall labor-market flexibility.
In the Swiss constitution, the national parliament and government are
considered responsible for legislation on immigration, emigration, and
residence of foreigners in Switzerland, and the cantons (provinces) for
the administrative decision making. The basic law on Swiss immigra-
tion ("Bundesgesetz tiber Aufenthalt und Niederlassung der Auslander",
ANAG), which dates back to 1931, and is still in force today, states the
principal duties of foreigners in Switzerland, but leaves the task of spec-
ifying the aims and tools of migration policy to the federal government
and national administrative bodies. In reality, until the early 1960s,
everyone who found ajob was allowed to work, but with the expansion
of foreign employment in the 1960s, domestic labor organizations and
unions started to worry that the situation was getting out of control. In
1963 political pressure led to the introduction of a restrictive policy for
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the foreign population in Switzerland.[6] The 1963 policy measures
focused on individual enterprises and set limits on the share of foreign
workers each company could employ. Actually, they mainly produced
incentives for foreign workers to change to companies with a previ-
ously low share of foreign labor. In spite of several additional attempts
to make the company-focused policy even more restrictive, total for-
eign employment continued to grow. In 1970 the foreign population in
Switzerland reached 18.2%, and 26.2% of all employees were foreign-
ers. A proposal by xenophobic groups to change the Swiss constitution
in order to bring the foreign population down to 10% of the total popu-
lation was only narrowly rejected by Swiss voters after the government
promised to change its immigration policy again.
In March 1970, the Swiss Federal Council of Ministers decided to
change to a centrally administered control system for the foreign pop-
ulation. [7] It was supposed to stabilize the share of foreign population
by fixing the number of new permits issued to foreigners entering the
country every year. This number reflected the desired volume of for-
eign population minus foreigners already resident in the country, plus
foreigners leaving. Every year, within these defined margins, the central
labor authority fixed quotas for new entries to each of Switzerland's 25
cantons and a national quota for special tasks. Now the labor authorities
in the districts and in Bern could decide on employers' applications to is-
sue work permits to foreigners. Very often, however, the actual decision
making in the districts was handed over to advisory councils, in which
representatives of employers' organizations, union syndicates, politi-
cal parties, and the administration tried to safeguard their respective
interests.
The decision to issue a work permit to a foreigner had to follow
several additional guidelines. In principle, immigration was restricted to
Europeans, although exceptions were made for key North American and
Japanese personnel. Permits could be authorized only if the employment
of a foreigner corresponded to an evidently urgent labor need, improved
the structure of a regional labor market, or suited the overall business
policy.
Alongside these more or less explicit tasks of the Swiss foreign
labor-market policy there was a general consensus that employment pri-
ority should be given to Swiss natives. This restrictive policy, which
is still in force, has turned foreign employment policy in Switzerland
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into an increasingly restricted bargaining process among the adminis-
tration, employers, and interest groups. Apart from the stabilization
task, structural, regional, and political interests were mixed up with
business-related targets. As Dhima (1991) has pointed out, exponents
of sheltered local businesses were most active and successful in procur-
ing for themselves a cheap labor supply, while international businesses
seemed to be reluctant and preferred to move their production abroad.
Once a permit was issued, labor-market policy was very passive. Lit-
tle attention was paid to the interests of the foreigners themselves, who
were supposed to be happy for being allowed to work in Switzerland.
Although inaccurate, the common assumption was that all foreigners
not married to Swiss nationals would be temporary guests only, so that
almost no measures were taken to support integration into the domestic
society (there are, for example, government-financed language courses
for asylum seekers, but for no other category of foreigners).
For a better understanding of the mechanisms and outcome of the
Swiss foreign employment control system, the five kinds of permits
are briefly explained below: permits for permanent residence, one-year
residence permits, permits for seasonal work, work permits for frontier
workers, and short-term permits for special objectives.
Formally, denizens in Switzerland should consist of holders of per-
manent residence permits only, although a large percentage of persons
with one-year residence permits must be regarded as de facto denizens.
They are distinguished from permanent residence holders through cer-
tain restrictions on the freedom to change employers and ownership
of real estate. They have to apply for new permits every year, but in
general this is merely a formality. Although they are legally considered
to be temporary labor migrants, experience shows that many of those
with one-year residence permits are in fact just waiting for the right to
obtain permanent residence permits after 5-10 years of uninterrupted
residence (the difference depending on nationality). Residence permit
holders are treated on equal terms with Swiss citizens, except that they
do not have the right to vote.
Seasonal permits are issued to workers employed in businesses that
are affected by seasonal fluctuations (in restaurants and hotels in the
mountains, ski resort maintenance, and so on). Seasonal workers are
allowed to stay in the country for a maximum of nine months within any
one year, and they have no right to change jobs or to bring spouses or
other family members with them. However, due to political pressure,
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seasonal workers are now entitled to obtain one-year residence permits
after working in Switzerland for four consecutive seasons of nine months
each.
Frontier workers are persons living outside Switzerland within a
geographically defined border area. Their right to work in Switzerland
is conditionally linked to daily commuting, i.e., they have to return home
every evening. Frontier workers are not subject to the control system,
and neither are holders of short-term permits for special objectives.
7.4 Effects of Immigration to Switzerland
In this section we discuss the most important effects of immigration to
Switzerland compared with the original intentions of Swiss immigration
policy and their social implications.
7.4.1 Effects of immigration compared with original
policy intentions
The original intention of Swiss immigration policy was to stabilize the
share of foreign population. Secondary goals were to satisfy labor-
market needs, to improve business policy, and to induce positive struc-
tural effects for the different Swiss regions.
Referring to the first goal (to stabilize the foreign population), the
introduction of the restrictions did not have any obvious effect on the
development of the number of foreigners living in Switzerland. The
policy may have somewhat curbed actual immigration into Switzerland,
but if the aim of stabilizing the share of foreign employment in total
employment is taken as an absolute criterion, the policy has failed. In
fact, this share continued to rise consistently until the first oil price shock,
and again from 1977 until today. Indeed, it seems that the development
of foreign labor, despite the many employment regulations, was mainly
driven by the global labor market performance.
The second and third goals were to satisfy labor market needs and
to improve business policy. Having just noted that Swiss foreign em-
ployment has been following labor-market trends, our hypothesis is
that though politically administered, the intensity of immigration to
Switzerland has been determined by factors of pure economic demand.
However, the political bargaining system for the distribution of work
permits has undoubtedly had some disturbing overall effects.
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Probably most important, the administrative restrictions applied in
the immigration policy have hampered the efficient allocation of foreign
labor in Switzerland. From the point of view of international economics,
(free) labor mobility should guarantee an efficient allocation of natural
resources. But the more a labor market is controlled, the greater are
the possibilities of distorting this allocation. As described earlier, im-
migration policy in Switzerland concentrated first on the distribution of
foreign labor within the country, and not on the efficient allocation of
foreign employment.
In a recent study, Dhima (1991) analyzed employment patterns of
foreign workers who immigrated to Switzerland in 1981 and stayed until
1989. In brief, he showed that 66% of all long-term immigrants (i.e.,
those who were still in Switzerland in 1989) had entered the country as
seasonal workers, and 47% of all seasonal workers had started a "career"
to obtain a permanent residence permit. Because the demand for simple
work in the mountain areas was especially efficient in the political
bargaining process determining the issue of permits, the majority of
seasonal workers had to do unqualified work in agriculture, construction,
hotels and restaurants, or public health. But after having obtained a
one-year residence permit, they left the mountains and moved into more
demanding jobs in industry, banking, insurance companies, the chemical
industry, transport, or trade (see Figure 7.4).
Of course, to force people to work in jobs that do not suit their
qualifications is a poor allocation of labor resources. [8] The inefficient
allocation of labor seems in fact to override the economic gains from
the reallocation of labor. This is because, on the one hand, workers
are not employed according to their potential abilities and, on the other,
the cheap supply of labor hampered structural adjustment within certain
business sectors and led to a weakening of their competitiveness.
In economic theory, many scholars, referring to Lewis (1954), con-
sider foreign employment to be a kind of "growth machine" for devel-
oped economies. They argue that since immigration can provide an
abundant supply of labor, it should check wage increases and allow sur-
pluses to be used for capital accumulation, inducing future growth and
(in combination with increasing economies of scale) productivity gains.
Other theorists (the so-called structural pessimists) find just the opposite
to be true. They suppose that cheap labor costs eliminate the most im-
portant incentives for rationalization, thus leading to lower productivity
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(more comprehensive surveys of theoretical arguments on growth and
structural effects of migration may be found in Tuchtfeldt, 1978, and
Blattner et at., 1985).
The Swiss experience supports the structural pessimists' hypothe-
sis. In Swiss sectors employing a high percentage of cheap foreign
labor we systematically find companies with below average productiv-
ity. Schwarz (1988) tried to isolate the macroeconomic effects of foreign
employment in Switzerland by means ofeconometrics and with a simple
macroeconomic model. He estimated the contribution of foreign and
domestic labor, of capital, and of technological innovations to the aver-
age annual economic growth and productivity increase in Switzerland
between 1962 and 1986. It is no longer a surprise that the positive and
negative economic growth effects of foreign employment have finally
roughly neutralized each other in Switzerland, and the real growth of the
GDP per capita can mainly be explained by technological innovations
and improved use of capital (see Schwarz, 1988: 136-40).
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Thus it can be stated that the second goal was also not achieved. The
restrictions produced an ineffective allocation that overrode the eco-
nomic gains. The third and fourth goals also do not seem to have been
fulfilled. During the oil price recession (1973-77) total foreign employ-
ment fell by 251,000, or 7% of total employment in 1977. The number
of denizens remained almost constant and unemployment continued at a
very low level (with a maximum of 0.7% in 1976); it seems that Switzer-
land "exported" its unemployment. Later, however, this mechanism did
not work the same way. The reaction of foreign employment to the (less
intensive) slump of the 1980s was only very moderate, and from 1990
until the present there has been no such reaction.
The introduction of the restrictive policy increased the risk that a
foreigner would lose the opportunity of employment in Switzerland for
ever if he emigrated. It created additional noneconomic incentives to
stay in the same place and work for the right to obtain a better category
of work permit. Thus, the structure of foreign employment by permit
category changed, and the flexibility of the labor markets suffered. Fol-
lowing the stabilization criteria of Swiss immigration policy described
in Section 7.2, in 1988, the number of work permits available for re-
issue (excluding the natural decrease in the number of foreign workers
through emigration, naturalization, marriage, and other demographic
changes, and including the natural increase through the birth of children
to foreign nationals, family reunions, and the transformation of seasonal
into annual permits) would have been as low as 13,145, or 2.16% of the
total foreign community. In fact, 37,880 permits were issued (data from
Dhima, 1991: 76). Thus it appears that the effect of Swiss immigration
policy was actually to reduce the flexibility of employment policy rather
than to increase labor market flexibility.
Up to now, the impact of migration on business cycles in the 1970s
has been depicted as mainly positive. However, in an analysis of eco-
nomic effects of foreign employment, Schwarz (1988: 151-6) finds
strong evidence to support the hypothesis that the sharp fall in foreign
employment was one major reason for the severity of the recession of
the 1970s in Switzerland (see Figure 7.5). Compared with other Euro-
pean economies, Switzerland suffered the longest and most pronounced
fall in economic growth rates.[9] Schwarz explains this in two ways.
First, he argues that the departure of foreigners caused a reduction in
domestic consumption that hurt the Swiss economy more than unem-
ployment would have done (for a discussion of the effects of migration
Economic and Social Aspects of Immigration into Switzerland 139
_ Foreign labor (% of total employment) ~",.
T """"IIi' .",,-"-
, ---~-
--
- - --~- - - - .... _.- -- --f- ,.
-
-f-
Employment index
-..
--
Newly immigrated foreign labor
"",......., "- I
-
./.....~ ~
,...,...
V~ ./~~ ~~........ ~ ....-.. v.: ~- -~Real GDP growth _b.!. -- - -\ If I(' Unemployment rate/
. • •
30
20
'"c
0
0-
><
"
10
"0
:;
~
0
-10
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Figure 7.5. Foreign employment and business cycles in Switzerland,
1965-91. Sources: Authors' calculations using data from the Swiss
Central Aliens Office, Bern, and OECD.
on domestic demand see Tuchtfeldt, 1978). Second, as discussed in
Section 7.3, foreign employment veiled structural adjustment deficits
of the Swiss economy that were corrected only when they had already
become pronounced.
7.4.2 Social implications
There is little quantitative evidence on the social effects of immigration
on Switzerland. Qualitatively, however, it seems clear that the rather
large foreign employment rate in Switzerland has had at least three
socioeconomic effects.
1. Above all, unqualified immigrants from southern Europe who ac-
cepted employment in simple jobs caused a certain stratification of
the Swiss labor market. Because "dirty" jobs were done by foreign-
ers, poorly qualified Swiss citizens could improve their labor-market
positions during periods of economic growth, but in times of reces-
sion they had to compete for work with foreign labor. Consequently,
social attitudes toward foreigners depended very much on overall
economic performance.[lO]
2. Because foreign workers were considered to be short-term guests
only, the public welfare system was not at all prepared to deal with
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the needs of the increasing numbers of workers who intended (and
managed) to stay in Switzerland with their families. As practically
no public integration assistance was organized and foreign residents
were drawn to the location of certain employers, primary schools
suddenly found themselves confronted with large percentages of
pupils unable to speak and understand the native languages. If such
pupils stayed for two or three years only, things got even worse.
Public investment in education had to be made, but this never ap-
peared as foreign labor costs. Swiss parents felt that their children's
education was being endangered by the foreign population, and the
potential for social tensions grew.
3. The requirement that (above all male) foreign workers had to stay
in the country for nine months without their spouses caused con-
siderable psychological stress and family disintegration. Indeed,
foreigners' inclination to commit rape and crimes of violence seems
to have been significantly higher than that of the native population.
In 1986, for example, foreigners represented 16.5% of the total pop-
ulation, and they committed 46.1 % of all rapes and 42.1 % of all
homicides. Rape and crimes of violence were especially common
among young male foreigners of low social strata living in urban
areas (Kunz, 1989).[11]
Swiss nationals are generally aware of the positive economic effects
of foreign employment and normally do not have a negative attitude
toward foreigners. But over time, the lives of "colored" foreigners and
foreigners with non-European habits or with non-Christian religions
became complicated, as they did elsewhere. Although in Switzerland
the number of asylum seekers never reached the same level as foreign
workers, most emotions and intense political discussion on the presence
of foreigners in general arose from those applying for political asylum.
In conclusion, in Switzerland we may note that as economic con-
ditions worsen, the observable tensions caused by foreign employment
increase; the foreigners appear "stranger" to the natives; and fewer
measures are taken to support the social integration of individuals into
society.[12]
7.5 Rethinking Swiss Immigration Policy
In recent years Swiss immigration policy has faced several challenges
that have caused changes in the general settings and have induced a
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process of rethinking that has finally led to a fundamental reorientation
of Swiss immigration policy.
7.5.1 New challenges
As in most other highly developed European countries, in Switzerland
there has been a steady decline in fertility. Without immigration (net
migration balance of zero) the Swiss population is expected to decrease
during the next half century by 17% from 6.8 million in 1993 to 5.6
million in 2040. The working-age population (15-60) would decrease
from 62% of the total population in 1993 to 54% in 2040 (Straubhaar
and Luthi, 1990). Obviously, such a decrease would create considerable
problems for the Swiss economy, as well as for the maintenance of the
Swiss social-security system.[13]
With a few underlying simplified assumptions, the population growth
and the changing age structure of the population during the next 50
years has been estimated for Switzerland under three different scenarios
(Straubhaar and Luthi, 1990). A restrictive scenario with no migration
or an annual net migration of zero was compared with an expansive
scenario with a net migration surplus of 50,000 immigrants every year.
In between, a liberalization scenario was estimated, in which the sudden
abolition of immigration restrictions first causes a backlog immigration
surplus of 50,000 per year, and then drops to an equilibrium annual
surplus of 20,000 after 10 years. In all three cases there is still a
moderate increase in the total population until the year 2000. But
while in the restrictive scenario the total population later declines to 5.6
million by 2040, an upward slope reaching 8.7 million was estimated
for the expansive scenario. The liberalization scenario brought about
an increase in Swiss population by about 500,000 until 2010, followed
by negative growth rates after 2020, ending with an overall surplus of
200,000 inhabitants in 2040 as compared with 1993.
This is in no way to say that immigration would solve Switzerland's
demographic problems; it might only change the country's dynamic
appearance. Nevertheless, thinking about the demographic challenge
facing Switzerland has influenced the discussion on immigration issues.
Above all, it has stimulated thinking about the previously unreflected
problems that a highly restrictive migration policy could generate.
The second challenge is represented by European integration and the
political changes in the East European countries. The Swiss economy
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has for a long time been economically very dependent on other West
European countries. In 1989, 78% of its imports originated in EU
and EFfA countries, and 63% of exports were directed to this area.
For exports from the EU, Switzerland was the second most important
trading partner after the USA, and for imports it was third after USA
and Japan (Hauser, 1991).[14]
Politically, however, the Swiss perceive their country as a sort of
island in stormy European waters. For a long time, the main concepts
in Swiss foreign policy have been neutrality and political sovereignty.
Meanwhile, the integration of the EU member countries has reached a
degree that is making it increasingly difficult and costly for Switzerland
to remain outside. At the same time, with the disappearance of the War-
saw Pact, Swiss neutrality is losing its original justification. This change
has caused (still ongoing) intensive public discussion and questioning
of Swiss political identity and self-perception. It has become clear that
Switzerland has to find a new role in a renewed Europe and that this pro-
cess will involve intensified (political) integration with other European
countries; this will require basic changes in Swiss immigration policy.
In Switzerland, the challenge of European integration and the cre-
ation of a common European Economic Area (EEA) first caused dis-
tinctive fears of mass immigration. In its first official statement on the
"EU '92 project", the Swiss government quoted the need to liberalize
immigration as one of five major obstacles to Swiss membership of the
EU.[15] But a subsequent closer evaluation of the theoretical aspects
and experiences with free mobility oflabor within the EU or the Nordic
Common Labor Market revealed that free migration between highly de-
veloped economies such as those of the EU is highly unlikely to cause
mass migration, and should improve rather than endanger the func-
tioning of labor markets. Estimates of the migratory consequences of
abolishing immigration restrictions for EU citizens predict an increase
in the migration potential from European countries to Switzerland of
about 100,000 additional immigrants for the decade 1990-2000. But
simultaneously they calculate that immigrants from Third World coun-
tries will be "crowded out", to little more than 100,000 (Straubhaar,
1991b; Dhima, 1991). If these estimates prove to be accurate, the net
migration to Switzerland would decrease slightly from its present level.
The third new challenge is the growing number of asylum seekers.
While in 1970 there were only 1,803 asylum seekers and 3,020 in 1980,
the demand for asylum in Switzerland rose dramatically during the
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1980s, to 41,629 in 1991. Until the 1970s most of the refugees originated
in (East) European countries, those in the 1980s came from further
away and were mainly members of non-European cultures (in 1990,
the principal groups came from Sri Lanka, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and
Angola, whereas in 1990 the most important national group comprised
former Yugoslavs fleeing the war). Today East European states are
regarded as "safe countries", so that the number of asylum seekers from
Eastern Europe and Russia has become negligible. In 1991, 120 persons
from the former Soviet Union applied for asylum in Switzerland, most of
whom were Russian Jews. At present no immigrants from East European
countries are accepted for labor market reasons so that Switzerland is
essentially closed to East Europeans.
The challenge of the Swiss refugee policy has had two basic con-
sequences: first, decision makers became aware that it might become
increasingly difficult to distinguish between refugees fleeing political
persecution and those migrating for economic reasons. It was therefore
proposed to integrate refugees in a more comprehensive migration pol-
icy (BIGA, 1989: 17). Second, it became generally accepted that in
order to oppose rising immigration pressure, more attention should be
paid to the specific causes of the emigration from other countries. A
national immigration (control) policy should in future be accomplished
through measures to reduce migration pressure at the international level.
7.5.2 Reorientation of Swiss immigration policy
With its report on a new refugee and foreigner policy of May 1991 the
Swiss government proposed a radical change in foreign labor-market
policy to a so-called three-circle model (Bundesblatt, 1991: 245; OECD,
1991e). This new approach brings about a fundamental reorientation of
Swiss immigration policy. The administered bargaining system is to be
replaced, by and large, by free mobility of European labor and reliance
on market forces in allocating foreign labor in the Swiss labor market.
Seasonal work permits are to be phased out and replaced by "normal"
residence permits.
In concrete terms, citizens of EU and EFTA countries would be-
long to a "first circle" of foreign labor recruitment and would enjoy
complete freedom to accept jobs in Switzerland. Workers needed for
specific labor-market reasons, but coming from countries that are neither
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ED nor EFTA members (such as traditional recruitment areas, partic-
ularly Turkey, and most likely from East European countries; former
Yugoslavia was excluded from the traditional labor recruitment areas in
1991), would also be included in the inner circle. For these workers
the administrative formalities would be simplified to help them obtain
exceptional rights to work in Switzerland.
All the other applicants from these countries would make up the
middle circle of the three-circle model. However, immigration policy
toward "second country immigrants" would become more restrictive.
All people from states other than those mentioned above would be-
long to the third circle. They would not be allowed to enter Switzerland
for work or residence, although temporary exceptions could be granted,
especially for science, research, teaching mutual education, and devel-
opment assistance purposes.
The granting of asylum is proposed to remain restricted to political
grounds only. To reduce immigration pressure from Eastern Europe, the
CIS, and Third World countries, economic, foreign, and development
aid policies are called upon to initiate specific action at the international
level.
The Swiss government's proposal of May 1991 has so far found
considerable political support. It is now generally assumed that more
qualified and better adapted foreign labor from Europe will crowd out
the less profitable seasonal workers who are employed in Switzerland
today.
7.6 Summarizing Suggestions
Although subject to an increasingly restrictive policy, immigration to
Switzerland after 1945 was determined mainly by demand. The vast
majority of immigrants moved from European countries to Switzerland
for labor-market reasons, and the majority attempted to stay more or
less permanently. Incentives to "work" for more permanent residence
permits hampered labor-market flexibility. The economic benefits of
the reallocation of labor in the restrictively administered foreign labor
system were neutralized by structural inefficiencies of the political and
economic bargaining process that determined the distribution of new
work permits.
Briefly, Swiss immigration policy was confined to the restriction
of immigrants and the distribution of permits. Distributional aspects
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generally dominated allocational efficiency. An artificially cheap labor
supply for certain sectors gave them an edge over their competitors.
While Switzerland continued to suffer from a structural shortage of
highly qualified labor, foreigners were (and to some extent still are)
allowed to immigrate for comparatively poorly qualified jobs. All in
all, the economic benefits of the Swiss labor-market policy remained
insignificant.
The Swiss experience supports the argument that between similarly
developed economies, liberal market solutions for the reallocation of
labor are more effective than administrative bargaining systems for the
distribution of foreign workers. In the absence of large differences in
wealth that would cause mass migration, the allocational gains of in-
creased labor mobility offset distributional losses. From this point of
view, the creation of a common labor market would be the best solution;
furthermore, the larger the scope of such a market, the bigger the po-
tential welfare gains are likely to be. Social implications included, the
market's demand for foreign labor should therefore be met by liberal-
ization of immigration as far as possible. Thus Switzerland's intention
to abolish the foreign worker system and to join a common European
labor market is a step in the right direction.
If additional labor immigration is to be allowed from countries that
do not belong to the same common labor market, quantitative limits
ought to be imposed. In Switzerland, discussion is going on whether to
offer such solutions to Turkey, some East European countries, Croatia,
or Slovenia. The selection and distribution of foreign labor from such
countries should, as far as possible, be left to efficient market mecha-
nisms such as foreign employment taxes or auctions, rather than trying
to regulate it by administrative or political processes. The revenue
raised through such instruments could, for example, be used to reduce
migration potential in countries of origin and to share the benefits of
migration more equitably (an interesting proposal for the design of such
a system has been made by Majava, 1991).
The rotation principle of the Swiss foreign worker system and the
lack of a public policy to support the social integration of foreigners
in Switzerland has led to real economic and social costs. Attempts to
actively shape structural or regional policies by means of the targeted
distribution of foreign labor have also been unsuccessful. Such aims are
obviously better pursued using direct fiscal policy measures.
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To actively integrate immigrants into Swiss society would have pre-
vented social costs caused by the Swiss adoption of a foreign worker
policy that relied on intensive rotation of foreign labor. Swiss expe-
rience indicates that the harder times are in economic terms, the more
"strange" a foreigner's appearance seems to the natives, the fewer mea-
sures are taken to support active social integration of individuals into
society, and the higher are the observable tensions caused by foreign
employment. Such effects might be an argument in favor of restricting
migration within Europe.
Free labor migration is not a realistic alternative for the development
of Third World countries nor for the reduction of the existing wide dif-
ferences in wealth. If at all, large-scale migration problems can only
be prevented by means of a consistent common international migration
policy of all major industrialized countries. Recent global challenges
demonstrate the decisive importance of an agreement of all the leading
economies (just as the one on the GATT system) on a General Agree-
ment on Migration Policy (GAMP), the aim of which should be to reduce
migration potential in the countries of origin. Possible measures to be
considered could be coordinated efforts to reduce income gaps (e.g., by
further trade liberalization, capital investment incentives, development
cooperation), to create new employment opportunities in less devel-
oped economies, to reduce deprivation, as well as to discourage false
expectations regarding employment opportunities and living conditions
in potential countries of destination. Furthermore, sustainable supra-
national political action should be taken to force the governments of
emigration countries to respect basic human, political, and democratic
rights in order to prevent the emigration of political refugees.
Notes
[I] Between 1880 and 1888 about 92,000 Swiss emigrated in search of better living
conditions somewhere abroad, while during the same time only 5,000 immigrated to
Switzerland (Hagmann, 1991: 238).
[2] Between 1988 and 1900 thousands of Italians helped the Swiss to drive through
Gottardo and Simplon. About 127,000 persons immigrated to Switzerland, while only
53,000 left (Hagmann, 1991: 238). In 1914, the foreign population reached a first
peak of 600,000, amounting to 15.4% of the total population (Hoffmann-Nowotny
and Killias, 1979: 45-6).
[3] If wage levels or GDP per capita (or per member of the labor force) are used as
indicators of labor productivity, in Switzerland both have traditionally been among
the highest in the world (see OEeD, 1991a,b).
[4] Every Swiss citizen has the right to propose a change in the national constitution or
in any other law. If such a proposal (or "initiative") is supported by signatures of at
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least 150,000 Swiss, it has to be discussed in parliament and must finally be accepted
or rejected in a referendum.
[5] Following Hammar (1990), the term "denizens" is used here to describe foreigners
permanently resident in a country but without political rights.
[6] Decision of the Federal Council of Ministers of I March 1963, on the restriction of
admission of foreign labor. For more detailed information on the history of Swiss
immigration policy, see Huber (1963), Gnehm (1966), and Haug (1980).
[7] Decision of the Federal Council of Ministers on the restriction of foreign employment,
16 March 1970. Today, the control system is legally based on an annually adjusted
ordinance of the Federal Council of Ministers.
[8] By examining the average productivity of branches in which workers were employed
before they obtained one-year permits and the productivity of branches to which they
moved, an average difference of more than SFr. 5,000 (about US$3,6(0) per foreign
worker and year could be saved if foreign workers were free to choose their jobs
directly (Straubhaar, 199Ia). In other words, the inefficient allocation of immigrants
in 1981 resulted in an annual economic loss of more than SFr. 100 million (US$70
million) that could have been obtained through immigration taxes and used for specific
support of mountain areas or businesses with structural problems.
[9] Although the average annual real GOP growth of all DECO countries was 2.7%
between 1973 and 1979 (+2.5% on average of EU countries), over the same period the
Swiss GOP fell by 0.4% (DECO, 1991 f: 48). In fact, Switzerland was the only DECO
country with a negative annual GOP growth rate from 1973 to 1979. A similar picture
may be derived from the GOP per capita figures. Apart from New Zealand (--0.2%),
only Switzerland suffered an average annual decline (--0.1 %) in GOP per capita after
the oil price shock (1973-79), while in DECO countries the GOP per capita increased
by an average of 1.9% (+2.1 in EU countries). Total employment in 1973-79 fell by
0.9% per annum in Switzerland, compared with an annual average growth of I % in
all DECO countries (+0.1 in EU countries; DECO, 1991 e: 30).
[10] Between 1970 and 1990, 10 regular referendums were held on proposed laws with
xenophobic background, but all of them were rejected. During the same period
proposals aiming to improve immigrants' rights were also rejected.
[II] These figures should be interpreted with caution, however, since they also include
crimes committed in Switzerland by foreigners not resident in the country. For a more
detailed discussion, see Kunz (1989).
[12] Although Switzerland's share of foreigners among the total population is one of the
highest in the world, social tensions linked to the presence of foreigners are no higher
than in other European countries. We would like to explain this through the hypothesis
that the social costs of immigration depend on dynamic changes in the intensity rather
than on absolute levels of immigration or of foreigners living in a country. Because the
number offoreigners has risen steadily over a long period, the Swiss have become used
to it, and it no longer causes any specifically serious tensions. Societies with suddenly
increasing numbers of immigrants are much more likely to experience widespread
fears of being "flooded" by immigrants and intensive xenophobic reactions, whatever
the previous share of foreigners among the total population.
[13] In theory, there are two principal ways to influence population growth. Population
policy may aim to change the reproductive behavior of natives, or it could try to
influence population growth through migration. A comprehensive analysis of Austrian
experiences with migration and population policy are provided by Fassmann and Miinz
(1990). For Germany, Feichtinger and Steinmann (1992) estimated that some 250,000
immigrants would be needed to keep Germany's population stable. Aiming at an active
population policy has proved to be a delicate issue in Switzerland for ethical reasons,
148 Thomas Straubhaar and Peter A. Fischer
as well as due to a lack of consensus. As far as migration is concerned, the feasibility
of a migration policy that would serve demographic tasks is also fairly questionable.
Empirical results show that in general immigrants quickly adapt their reproductive
behavior to that of the natives. The most important impacts of immigration on the
demographic features of a population are therefore closely linked to the biased age
structure of immigrants. Provided the immigrant age distribution is "younger" than
that of the natives, total population growth increases and the total labor force share of
the total population is bound to receive a boost.
[14] Some 25% of inward foreign direct investment flows (FDI), came from EEA (European
Economic Area) countries, and 56% ofoutward flows went to EEA countries (Leskel,
1990). Finally in 1991, 77% of all foreigners living in Switzerland were citizens
of EEA countries, in which, in tum, 60% of all Swiss living abroad were resident
(Nabholz and Artho, 1992).
[15] Besides the free movement of labor, Switzerland's Federal Council identified four
major obstacles to EU membership: neutrality, political sovereignty (above all in
foreign policy), Swiss federalism, and (direct) democratic rights such as referendums
and initiatives.
Chapter 8
Austria: A Country of Immigration
and Emigration
Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Miinz
8.1 Self-image and Demographic Reality
There is a yawning gap between Austria's self-image and its demo-
graphic reality. Migrants in search of work, asylum seekers, displaced
persons, and other immigrants come in tens of thousands. About 15%
of the resident population were born outside Austria's present-day bor-
ders, 7% are foreigners by nationality, yet this country hardly tends to
see itself as an immigration society.
The self-image of Austria as a nonimmigration country has had a
number of consequences. Austria lacks a clearly defined immigra-
tion policy, public opinion in general favors strict border controls, and
the term "immigration" has a negative connotation for many people.
For these reasons Austria's basic immigration law (drafted in 1992) is
somewhat shamefacedly called "residence law". Labor migrants are
still called "guest workers" - a term that implies a limited period of resi-
dence. Refugees and asylum seekers are also not very welcome. On the
other hand, expatriate Austrians are considered "lost sons and daugh-
ters". No one would describe them as economic refugees, although most
of them emigrated for similar reasons to those of the Moroccans, Poles,
and Turks who come to the countries of Western Europe - in search of
higher wages and a better life.
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8.2 Austria in Preindustrial Times
Until the mid-nineteenth century the situation in the predominantly
German-speaking Alpine provinces of the Habsburg Empire was char-
acterized by three migration movements: the forced expatriation of
Protestants and other dissenters for political and religious reasons; the
seasonal migration from the Alpine countries to richer agricultural ar-
eas caused by over-population and poverty in the Alps; and finally, the
immigration of political, artistic, and commercial elites from abroad
to Vienna. Prince Eugene of Savoy, Beethoven, and Mettemich are
prominent examples of this.
8.2.1 The Industrial Revolution
From the mid-nineteenth century, with the beginning of the Industrial
Revolution and the building of new transportation systems (railways
and steamer ships), migration became a mass phenomenon. Migration
to the emerging industrial centers of the Habsburg Empire became just
as popular as to the cities of Vienna, Prague, and Budapest (Fassmann
and Miinz, 1990).
From 1869 the proportion of foreigners in the Austrian part of the
Empire increased. In 1910 they comprised about 2% of the population.
In this period immigration to Austria from the West decreased, especially
from the German Empire. There was, on the other hand, an increase
in immigration to Austria from the east of Hungary, the Russian part of
Poland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia.
At the same time the emigration from Austria to the West began. In
1910 about 623,000 Austrians were living in the German Empire, com-
pared with only about 100,000 German citizens in Austria. Migration
between the two parts of the Habsburg Empire was more or less equally
balanced: in 1910, 301,000 Austrian citizens were living in Hungary
and 270,000 Hungarian citizens in Austria.
8.2.2 The turn of the century
Between 1890 and 1910 emigration from Austria-Hungary increased
rapidly, particularly to the USA. Between 1900 and 1910 about the
same number of people emigrated from Austria-Hungary to the USA as
from Italy, and considerably more than from the German Empire or from
Russia. The US census of 1910 documented about 2.3 million citizens
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who came from the Austrian part of the Empire. For example, by 1914
about 30,000 people had emigrated from what is now Burgenland and
what was then western Hungary to the USA (see Horvath, 1988). Fred
Austerlitz - better known by his stage name ofFred Astaire - is probably
the most prominent son of Austro-Hungarian migrants to the USA from
Burgenland at that time.
This emigration was seen by some as a safety valve against poverty
and political unrest, but by many others as a national danger that should
be reduced by political measures. An emigration law was already drafted
in 1914 but the outbreak of World War I stopped all parliamentary
procedures.
8.2.3 The interwar period
After the end of World War I emigration from Austria to the USA began
again. Before 1914 Austrian emigration to the USA had mostly been
from the northeastern (Galicia) and southeastern (e.g., Croatia) parts
of Austria-Hungary. Between the wars, 70% of those who emigrated
overseas came from the province of Burgenland, which was annexed to
Austria in 1921. Between 1921 and 193834,200 people left Burgenland
for the USA (see Horvath, 1988).
The interwar period was also marked by a smaller stream of return
migrants. After the onset of the economic depression in 1929 about
3,500 emigrants from Burgenland returned to Austria with their children.
The best-known example is Robert Graf, who was born in New York and
later became Minister of Trade and Industry. The end of the interwar
period coincided with the beginning of a mass exodus of Jews and other
people subjected to political and religious persecution by Nazi Germany,
to which Austria was annexed in 1938. In 1938 there were 170,000 Jews
in Vienna alone; in 1945 only 150 remained. Many of them died in the
holocaust, others managed to find exile abroad.[l]
8.3 Migration from and to Austria:
Developments since 1945
8.3.1 Political refugees and economic migrants
Since the mid-1940s Austria has been a country of destination or transit
for millions of migrants. Between 1945 and 1950 about 460,000 ethnic
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Germans and 140,000 other refugees and displaced persons from Eastern
Europe stayed in Austria and were integrated. This first wave was
followed in 1956--57 by the mass exodus of Hungarians, 180,000 of
whom sought asylum in Austria. In 1968-69 162,000 Czechs and
Slovaks left their homeland via Austria, but only 12,000 of them sought
asylum. In 1981-82, after the imposition of martial law in Poland,
between 120,000 and 150,000 Poles stayed on as "tourists" in Austria,
only about 33,000 of them later applied for asylum (see Table 8.1).
After some years with fewer applications the number of asylum
seekers from Eastern Europe and the Middle East started to grow again.
In 1985 only 6,724 applications for asylum were made; in 1988 there
were 15,790, in 1991 as many as 27,306, but only 16,238 in 1992.
In 1988 Poles (6,670), Hungarians (2,610), and Romanians (2,134)
accounted for more than half of all asylum seekers. In 1990 more than
half of all applicants came from Romania, and about 10% from Turkey
and Iran. In 1991-92 the emphasis shifted to asylum seekers from
former Yugoslavia (1991,6,436; 1992,7,410), especially from the war-
tom areas of Croatia and Bosnia. In 1991 the number of asylum seekers
from Romania (7,506) and Turkey (2,252) remained high. About 14,000
victims of the civil war in Croatia were granted temporary residence as
de facto refugees. While not officially recognized as refugees, they
did for a time receive financial support from the federal and provincial
governments. It is estimated that a further 30,000 Croats stayed in
Austria temporarily, without financial support. In 1992 the main influx
was from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yet, in contrast to 1991, Austrian border
officials refused the right of entry or passage to many displaced persons,
most of them victims of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.
In 1992 the reduced number of people applying for asylum in Austria
(16,238) is clearly to be seen as a result ofmore restrictive administrative
practices. For this reason two groups of foreigners in Austria seem to
be rising: illegal immigrants and de facto refugees. In 1993 the 65,000
de facto refugees from Bosnia living in Austria were tolerated by the
authorities but not recognized as political refugees. However, the main
burden of this largest wave of refugees since 1945-46 is being carried
by Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia.
The official asylum statistics do not show the role played by Austria
since the 1970s as a launchpad for Jewish emigration from the Soviet
Union. From 1973 to 1989 about 250,000 Jewish emigrants from the
Soviet Union came to Austria and, with few exceptions, left this country
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Table 8.1. Asylum seekers in Austria by country of origin (new admis-
sions per year).
Total
Former number of
Roma- Yugo- asylum
Year CSFR Poland Hungary nia slavia Turkey seekers
1961 52 125 174 19 3,532 4,116
1962 53 65 155 13 3,019 3,458
1963 89 40 290 5 2,783 1 3,435
1964 434 87 492 15 2,421 2 3,611
1965 552 146 659 21 2,696 - 4,247
1966 636 215 791 45 2,000 3,805
1967 886 106 827 53 1,917 3,919
1968 4,176 183 812 259 1,742 7,362
1969 6,530 206 1,005 575 1,279 2 9,831
1970 1,192 207 1,161 156 151 3,085
1971 356 223 1,064 184 87 2,075
1972 291 145 968 183 70 - 1,838
1973 123 161 729 213 105 3 1,576
1974 173 202 584 349 156 1 1,712
1975 156 182 471 203 230 1 1,502
1976 194 291 467 203 108 5 1,818
1977 394 538 534 551 81 14 2,566
1978 515 773 525 958 66 49 3,412
1979 1,834 1,095 580 976 49 100 5,627
1980 3,241 2,181 1,043 1,023 45 120 9,259
1981 2,196 29,091 1,225 1,316 40 35 34,557
1982 1,975 1,870 922 737 74 54 6,314
1983 1,651 1,823 961 502 116 39 5,868
1984 1,941 2,466 1,229 501 158 31 7,208
1985 2,333 662 1,642 890 410 56 6,724
1986 2,147 568 2,220 2,329 488 163 8,639
1987 2,705 667 4,689 1,460 402 408 11,406
1988 1,728 6,670 2,610 2,134 477 644 15,790
1989 3,307 2,107 364 7,932 634 3,263 21,882
1990 176 132 46 12,199 768 1,862 22,789
1991 12 19 6 7,506 6,436 2,252 27,306
1992 10 10 0 2,609 7,410 1,251 16,238
Source: Statistisches Handbuch der Republik Osterreich, BM!.
of transit after a couple of days or weeks. About 65,000 of them chose
Israel as their destination, but the majority went to the USA and other
countries. Since 1990 Jews from Russia and other CIS countries have
emigrated directly to Israel or overseas without passing through Vienna
(or Rome). In 1989 Austria was also for a short time the launchpad for
migration between East and West Germany. More than 45,000 former
GDR citizens crossed the Hungarian border into Burgenland between
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Figure 8.1. Asylum seekers to and transmigrants through Austria.
July and October 1989; at first illegally, but later with the permission of
the authorities in Budapest.
Most of the emigrants from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union that have come to Austria since the 1950s have gone on to the
USA, Canada, South Africa, Australia, and Israel.[2] Figure 8.1 gives
figures on asylum seekers to and transmigrants through Austria. Some
returned to their homelands or at least tried to do so. A smaller but visible
proportion of the migrants from the East stayed in Austria, became
naturalized, and, for the most part, are politically and socially fully
integrated.
The cultural heritage ofthe Habsburg Empire and the ethnic networks
that remained from earlier East-West migration obviously helped to
integrate some of the new immigrants. A rough estimate suggests
that since 1945 more than 2.8 million people have come to Austria as
displaced persons, refugees, or transmigrants. Of these:
• Some 550,000 people used Austria only as a transit country (trans-
migrants).
• Some 1.4 million stayed in Austria for a longer period but emigrated
later to another country of destination or returned to their countries
of origin.
• Some 700,000 displaced persons, ethnic Germans, and other refugees
from Eastern Europe - about 9% of the country's total population-
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have settled permanently in Austria. Of these 340,000 have or had a
mother tongue other than German.
More recently, although the Austrian authorities have continued to
stress that the tradition of granting asylum remains a basic principle of
Austrian policy, the social climate and political practices have changed
completely. Numerous potential asylum seekers and would-be immi-
grants are tumed away or sent back at the borders or at Vienna airport.
In many cases this is done before they have a chance to apply for asy-
lum; others are discouraged from asking for political asylum (e.g., war
refugees from Bosnia) or at least are excluded from official support
schemes after they have applied. The hidden agenda of such practices
is obvious. Austria wants to reverse its traditional image as a country
with open doors for East-West migrants - an image that was easy to
maintain as long as most of these migrants could move on easily to the
USA, Canada, Australia, South Africa, or even Germany. Since 1990,
however, none of these countries has provided preferential status for
would-be emigrants from Eastem Europe.
Austria's restrictive immigration policy is backed by public opinion.
Ethnic stereotypes and negative attitudes vis-a-vis foreigners in general
and asylum seekers in particular have become more virulent. Both do-
mestic opinion and Westem Europe's reluctance to share the burden are
the main reasons why in 1992 Austria was able to close its borders to
many refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina without having to deal with
strong criticism at home or abroad. The position of the Austrian authori-
ties is that these war refugees and displaced persons would already have
been safe on Croatian, Slovenian, or Hungarian soil. While this may
be true in principle, it only "solves" the refugee problem at the expense
of poorer and more vulnerable states closer to the conflict areas. What
would Austria have done in 1956, in 1968, or in 1981-82, if the West
had behaved in a similar way while Austria had to deal with a wave of
refugees from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland?
Refugees recognized under the conditions of the Geneva Convention
have more or less the same rights in Austria as do Austrian citizens
themselves, except for the right to vote. They have the same right
of access to the Austrian labor market, and, where necessary, they
receive financial support from the federal govemment.[3] Recognition
as a refugee requires an administrative procedure that can last several
months, during which time an increasingly smaller number of asylum
seekers are provided with accommodation under the direction of the
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Minister of the Interior (federal authority care).[4] In mid-1992 about
12,500 asylum seekers and refugees were in the care of the federal
authorities in three transit camps and several hundred small hotels and
private accommodation. At the same time, some of the 60,000 de facto
refugees from Bosnia were also receiving financial assistance.
The most important change in the last few years is that not all asylum
seekers are supported by the federal authorities for there is no inherent
legal claim to this support. Instead, access to federal support depends
both on the varying practices of the authorities and on each asylum
seeker's self-assertiveness. At the same time an "accelerated procedure"
was introduced. Ifan application for asylum is declared by authorities as
being "obviously unfounded" the case is not even processed to determine
the material reasons for seeking asylum. This applies to almost all
applicants from Eastern Europe and other parts of the world in which
the Austrian authorities do not expect any infringement of human rights
("safe country status"). People from these areas are considered to be
economic refugees. But this also applies to potential asylum seekers
and refugees who do not enter Austria by air with valid papers. Those
who disembark at a "safe" airport on their way, or who come to Austria
by land are seen by the authorities to have already been in safety;
therefore they can under these circumstances no longer show they are
in immediate danger of persecution under the terms of the Geneva
Convention. Similar restrictions were adopted by Germany in 1993.[5]
Until 1984 asylum seekers had a 5~80% chance of being recognized
as political refugees in Austria, yet the figure fell to 13% in 1991 and 10%
in 1992. Since the beginning of 1992 a separate Federal Asylum Office
decides on all cases. In line with current administrative practices, most
applications are rejected in summary proceedings. In the past only 3,000
applications per year were accepted yet in 1993 less than 5,000 people
were able to apply for asylum. Many potential asylum seekers move on
to another country. Of those whose applications are rejected, however,
some stay. [6] Others do not even get in contact with the authorities, and
the numbers of illegal immigrants and de facto refugees in Austria are
growing rapidly.
8.3.2 Foreign labor in Austria and Austrians abroad
In Austria the recruitment of labor migrants began considerably later
than in West Germany, Switzerland, or Scandinavia. Austria concluded
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Figure 8.2. Foreign workers in Austria and Austrian workers in Ger-
many and Switzerland.
the first Recruitment Agreement with Spain in 1962, a second with
Turkey in 1964, and a third with Yugoslavia in 1966. As a result, so-
called guest-worker quotas were negotiated for individual branches by
trade unions and employer organizations. Applications for individual
work permits only made up a small proportion (about 30%) of the foreign
workers. In 1974 the employment of guest workers reached its first peak
with 220,000 foreign workers in Austria comprising less than 10% of
the labor force at that time (see Figure 8.2).
Periods ofeconomic stagnation after 1974 and the arrival of the baby-
boom cohorts on the labor market led to significant reductions in the
guest-worker quotas in Austria (see Table 8.2). In this way, Austria and
other West European countries exported their unemployment. In 1984
the number of registered foreign workers in Austria was only 138,710
- a decrease of almost 40% within 10 years - but thereafter the figures
again rose appreciably. In December 1992 about 261,000 foreigners
were legally employed in Austria, about twice as many as in 1984.
A further 34,000 foreigners were unemployed, of whom only a small
number (20% in 1990) were still employed as part of branch quotas.
One-third of all foreign workers (93,000 in December 1992) were in
possession of full work permits that allowed complete mobility in the
labor market. In addition to these workers there is also an undoubtedly
growing number of East-Central European immigrants who are either
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Table 8.2. Foreign labor in Austria by country of origin, 1963-92
(annual averages).
Former
Ger- Yugo- Annual
Year many Italy slavia Spain Turkey Others Total change
1963 5,205 3,549 4,917 984 1,520 5,325 21,500
1964 4,463 2,485 9,782 1,176 3,793 4,401 26,100 +4.600
1965 3,860 2,588 19,595 1,120 5,986 4,151 37,300 +11,200
1966 3,355 2,271 34,662 807 6,767 3,638 51,500 +14,200
1967 3,284 1,598 49,436 427 7,632 3,823 66,200 +14,700
1968 3,330 1,296 51,020 287 7,561 4,006 67,500 +1,300
1969 3,620 1,201 65,126 253 11,348 6,152 87,700 +20,200
1970 3,506 995 83,435 232 16,816 6,731 111,715 +24,015
1971 3,546 1,052 115,716 266 21,931 7,705 150,216 +38,501
1972 5,313 1,577 145,267 282 21,356 13,270 187,065 +36,849
1973 5,770 1,710 178,134 291 26,692 14,204 226,801 +39,736
1974 5,890 1,537 169,372 261 29,999 15,268 222,327 --4,474
1975 5,947 1,464 141,199 265 27,026 15,110 191,011 -31,316
1976 10,635 1,655 120,543 225 24,616 13,999 171,673 -19,338
1977 11,806 1,805 131,720 219 27,077 16,236 188,863 +17,190
1978 11,701 1,999 121,050 215 26,209 15,535 176,709 -12,154
1979 11,613 1,940 114,690 211 26,638 15,500 170,592 -6,117
1980 12,071 1,992 115,215 216 28,244 16,974 174,712 +4,120
1981 12,210 2,066 110,820 224 29,069 17,384 171,773 -2,939
1982 11,886 2,139 96,778 210 28,592 16,282 155,988 -15,785
1983 11,380 1,881 89,278 191 27,563 15,054 145,347 -10,641
1984 11,054 83,144 27,725 16,787 138,710 -6,637
1985 11,179 - 82,015 29,101 17,912 140,206 +1,496
1986 11,399 83,681 31,272 19,610 145,963 +5,757
1987 11,566 - 82,503 32,646 20,658 147,373 +1,410
1988 11,984 83,108 34,205 21,618 150,915 +3,542
1989 12,349 90,836 39,200 24,997 167,381 +16,466
1990 13,063 - 110,504 50,555 43,488 217,610 +50,229
1991 13,687 - 129,144 57,541 66,089 266,461 +48,851
1992 13,565 136,103 - 55,637 68,579 273,884 +7,423
Sources: Years until 1983 from Biffl (1986: 40); 1984-91 from the Federal Ministry of Labor and
Social Affairs and from Statistische Ubersichten (OSTATIWIFO); since 1984 Italians and Spaniards
are listed as "others"; BMAS: Employment of Foreigners 1991. Data for 1992: only Dec. 1992
(BMAS). In 1992 the category "other" comprised 11,086 Poles, 10,715 Czechs and Slovaks, 10,143
Hungarians, and 9,241 Romanians.
illegally employed or working on their own account. The majority
of them, however, only have occasional jobs and stay temporarily in
Austria.
Since the mid-1970s there have been changes not only in the num-
bers of foreigners gainfully employed but also in the origins and struc-
ture of the new immigrants. Slovenians and Croats were followed by
Serbs, Bosnians, and Kosovo-Albanians. Former Yugoslav citizens
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were followed by Turks and foreign employees of "other" nationalities,
most recently particularly by new migrants from East-Central Europe.
Male guest workers living on their own have been followed by their
wives and other family members, legal immigrants by illegal ones.
With the fall of the Iron Curtain, however, the proportion of gainfully
employed men among the foreign workers has increased again while
the war in Croatia and Bosnia has brought mostly women and children
to Austria who are not accepted as political refugees and are therefore
denied access to the labor market.
When talking about labor migrants or guest workers, most Austrians
think of Turkish or former Yugoslav citizens working in their country.
However, Austria was and remains a country of origin of labor mi-
grants. Their postwar emigration began as early as 1950 - well before
foreign workers were recruited by Austria. The majority of Austrians
abroad live in Germany (183,000 in 1991) and in Switzerland (28,800;
OECD/SOPEMI, 1992). In addition, there are (according to the Fed-
eral Ministry for Foreign Affairs) some 10,800 Austrians in Australia,
21,300 in Brazil, 20,000 in South Africa, 18,500 in the USA, 10,300 in
Canada, 10,000 in Argentina, 10,000 in Italy, 7,000 in Argentina, and
6,500 in the UK (Fassmann and Miinz, 1993: 35). According to the
1981 census, a further 50,000 Austrians work abroad either as daily or
weekly commuters, mainly to Germany and Switzerland.
On balance, the number of foreign workers in Austria and the number
of Austrians working abroad is more or less the same (see Figure 8.2),
but the structure of the two groups of migrants are quite different. Aus-
trian migrant workers, in Western Europe and overseas, usually occupy
positions on the foreign labor markets that are considerably better than
those filled by foreign workers in Austria. One can with justification
speak of "low in, high out" (LIHO) labor migration. Compared with
some 560,000 foreigners (estimate for the fourth quarter 1992) legally
resident in Austria, there are some 500,000 Austrians living abroad; it
can therefore be assumed that this "throughput" situation is also accom-
panied by a brain-drain - an outflow of human capital and well-qualified
people.
In the late 1980s, alongside the growing stream of asylum seekers,
refugees and other immigrants from Eastern Europe, new labor migrants
from former Yugoslavia and Turkey also found employment in Austria.
Regulations controlling the entry and immigration of foreigners were
tightened; the restrictions were unable to stop de facto immigration
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into and through Austria, but they stopped any further increase in the
number of gainfully and legally employed foreigners. One must also
acknowledge that this restrictive policy might have fostered the growth
of illegal conditions of employment and badly paid moonlighting. Some
of the immigrants, while not being prevented from immigrating, were
and continue to be forced into illegality (see Tabah, 1989; Komitee,
1984).[7]
The position of those foreigners who are legally working in Austria
has, on the other hand, improved. After working for a year they get a
two-year work permit for one province and with this they can change
employers. After five years of uninterrupted employment they can ob-
tain a full work permit ("exemption certificate") which allows them to
work anywhere in the country. Such full work permits can be immedi-
ately granted to foreign spouses married to Austrians, as well as to the
children of foreign workers. [8]
The 1990 amendment to the Law on the Employment of Foreign-
ers laid down quantitative limits. Until further notice, the number of
legally employed foreigners was not to exceed 10% of the domestic
labor market. In 1993 this "ceiling" was lowered to 8% but the Ministry
for Social Affairs can raise it up to 10% when there are special pub-
lic or economic interests. The actual maximum is now 304,000 either
employed or registered as unemployed foreigners.[9]
8.3.3 Legal regulations concerning immigration to Austria
The 1992 Act Concerning the Admission of Foreigners to Austria
(Domicile Act) is the basic law regulating migration beyond the granting
of asylum and the recruitment offoreign labor. Although an appropriate
name was avoided in view of prevailing public opinion, it is in fact a
law on immigration that divides potential immigrants into three groups:
• Since 1993 all citizens of the EU and EFTA require neither permis-
sion to enter the country nor a work permit.[1O]
• For immigrants from the rest of the world the federal government laid
down a maximum number of entry permits on an annual basis. These
people are subject to a selection procedure. Foreign spouses and
children of both Austrian nationals and foreigners living in Austria
are given priority when applying for entry permits. [11] Priority is
also given to people with specific qualifications for which there is an
unmet need on the Austrian labor market.
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• In cases of sudden shortages on the Austrian labor market the Federal
Minister for Employment and Social Affairs can grant work permits
for temporary seasonal employment, beyond the immigration quota.
In principle, applications for immigration to Austria must be made
in the country of origin. The granting of permission to immigrate does
not only depend on the above-mentioned priorities (family members,
special qualifications); would-be immigrants must also provide proof
that they have a place to live and means of subsistence. In practice
this means that potential immigrants from non-EU/non-EFTA countries
must either have a job waiting for them in Austria, or they must be
joining heads of family who already live in Austria.
On first immigrating, employed persons are granted residence per-
mits for six months, which can be prolonged for a further six months
and then, after a year, for a further two years. After five years foreigners
from non-EU/non-EFTA countries may be granted unlimited residence.
When immigrants from outside the EUIEFTA lose their jobs or their
accommodation and cannot find new jobs or places to live, they also
lose their right of residence. Those directly affected and their dependent
family members may in these cases be forced to leave the country. In
practice this means that many unprivileged immigrants, although they
have paid taxes and social-security contributions, cannot in a case of
emergency make use of their social-security rights.
8.4 Migration Policy
8.4.1 The influence of migration on population development
Since the end of World War II the population of Austria has increased
from about 6.5 million to about 7.9 million in 1993. Between 1945
and 1992 almost 3.7 million people have come to Austria as displaced
persons, refugees, transmigrants, recruited workers, or family depen-
dents. For them Austria has been either their country of destination, a
transit country, or just a short stopover. About 1.2 million have stayed
permanently in Austria or will probably only return to their country of
origin on retirement or in the case oflong-term unemployment.[12l
For decades, migration to and from Austria was largely the result of
an unplanned process. The political authorities clearly took the initiative
only in the case of the regulated interstate recruitment of foreign labor
from the mid-1960s and in the reduction of these quotas between 1974
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and 1984. But this foreign labor policy was neither conceived as a mi-
gration policy nor as a population policy. Only with the 1992 Domicile
Act did the state try more closely to control and consciously regulate the
number and structure of immigrants with regard to the overall economic
and demographic development.
8.4.2 Austria's role in the European migration context
A retrospective analysis reveals some persistent patterns of migration.
Since the end of the nineteenth century Austria's position in European
migration was and is determined by economic and geopolitical factors.
From the perspective of the industrialized West, Austria was - and to
a certain extent continues to be - on the periphery. This view is also
shared by many Austrians for whom the country's western neighbors,
especially Switzerland and Germany, offer attractive labor markets char-
acterized by higher salaries, advanced production structures, and often
somewhat more attractive working conditions. Therefore the emigration
of Austrians could be interpreted as outflow of human capital.
A similar perspective applies to Austria's eastern neighbors, but the
roles are reversed. For them Austria is both a "gateway to the West"
and a country of destination for economically and politically motivated
migrants. Since 1991, however, Austria has been increasingly trying to
stop the influx of new immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees.
For the foreseeable future it can be assumed that Austria will re-
main a country of both immigration and emigration (a "throughput"
situation). Above all, the fall of the Iron Curtain and the current po-
litical and economic upheavals and crises in the eastern part of Europe
render improbable a complete stop to the influx from these countries,
or the potential influx from the Balkans and the Middle East. Given
the increasing freedom of movement in the East and a certain degree
of integration between East and West, Austria's control of immigra-
tion and emigration will continue to be limited. In 1989 immigrants
exceeded emigrants by about 53,000; in 1990 by as many as 123,100;
and in 1991 by about 59,000 (see Table 8.3 and Figure 8.3). In 1992-
93 another 70,000 displaced people from Bosnia were accepted as de
facto refugees. From 1989 to 1992 Austria lost a net total of about
21,000 nationals through increased emigration and gained about 292,000
foreigners through increased immigration, almost exclusively from for-
mer Yugoslavia, Turkey, and East-Central Europe.
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Table 8.3. Population trends in Austria, 1980-92.
Pop. Pop. Balance of
(annual (end of Annual births minus Balance of Natura-
Year average) the year) change deaths migration lizations
Total population
1980 7,549,433 7,553,326 7,786 -1,570 9,356
1983 7,551,842 7,550,967 -4,795 -2,923 -1,872
1984 7,552,551 7,555,630 4,663 768 3,895
1985 7,557,667 7,560,766 5,136 -2,138 7,274
1986 7,565,603 7,569,824 9,058 -107 9,165
1987 7,575,732 7,586,416 16,592 1,596 14,996
1988 7,596,081 7,602,431 16,015 4,789 11,226
1989 7,623,605 7,660,345 57,914 5,352 52,562
1990 7,718,248 7,790,957 130,612 7,502 123,110
1991 7,825,261 7,860,810 69,853 11,201 53,253
1992 7,884,219 7,909,575 48,756 12,140 36,616
Austrian citizens
1980 7,266,739 7,265,125 -3,227 -6,547 -4,856 8,176
1981 7,265,466 7,268,267 3,142 -4,081 -209 7,432
1982 7,271,213 7,275,773 7,506 -1,988 2,335 7,159
1983 7,276,826 7,281,834 6,061 -7,01 I 3,172 9,900
1984 7,283,789 7,286,121 4,287 -2,148 -1,357 7,792
1985 7,285,947 7,288,428 2,307 -4,900 -104 7,311
1986 7,289,940 7,291,857 3,429 -2,912 -1,719 8,060
1987 7,292,724 7,294,026 2,169 -1,499 -2,950 6,618
1988 7,297,366 7,299,540 5,514 1,299 -3,100 7,315
1989 7,300,973 7,302,992 3,452 1,247 -5,100 7,305
1990 7,304,856 7,308,812 5,820 2,439 -5,600 8,981
1991 7,313,067 7,318,566 9,754 4,017 -6,267 11, I37
1992 7,322,464 7,328,042 9,476 2,320 -4,500 11,656
Foreigners in Austria
1980 282,694 288,201 11,013 4,977 14,212 -8,176
1981 299,163 319,106 30,905 5,330 33,007 -7,432
1982 302,872 279,989 -39,117 5,489 -37,447 -7,159
1983 275,016 269,133 -10,856 4,088 -5,044 -9,900
1984 268,762 269,509 376 2,916 5,252 -7,792
1985 271,720 272,338 2,829 2,762 7,378 -7,3 I I
1986 275,663 277,967 5,629 2,805 10,884 -8,060
1987 283,008 292,390 14,423 3,095 17,946 -6,618
1988 298,715 302,891 10,501 3,490 14,326 -7,315
1989 322,632 357,353 54,462 4,105 57,662 -7,305
1990 413,392 482,145 124,792 5,063 128,710 -8,981
1991 512,194 542,253 6,010 7,184 59,520 -11,137
1992 561,755 581,533 39,280 9,820 41,116 -11,656
Source: Estimates of the Austrian Central Statistical Office (OSTAT).
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Figure 8.3. Immigration to Austria, 1988, based on a survey of repre-
sentative random sample of Austrian households carried out in 1988. In
interpreting the figure, care should be taken not to confound Austria's
foreign-born population with foreigners living in Austria. Many immi-
grants to Austria, especially those who came before 1965, have become
Austrians through naturalization.
8.4.3 Police state or migration policy?
Because of its economic attractiveness and its geographical position,
Austria must actively come to terms with its role as a de facto immi-
gration country. What could a national policy achieve with regard to
international migration in light of the limited room for maneuver? First,
a more realistic self-image and a comprehensive policy are needed. Pri-
ority should be given to a shift from a mostly reactive and defensive
immigration policy to a forward-looking one; this is necessary for de-
mographic, economic and social reasons. Low birth rates and the em-
igration of highly mobile university graduates and a highly qualified
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Table 8.4. Naturalization of foreigners living in Austria.
Total number Germans Former Yugoslavs
Year naturalized No. % No. %
1980 8,176 2,077 25.4 1,823 22.3
1981 7,432 1,842 24.8 1,496 20.1
1982 7,159 1,799 25.1 1,185 16.6
1983 9,900 2,552 25.8 2,224 22.5
1984 7,792 2,293 29.4 1,411 18.1
1985 7,311 1,769 24.2 1,437 19.7
1986 8,060 1,497 18.6 1,439 17.9
1987 6,618 889 13.4 1,391 21.0
1988 7,315 793 10.8 1,723 23.6
1989 7,305 512 7.0 2,293 31.4
1990 8,981 485 5.4 2,639 29.4
1991 11,137 441 4.0 3,217 28.9
1992 11,656 398 3.4 4,329 37.1
Source: bSTAT.
work force to Western Europe are likely to continue. Therefore migra-
tion policy should both secure the constant immigration of particular
categories of foreign labor to Austria and their long-term integration. It
should be made easier for these immigrants to become Austrian citizens.
At present the right to apply for Austrian citizenship only arises after ten
years of residence in Austria. Since 1980 only 2-3% of all foreigners
have made use of this option each year (Table 8.4).
The 1992 Act Concerning the Admission of Foreigners to Austria
regulating immigration to Austria from outside the EUIEFTA can be
seen as a first (albeit inadequate) step toward a rational immigration
policy. Between 1989 and 1992, however, the policy on foreigners had,
to some extent, other aims. The unspoken desire for a new "Iron Curtain"
was and remains dominant. In 1989 visas were introduced for Bulgaria;
since 1990 Turks and Romanians again require entry visas for Austria.
Since 1992 this also applies to Serbs, Montenegrins, and Bosnians with
"Yugoslav" passports. For a short time in 1990-91 even Poles needed
visas. Existing legislation on passports, border controls, and asylum
procedures has also been amended. Since April 1990 foreigners may
be prevented from disembarking from a plane, casually returned over
the border, or detained in custody pending deportation. It is now also
legally possible to deport foreigners before they can apply for asylum or
after their applications have been rejected. The deportations can even
take place when the person concerned has appealed against deportation
or against rejection of an application for asylum. Since September 1990
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Austrian troops have been stationed on the "green" Austro-Hungarian
border at the request of the Minister of the Interior. In the future this job
will be done by armed border guard units.
Officially, the above measures are intended to fight uncontrolled
immigration and to protect the Austrian labor market. But they are in line
with mainstream domestic public opinion. Austria's policy also reflects
the attitude of the EU, Switzerland, and Scandinavia to East-Central
Europe, the Balkans, and the countries of the former Soviet Union. The
West is increasingly trying to close its borders to immigrants from these
countries now that citizens have passports and greater freedom to travel.
In line with this view, even Turkey is no longer part of the West.
8.4.4 Why an immigration policy?
In the long run, Western countries like Austria will have to rely on
immigration. In the case of Austria, demographic forecasts show that
after the year 2000 an annual immigration of 25,000 people would
balance the birth deficit, halt the population decline, and reduce the pace
of the aging process.
The main arguments in favor of a stabilization of the population are
related to both fiscal and social policy. The financing of health and
pensions insurance could be more broadly based, for example, and most
social and educational services are easier and less expensive to deliver
within a larger and stable population. The pressure for substantial system
reforms, major cost-cutting programs, and reallocations of funds would
be smaller with a stationary population than with a rapidly aging and
shrinking one.
8.5 Future Prospects
For the moment the main obstacles to immigration are growing unem-
ployment, serious housing shortages, and increasingly hostile public
opinion. On the whole, rational arguments are inadequate in the face of
hostility to and fear of foreigners, yet historical experience has shown
that during the last 50 years Austria has been able to absorb and integrate
large numbers of immigrants. On average, annual net immigration to
Austria amounted to 27,000 people. There is also evidence that the eco-
nomic yield and fiscal contributions of immigrants were substantially
greater than the social benefits and public expenditure they received.
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In the past immigration thus turned out to be a "good bargain" for
a receiving country like Austria. One should also bear in mind that
immigration cannot be held responsible for most defects of a Western
society but, by and large, simply makes them more obvious or aggra-
vates them. Unemployment, petty crime, moonlighting, the housing
shortage, right-wing extremism, and hatred of foreigners would also
exist without immigrants. It goes without saying that the existence of
such problems hinders the integration of immigrants while adversely
affecting their conditions of life.
This diagnosis does not advise against immigration but for a rational
and comprehensive immigration policy that includes an annual upper
limit on the number of immigrants. It must go further than a mere
neglecting tolerance of asylum seekers, refugees, and labor immigrants;
a planned migration policy must also influence public opinion, try to
gain acceptance, and purposefully employ public funds for integration
measures.
For these measures to be effective, countries like Austria require
a legal and institutional framework regulating immigration. The Act
Concerning the Admission ofForeigners to Austria (in force since 1993)
is a first step in this direction. Austria has become the first European
country to follow the US or Canadian examples, to attempt to control
spatial mobility with a genuine immigration law. The conflict that
remains is also known from the US experience. In the coming decades
those who are ready and willing to come to Austria will outnumber by
far those who will be eligible.
Notes
[I] According to information from the Documentation Archive of the Austrian Resistance
Movement, about 125,000 Austrian Jews managed to emigrate after 1938 and about
45,000 died in concentration camps.
[2] Some East European immigrants and refugees applied directly to the authorities of one
of the traditional immigration countries, others found a country of destination through
the International Organization for Migration (10M, previously the ICM).
[3] The 1992 Domicile Act also empowers the federal government in an emergency
to consider whole population groups as endangered and to grant them temporary
residence in Austria, even where the strict criteria of the Geneva Convention (the
danger of individual persecution) do not (yet) apply. These groups of people can be
supported by public funds.
[4] This status can, however, be altered over time. In the summer of 1989 about 5,000
Poles and Hungarians were "discharged" from federal care in view of the changed
political conditions in their countries of origin, and were thus reduced to mere de
facto refugees. Moreover, at the present time, there is in general no accommodation
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(in federal care) for asylum seekers from Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey (with the
exception of some of the Kurdish asylum seekers) and for those entering Austria
without valid papers.
[5] All Austria's neighboring countries, including the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary,
and Slovenia, are now signatories to the Geneva Convention on Refugees. Hungary,
however, only recognizes European refugees (Ratification of the Geneva Convention
with European proviso).
[6] According to the special Police Law on foreigners, persons not recognized as refugees
cannot automatically be sent back to their country of origin if there is still a danger of
political persecution following their return, even if no such immediate danger existed
before they left (non-refoulement). In practice, however, such distinctions are not
always made.
[7] In 1991 an estimated 90,000 foreigners were illegally working in Vienna alone; one-
third of them from Turkey, another third from Poland, and the rest mostly from
Romania, Bulgaria, former Yugoslavia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary.
[8] On condition that these children (second-generation immigrants) have either spent
more than 50% of their lives here or have had at least half of their schooling and
completed compulsory education here.
[9] In line with an established formula, permission to take up employment and work
permits for the nine provinces can be granted for up to 90% of this maximum quota.
[10] Similar status is enjoyed by: foreign employees of international organizations based in
Vienna (e.g., UN, ONIDO, IAEA); "foreigners sent by their firms" (mostly specialist
and managerial staff of multinational or foreign companies); employees of foreign
media (newspaper, radio, TV, and news agency correspondents); foreign artists (as
long as their incomes are derived from their artistic work); and recognized refugees.
[11] The right to bring in one's family only exists if the family head has been a legal
resident in Austria for over two years. Spouses joining their partners who are resident
in Austria must have been married to them for at least a year. Both minimum periods
may be shortened in special cases.
[12] This number includes those in employment and their dependents; refugees, asylum
seekers, and tolerated de facto refugees; and not gainfully employed foreign spouses
of Austrian nationals.


Chapter 9
Emigration from Poland after 1945
Piotr Korcelli
9.1 Introduction
The factors and nature of emigration from Poland have evolved over
time. In the mid-nineteenth century the country (at that time parti-
tioned among Russia, Prussia, and Austria) underwent rapid demo-
graphic growth, matched only partly and locally by the demand for
labor in industry and related economic activities. As a consequence, the
human pressure on agricultural land became acute, causing increasing
land fragmentation and widespread rural poverty. This in tum led to
the emigration of some 3.5 million people by 1914 and an additional
1.5 million during the interwar period (1919-39). The USA was the
destination of more than one-third of all emigrants; other important des-
tinations included Germany (mainly the Ruhr area), France, Canada,
Brazil, and Australia. Also many thousands of Poles were subject to
deportations to Siberia and other parts of the Russian Empire throughout
the nineteenth century, in particular following the national uprising of
1863-64.
During World War II there were further mass deportations of the
Polish population to both Germany and the Soviet Union. In the years
immediately following the war, the large-scale boundary shifts caused
massive movements of both Germans and Poles, involving several mil-
lion people. At the same time, the majority of members of Polish armed
forces in the West chose not to return to postwar Poland.
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Figure 9.1. Emigration from and immigration to Poland, 1951-91.
Source: Central Statistical Office (1991).
During the Cold War in the early 1950s international migration (as
well as travel across the borders) from and to Poland was almost im-
possible. A period of political liberalization that began in Poland in
1956 allowed for the out-migration of some of the remaining ethnic
German population as well as for the repatriation of a few hundred
thousand ethnic Poles from the Soviet Union. However, these policies
were soon discontinued, which is reflected in a sharp decrease in the
volume of international migration in the late 1950s. During the 1960s
emigration from Poland to the USA, Germany, Israel, Sweden, and other
countries amounted to between 20,000 and 30,000 annually. In 1968
a considerable share of Poland's remaining Jewish population left the
country. During the early 1970s emigration reached another low level
of 10,000-15,000 per year on average (see Figure 9.1 and Table 9.1).
A larger-scale emigration to Germany, officially labeled as a family
reunion program, was resumed in the mid-1970s. The outset of the
political, social, and economic crisis which became evident in the late
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Table 9.1. Foreign migration to and from Poland (thousands).
Emigration Immigration Emigration
Year (CSOdata) (CSO data) (OCP data)
1946-1950 1499.9 2543.6
1951 7.8 3.4
1952 \.6 3.7
1953 2.8 2.0
1954 3.8 2.8
1955 \.9 4.7
1956 2\.8 27.6
1957 133.4 9 \.8
1958 139.3 92.8
1959 37.0 43.2
1960 28.0 5.7
1961 26.5 3.6
1962 20.2 3.3
1963 20.0 2.5
1964 24.2 2.3
1965 28.6 2.2
1966 28.8 2.2
1967 19.9 2.1
1968 19.4 2.2
1969 22.1 2.0
1970 14.1 \.9
1971 30.2 \.7
1972 19.1 \.8
1973 13.0 1.4
1974 1\.8 1.4
1975 9.6 \.8
1976 26.7 \.8
1977 28.9 \.6
1978 29.5 \.5
1979 34.2 1.7
1980 22.7 \.5
1981 23.8 1.4 79.1
1982 32.1 0.9 27.3
1983 26.2 \.2 45.5
1984 17.4 \.6 4\.4
1985 20.5 \.6 55.8
1986 29.0 \.9 67.4
1987 36.4 \.8 108.3
1988 36.3 2.1 288.0
1989 26.6 2.2 (c. 250.0)
1990 18.4 2.6 (c. 120.0)
1991 2\.0 5.0 (c. 70.0)
Source: Central Statistical Office (l99\); GCP (1989).
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1970s, prompted a sudden rise in the population outflow to Western
Europe, the USA, and Canada.
The available data suggest that about I million people left Poland
for Western countries between 1980 and 1990. This represented the
largest component - about one-half - of the total East-West migration
in Europe during the 1980s. Since 1990 the volume of emigration from
Poland has been declining, although it remains relatively high. The
political factors responsible for the bulk of population outflow during
the Communist period have ceased to exist, but the economic push and
pull factors are still generating a substantial migration potential among
the Polish population.
9.2 Data on International Migration
Migration statistics, which normally represent the weakest part of de-
mographic statistics in general, also tend to be piecemeal and in the
case of international population movements are often unreliable. This
applies to Poland, mostly with regard to emigration, which has been
considerably underreported since 1945.
The basic source of data on international migration is the current
population register, which reports on permanent domicile registration
in Poland by immigrants and on domicile cancellations by emigrants.
These data are published annually by the Central Statistical Office (1991)
and enter the official population accounts. They are also used as a basis
for various population projections.
Such data, however, are incomplete and do not reflect the real mag-
nitude of emigration from Poland and from comparable East-Central
and East European countries. Between the late 1940s and the late 1980s
emigration decisions by individuals were subject to approval by the
relevant government agencies (the Ministry of Internal Affairs). The
procedures of issuing passports, especially those with "exit visas", were
quite complicated and took a long time. Practically, the only reason for
emigration that was regarded as valid by the officials was for family
reunion, but even then there was no guarantee that passports would be
issued by the authorities. Public opinion was molded to create a strongly
negative image of an emigrant (this image, of course, did not apply to
prewar emigration from capitalist Poland), but such efforts had little
effect in terms of real societal values and aspirations. Emigration to a
Western country became a widely accepted goal.
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Under conditions of strong restrictions on "formal" emigration, "in-
formal", undocumented emigration became a logical alternative. The
dominant mechanism of the latter type of migration was travel abroad
for allegedly different purposes. In practice, reasons such as tourism
and family visits were entered in the appropriate passport applications
both by short-term visitors and by "would-be emigrants". Along with
the gradual liberalization of passport policies after 1956, and especially
since the 1970s (except for the period of martial law, 1982-83), the
number of undocumented emigrants grew steadily. Once in a Western
country, many of them were entitled to claim asylum. The West accepted
them until 1989-90 as refugees from the Communist countries.
Such departures, which were defined as illegal at the place of origin,
were either not fully reported (for example, the domicile changed to
"address unknown") or they entered the population register only after
some delay, often at the time of the next census. The category of "migra-
tion to foreign countries", appearing in the official population statistics,
was undernumerated in the 1970s, and then totally irrelevant during
the 1980s, when several hundred thousand Polish citizens emigrated
"unofficially" to the West.
The partial character of the international migration statistics may
account for some of the observed discrepancies between the time-series
data derived from the current population register and the results of
periodic population censuses. The census results led to downward ad-
justments of the size of the total population of Poland. In the case of the
1970 census this difference amounted to about 280,000, in the 1978 cen-
sus to 82,000, and in the 1988 census to 85,000 persons. Hypothetically,
the census coverage can be incomplete resulting in the undernumeration
of the de facto population, so that one could conclude that in Poland the
census coverage improved between 1970 and 1988. However, data from
the current population registers referring to net international migration
(see TabLe 9.1) suggest that the migration outflow was 2-6 times smaller
than the actual size of net emigration. Therefore, a more likely interpre-
tation is that differences between the data from the current population
register and those from the population census can at least in part be
attributed to undocumented emigration during the intercensal periods
(see TabLe 9.2).
This is a plausible hypothesis for the years 1961-70, and to some
extent for the 1971-78 period as well. A somewhat different interpre-
tation is needed with regard to the last intercensal period of 1978-88.
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Table 9.2. Basic population accounts for Poland, 1968-90 (thousands).
Total Net into
popula- Change Births Deaths migr. 3-4+5
Year tion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1968 32,426 263 524 244 -17 263
1969 32,671 245 531 263 -20 248
1970 32,658 -13 546 267 -12 267
1971 32,909 251 562 284 -29 249
1972 33,202 293 576 265 -17 294
1973 33,512 310 599 277 -12 310
1974 33,846 334 621 277 -10 334
1975 34,185 339 644 297 - 8 339
1976 34,528 343 670 304 -25 341
1977 34,850 322 603 313 -27 263
1978 35,081 231 666 325 -28 313
1979 35,414 333 688 323 -33 332
1980 35,735 321 693 350 -21 322
1981 36,062 327 679 329 -22 328
1982 36,399 337 702 335 -31 336
1983 36,745 346 721 349 -25 347
1984 37,063 318 699 365 -16 318
1985 37,341 278 678 382 -19 277
1986 37,572 231 635 376 -27 232
1987 37,764 192 606 378 -35 193
1988 37,862 98 588 371 -34 183
1989 37,963 101 563 381 -24 158
1990 38,119 156 546 388 -16 142
Source: Central Statistical Office (1991).
The 1988 census intended to cover those individuals who were staying
"temporarily" abroad for at least two months on the day of the census
(December 6). The figure was 508,000. According to Okolski (1991 a),
this was at least 250,000 below the actual number, which suggests a
population overcount in the previous census. This seems to have been a
consequence of a specific character of emigration as observed during the
late 1980s. The peak of the last emigration wave in fact occurred during
the census year, when a considerable proportion of migrants preferred to
retain fonnal resident status in Poland just in case they wanted or were
forced to return. Such a status might, for example, allow them, or their
family members, to maintain access to subsidized housing at the place
of origin. Hence, we may have witnessed an overreporting, rather than a
more conventional underreporting with regard to the resident population
in the 1988 census. The real test will come with the next population
census, which will probably be held in 1998.
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Alternative infonnation on migration was provided by the passport
data bank, established at the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1980. It
comprised a computerized population registration system introduced in
the late 1970s as a means of total police control. The data bank, which
was discontinued at the end of 1989, recorded all exits and re-entries
of Polish citizens from and to Poland. Initial estimates of the size and
composition of emigration from Poland during 1981-87 derived from
that source, were published early in 1988, and were subsequently ex-
tended and elaborated by the Governmental Commission on Population
(GCP, 1989).
Data on emigration from Poland are also available from reports
on immigration by appropriate government agencies in the receiving
countries. These are usually reliable sources, but the data are often
piecemeal and mutually incompatible due to different definitions used
and the time intervals covered. Also, these data may not account for
incidents of de facto re-migration to the country of origin or of forward
migration to third countries.
9.3 Recent Trends in Migration
During the 1980s approximately 1 million people emigrated from
Poland. The accelerating deterioration of economic conditions and liv-
ing standards (following the relative prosperity of the 1970s), combined
with the loosening of restrictions on foreign travel, and the emerging
symptoms of political chaos, led to strong pro-emigration attitudes by
large segments of the society. The population outflow abroad was par-
ticularly large in 1981, when the showdown between the Solidarity-led
social and political movement and the Communist party apparatus be-
came imminent. Subsequently, emigration fell considerably in 1982
as a consequence of the imposition of travel restrictions under martial
law, and rose dramatically during the late 1980s, when signs of a deep
economic crisis and political crisis coincided with the implementation
of "passports for everyone" policies, carried out by the last "reformist"
Communist government.
Available data indicate that about 1.7 million journeys were under-
taken by Polish citizens to Western countries during the peak emigra-
tion year of 1988. These included 26,000 "pennanent migrations" and
1.66 million "temporary moves" for such (self-declared) purposes as
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tourism, family-related visits, participation in sport events, and scien-
tific and business-related activities. Out of the 1.66 million exits some
280,000, i.e., one in eight, were one-way. This means in December 1988
the persons involved still remained abroad and the journey had already
lasted more than one month longer than originally intended (according
to the passport application). Out of these 280,000 persons, 202,000
had not returned to Poland by the end of November 1989. Together
with the 26,000 "official emigrants", these made up the total of 228,000
emigrants in the year 1988.
Since emigration registration at the Polish borders was abolished in
1989, there is no direct infonnation that would allow this figure to be
adjusted by deducting those migrants who returned within the following
year. An extrapolation of the proportion of returnees (those who moved
back between 6 December 1988 and 23 November 1989) among the
earlier emigrants (those who left Poland in 1981-87) yields an estimate
ofsome 25%. Thus, the effective ("pennanent") emigration from Poland
in 1988 might be scaled down to some 180,000. However, in Table 9.1
the 228,000 figure has been retained since it represents the only number
documented in the GCP report of 1989.
Where did these emigrants go? The GCP refers to countries of first
destination, while data published by the Central Statistical Office (1989)
list the final destination countries (again, as declared in the passport
applications by the prospective migrants). According to the latter source,
West Gennany accounted for 64.0% and the USA for 12.3% of the
"official" emigration from Poland to Western countries during 1981-88.
The GCP published slightly different shares. According to this source
some 48.7% ofall official emigrants went to West Gennany and 14.0% to
the USA. The report attributed 13.6% of all temporary migration during
1981-88 to Austria, Greece, and Italy. But these countries served mainly
as transit countries for Polish emigration to North America, Australia,
and South Africa.
Based on these accounts, one can estimate the size of emigration
from Poland to West Gennany (including West Berlin) to be within
the range 335,000-360,000, i.e., 51-55% of the total emigration of
653,000 during 1981-88. Emigration to the USA can be estimated at
110,000-125,000 (17-20% of the total) and to Canada 60,000-80,000
(9-12%). Other important destinations were Australia, South Africa,
France, Sweden, Italy, and Austria (see Korcelli, 1991).
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According to official West German sources (see Mackensen, 1991)
the total net emigration from Poland to West Germany during the 35-
year period 1954-88 amounted to 790,500, including 468,900 ethnic
Germans (AussiedLer) and 321,600 ethnic Poles. According to other
data, the total number of ethnic German resettlers (AussiedLer) from
Poland was 853,300 during 1968-89; of these, 328,500 had arrived by
1982, 134,300 during 1983-87, 140,000 in 1988, and 250,000 in 1989
(Mackensen, 1991: 74). The report by the Council of Europe (1991)
quotes a total emigration figure from Poland to Germany of 608,300 in
1987-90 (see Rudolph, Chapter 6, this volume).
These data suggest that for 1954-80 the figures listed in the German
sources are roughly comparable with those published by the Polish
Central Statistical Office (1989); in the case of 1981-88 the same holds
true with respect to the data of the GCP (1989). Independent of the
different sources, the crest of the emigration wave occurred in 1989
rather than 1988, with a high intensity of outflow continuing in 1990.
However, since the AussiedLer do not enter the official German statis-
tics as immigrants until they receive resident status (permanent domicile)
in Germany, there is a delay of a year or so before they appear in the
immigration data (Mackensen, 1991: 73-4). Therefore, the figure of
250,000 arrivals from Poland in 1989 is probably considerably inflated,
while a large part reflects moves that had already taken place in 1988-
87. This suggests some undercounting for those years in the data of the
GCP.
The rapid increase in emigration from Poland during the late 1980s
clearly reflected a coincidence of the mounting internal political and
economic crisis with new passport regulations that allowed individual
travel and emigration without bureaucratic procedure. With the in-
evitable demise of the Communist rule in Poland clearly in sight by
mid-1988, a number of prospective emigrants chose to take advantage
of the possibility, still open at that time, of claiming refugee status in
a Western country. The above of course does not apply to persons
eligible for the AussiedLer status, which is defined by the German con-
stitution on the basis of historical and ethnic considerations. This status
can be claimed by all persons (and their descendants and close family
members) who lived within the borders of Germany before 1938-45,
by those who were German citizens in 1939-45 but lived outside these
borders, and by other ethnic Germans living in Eastern Europe, the
180 Piotr Korcelli
Balkans, and the former Soviet Union. Within the territories taken over
by Poland in 1945 (West Prussia, Silesia, and the southern part of East
Prussia excluding the free city of Gdansk), the number of remaining
autochthonous population was 1 million (compared with the total of
8.5 million inhabitants of these territories before the war). They were
interpreted as being of Polish origin by the Polish authorities, but at least
partly as ethnic Germans by the West German government. In fact, such
different evaluations apply to earlier periods as well. In 1925, according
to official German statistics, the number of ethnic Poles living within
the territories annexed to Poland after World War II was calculated at
683,000 (induding 543,000 in the western part of Upper Silesia and the
Opole region), while Polish researchers (Romer and others) put their
number at 1.2 million (see Kosinski, 1963: 24-5).
In 1970, after the first phase of the so-called family reunification
program, the German Red Cross estimated that 290,000 ethnic Germans
were still living within Polish borders (according to Korbel, quoted in
Okolski, 1991 b: 14). This figure contrasts with the approximately three
times as many migrants who have moved to Germany from Poland as
Aussiedler since 1970, as well as with the most recent estimates of the
size of the ethnic German minority in Poland, i.e., about 440,000.
9.4 Selected Characteristics of Migrants
Migrants are typically a selected category with respect to age, educa-
tion, and economic ambitions. In Poland, a high proportion of children
(the age group 0-17 years) were among those emigrants who left "ille-
gally", i.e., who left the country for a temporary period, but remained
permanently (or at least much longer than originally stated) abroad (see
Figures 9.2 and 9.3). Apparently, it was more difficult for families with
small and school-age children to obtain official exit visas than was the
case for older persons. One can also notice a much higher proportion of
women than of men among the young adults who left "temporarily".
The considerable share of children and young adults among emi-
grants of the late 1980s has caused adverse changes in the age composi-
tion of the resident population of Poland. According to the GCP (1989),
the total number of persons of working age (18-64 years of age) fell by
257,000 between 1986 and 1988.
The migrants of the 1980s were better educated than the population
from which they originated. Among those (18 years of age and above)
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Figure 9.2. Age composition of official "permanent" emigrants, 1988.
Source: Census (1988).
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Figure 9.3. Age composition of illegal "temporary" emigrants, 1988.
Source: Census (1988).
who emigrated or left for extended periods, college and university grad-
uates accounted for 13.3%, and those who had completed secondary
school for 46.4%, compared with 6.5% and 31.3%, respectively, in
the total population of Poland in 1989. Among those who emigrated
between 1981 and 1988 were 19,800 engineers, 8,800 scientists and aca-
demics, 5,500 medical doctors, and 6,000 nurses. Some 15,000 students
interrupted their studies in Poland to go abroad, where the majority of
them took jobs below their skill level, often in the informal sector. These
are typical features of the brain-drain phenomenon, which is unlikely to
disappear in the near future.
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Figure 9.4. Regions of origin of emigrants, 1981-88 (as percentages of
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from GCP (1989).
Figure 9.4 shows the regions of origin of migrants during the period
1981-88. One distinct characteristic of this spatial pattern is the high
emigration rate from the Opole (Oppeln) district, which contains the
main clusters of the remaining ethnic German minority. To a lesser
degree, the same applies to the western part of the Upper Silesian conur-
bation (Katowice district). Another feature is an overrepresentation of
the large urban regions among major migration origins. Aside from the
Katowice region, the regions of Warsaw, Gdansk, Cracow, and Wroclaw
accounted for higher proportions of migrants than the national mean.
The map does not reflect the observed gradual shift of migration origins
from the western to the central and eastern regions of Poland.
Until the late 1980s, the contemporary emigration from Poland was
not a popular topic of scientific research, largely for political reasons,
but also due to the lack of reliable statistical information on interna-
tional migration. Therefore, few such studies are available so far, but an
interesting case study of emigration from the Warmia-Mazury region,
in the southern part of former German East Prussia, has been described
by Sakson (1986). The local, autochthonous population of the region,
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estimated at 350,000-500,000 in the interwar period, lived mostly in
the rural areas. They constituted a typical peripheral agrarian society
that adopted traditional values and behavior patterns, and spoke a local
dialect of Polish at home and German in public. After the war, with the
resettlement and forced and voluntary migration during 1945-48, this
group shrank to 113,000 in 1948. Conflicts with settlers from central
and eastern Poland, combined with discrimination by local officials,
resulted in a collective desire to emigrate. The first wave occurred in
1956-58, when some 37,000 left for West Germany, but also for the
former German Democratic Republic. At the end of the first "family
reunion" program in 1958, the autochthonous population of the region
was estimated at only 75,000. Emigration, although on a smaller scale,
continued after 1958. Between 1975 and 1983 a second wave of emigra-
tion involved some 36,000 persons, and since then most of the remaining
population ofWarmia-Mazury have also emigrated to West Germany.
Unlike in Warmia-Mazury, where the local communities were tightly
knit and emigration typically involved whole families, the Upper Sile-
sian region has been characterized by some degree of intermarriage
among members of the so-called autochthonous population in the for-
mer German territory, the population of the neighboring region, as well
as migrants from other regions (Rykiel, 1989) that became part of Poland
after World War I. Inter-group contacts have been stimulated by local
migration (related to housing projects), the patterns of work in industry,
and the educational system. As a result, emigration from Upper Silesia,
which began during the late 1960s, but reached high levels from the
late 1970s on, has included wider and wider circles, in social, ethnic,
and territorial terms. This has been an example of the phenomenon of
"non-Euclidean demography" (Brubaker, 1991), where emigration from
a given region, or country, results in a growth, rather than a contraction,
of the population eligible for emigration on the basis of existing family
and other social ties.
9.5 Future Migration Trends
The new political and economic order in Poland has some consequences
for international migration. Emigration for true or alleged political
reasons is no longer in question. Economic determinants have also
changed, although there are some new forces (such as unemployment)
which may stimulate both permanent and temporary emigration. The
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brain-drain is certain to continue, particularly among the groups with
the highest educational qualifications and skill levels, such as scientists
and medical doctors, but also nurses. The push factors will be increased
by the rapidly increasing numbers of new young entrants to the labor
market starting from the mid-1990s, a trend that reflects the large size
of the cohort born during the period of high birth rates in the late 1970s
and early 1980s.
Nevertheless, the peak ofemigration from Poland, which represented
the largest component of East-West migration in Europe during the
1980s, has already passed. Other origins in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union will take its place. Recent survey results suggest
that only 2-4% of Polish citizens would like to emigrate, compared with
the 70% of secondary school students who were in favor of emigrating
permanently or temporarily from Poland in the late 1980s. Even today,
a sizable proportion of all respondents consider a several-year long stay
in a foreign country as the best choice to be made by a young Pole.
Although permanent migration from Poland has decreased consid-
erably, the number of Polish citizens living abroad has probably grown
since 1990, with the introduction of visa-free travel agreements between
Poland and most European, as well as many non-European, countries.
The relevant figures are very difficult to estimate, but it is known that
many thousands of Poles have been working in the informal sectors of
the economy in Austria, Germany, the USA, Italy, and Greece. With
regard to the USA, Poles have been very active and successful partici-
pants in the US immigration lottery, accounting for about one-half of all
"winning tickets" in both 1991 and 1992. Taking these recent develop-
ments and factors into account one can forecast that a sizable emigration
from Poland will continue during the 1990s, perhaps at half the level
as observed during the 1980s (see Korcelli, 1991); this would imply an
outflow of 400,000-500,000 people between 1993 and 2000, excluding
irregular migrants. In any case, permanent emigration will account for
a minor fraction of all Poles having direct contacts in Western Europe
and North America. The category of legal contract employees, which
now number some 350,000 (most of them working in Germany), will
probably expand further by the late 1990s.
The majority of those who left Poland since the 1980s were ethnic
Germans and others entitled to claim German citizenship, most of whom
will never return. A smaller fraction of the emigrants, who consider
themselves ethnic Poles, left at a young age during the 1970s or the
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1980s. Some of them have become entrepreneurs and are now interested
in investing capital and knowledge in their home country. Others became
successful researchers and scientists. Virtually all major universities in
North America, and many in Western Europe, have Polish emigrants
among their faculty members. A third group is represented by hundreds
of Polish ex-students, who cling to poorly paid jobs in the construction
or restaurant sectors in cities such as New York. Since they have to rely
on the local press for the evaluation of the current political and economic
situation in Poland, they are not fully aware of alternative opportunities
back home, and are unwilling to be regarded as failures by returning to
their families and friends without bringing with them sizable amounts
in savings; they live rather hopeless lives waiting for their big chance to
come.
In the past few years there has been a substantial increase in im-
migration to Poland, although the level remains rather low (5,000 in
1991, according to official statistics). At the same time, Poland has
become a major destination for temporary emigrants from the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Romania. The number of
"trading tourists" from the CIS has been estimated at 350,000, about
50,000-70,000 of whom have been working in the informal sector of
the economy (in construction, services, and agriculture), a large propor-
tion of them in Warsaw and its environs. Further immigration to Poland
will be determined not only by remigrants but also by an estimated 2-3
million ethnic Poles and people of Polish descent living in Lithuania,
Belarus, and Ukraine. They represent a considerable immigration po-
tential, particularly if their living conditions deteriorate in economic or
political terms.
In Poland, the status of Poles living in these neighboring countries to
the east and those deported to Central Asia during or shortly after the war,
is regarded as an important issue. It is thought that these people and their
descendants should be granted restitution of their Polish citizenship, and
hence the right to settle in Poland. However, concrete policies and legal
action in this respect have been delayed, overshadowed by other, more
pressing political and economic problems.

Chapter 10
Hungary and International
Migration
Zoltdn Dovenyi and Gabriella Vukovich
10.1 Introduction
Until very recently Hungary was an emigration rather than an immigra-
tion country. Four distinct periods can be identified in modem Hungarian
emigration history. The first started with the onset of mass migration in
the mid-nineteenth century and lasted until the end of World War I. It
was marked by relatively heavy out-migration, particularly to the USA.
During the second period, 1920-48, migration was influenced by
more diverse push factors than before, but the flows at the beginning
of the period were greatly reduced by immigration restrictions in the
most favored country of destination, the USA. The years after the end
of World War II were marked by the troubled history of postwar Central
Europe.
During the third period of the Cold War and the Iron Curtain, which
lasted until 1988-89, emigration was minimal, except during the few
months when the borders were open in 1956. Immigration during this
period was even less significant than emigration. Elections that brought
an end to Communist rule were held in 1989, but the turning point in
migration history came in 1988.
Hungary has now entered a fourth phase in its migration history, and
has become an immigration country. This process started when Hungary
began to accept refugees in 1988, and signed the Geneva Convention
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in March 1989. Since then the issue of refugees and immigrants has
become more complex. At first, the overwhelming majority of refugees
were ethnic Hungarians from Romania, but now the national and ethnic
composition of immigrants has become more diverse. Most recently,
the war in former Yugoslavia has led to an influx of large numbers
of refugees fleeing the fighting; both the refugees themselves and the
host country expect their stay to be temporary. Different attitudes and
policies are needed to accommodate conventional refugees and other
immigrants such as labor migrants, whose settlement is expected to be
long term or, possibly, permanent.
A further new feature brought about by the democratic change in
Hungary is the fact that in the West emigrants from Hungary no longer
qualify as refugees. Should a Hungarian citizen wish to move to an-
other country temporarily or permanently, he or she has to go through
regular immigration procedures of the country of destination without
preferential treatment.
10.2 Migration Flows before World War I
Migration in Central and Eastern Europe became a mass phenomenon in
the mid-nineteenth century. Technical developments in transportation
enabled the movement of large masses of people. Communications
also improved, and people received news of remote areas rather quickly.
During the late nineteenth century migration became an important means
of relieving social and political tensions, as well as shortages of human
capital in one region or abundances in another.
The characteristic direction of geographic mobility in Central and
Eastern Europe was toward the more developed West. Table 10.1 gives
an illustration of this through the evidence of the stock of foreign pop-
ulation in Austria and in Hungary. Overseas emigration from Hungary
started with political and/or religious refugees fleeing to the USA, but
they were not very numerous. Migration from the Austro-Hungarian
Empire to the USA became more important only during the last quarter
of the nineteenth century, but, once the mass movement started, the flow
grew rapidly. In the first decade of the present century the Austro-
Hungarian Empire was the most important pool of trans-Atlantic mi-
gration. Emigrants from the politically dominant ethnic groups of the
Empire, Germans and Hungarians, were underrepresented compared to
their share in the total population: 19% of the migrants were Poles,
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Table 10.1. Austrians and Hungarians as foreigners
in the respective other part of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, 1900 and 1910 (thousands).
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1900
1910
Hungarians
in Austria
270.8
301.1
Austrians
in Hungary
207.6
227.6
Source: Austro-Hungarian Census, CSO.
16% Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians, 15% Slovaks, but only 15% Hun-
garians and 12% German-speaking migrants; two-thirds of the German-
speaking migrants came from the Hungarian part of the Empire (John,
1991). On the whole, migratory movements were marked by the out-
migration of ethnic minorities, mainly from the eastern and southern
peripheries of the Empire. In the western provinces internal migration
was more characteristic than international migration (Fassmann, 1991).
In general, internal and international migration were complementary
rather than simultaneously observed patterns of behavior in the various
regions of the Empire.
During the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries
neither Hungary nor Austria were immigration countries; on balance,
both countries released more migrants than they received. Moreover,
the majority of immigrants to the Austrian part of the Empire came from
Hungary (e.g., in 1910 more than halfof all immigrants), and immigrants
to Hungary came mainly from Austria (almost 85% in 1910; Fassmann,
1991 ).
Immigration to the USA from Central Europe accelerated after 1882.
The new immigrants, although mainly of peasant origin, arrived at the
time when the conquest of the American West was already more or
less completed, and despite their agricultural backgrounds most of them
settled in industrial and mining centers.
While economic push factors were the dominant reasons for emigra-
tion from Hungary, the importance of other social, political, and cultural
factors is shown by the ethnic composition of migrants, i.e., ethnic mi-
norities were more likely to migrate than Hungarians. There is evidence
that entire ethnic village communities emigrated to the USA. However,
until World War I, a significant proportion of migrants moved with the
intention of temporarily staying there and returning after a while to their
homelands with their savings.[l] Migrants to Canada, whether they
went directly or via the USA, were more likely to settle permanently,
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as they were allotted land and could start fanning; this was a strong
incentive for the settlers who were mainly of peasant origin.
World War I was a turning point in the migration of Hungarians in
that it barred emigration and return migration for a number of years, thus
keeping large numbers of originally temporary migrants permanently in
the USA. The motivation of migrants after World War I and throughout
the successive interwar period was completely different from the pre-
dominantly economic push-and-pull factors that marked the flows of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
10.3 Migration Patterns between 1920 and 1945
After World War I migration from Europe to the USA slowed down. The
lowest figures were registered during the 1930s, when an annual average
of 139,000 persons migrated from Europe. The reduced migration flow
was due to two major factors: the restriction of labor migration and
the economic depression. Restrictions on immigration to the USA
were imposed in 1921 by the Quota Act, which limited the annual
number of authorized immigrants from each ethnic group to 3% of their
number resident in the USA as registered in 1910. Later, in 1924, the
Immigration Restriction Act introduced further limitations by changing
the basis of calculation to the 1890 population census.
These quotas did not affect the migration flows from Western Eu-
rope as severely as those from Eastern Europe, as migration from West
European countries had already slowed down considerably by the time
the limits were enacted. Movements from Central and East European
countries, including Hungary, were restricted more by the willingness
to accept migrants than by the desires of people to move.
On the other hand, with the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire and owing to the new boundaries established by the Trianon treaty,
the territory ofHungary had been reduced to one-third and the population
to less than half of its original size. The majority of non-Hungarian eth-
nic groups lived in areas that were annexed to the neighboring countries.
But the new borders also created large Hungarian-speaking minorities
in these countries. Subsequently the out-migration of non-Hungarians
from these new nation-states slowed down, whereas the out-migration
of Hungarians who became ethnic minorities in the neighboring coun-
tries began to increase. According to estimates at the time, about 70,000
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ethnic Hungarians emigrated to the USA between 1922 and 1927,40,000
from Hungary and 30,000 from neighboring countries.[2]
A further new feature of the 1920s was the change in the principal
destinations. Due to the restrictive measures implemented in the USA,
migration to Canada, to South America, and to Australia gained impor-
tance. For example, between 1924 and 1930 some 30,000 Hungarians
settled in Canada, the majority of whom were of peasant, agrarian origin
from the underdeveloped northeastern region of Hungary. The Cana-
dian and South American labor markets favored agricultural labor, as
opposed to the needs of US industry.
The socioeconomic composition of migrants is difficult to recon-
struct from the scarce information available, but it is evident that mi-
grants from rural areas were dominant until the 1930s, and although
the proportion of migrants from urban areas grew steadily, their number
only exceeded that of rural migrants during the 1930s. The traditional
regions of origin remained the underdeveloped northern and eastern
regions of Hungary.
After World War I the factors of emigration were more complex
than in the prewar period. In addition to labor migration, political
refugees and forced emigration also emerged, and growing numbers
of intellectuals, professionals, and other middle-class strata emigrated
during the 1920s and 1930s.
Before World War I few migrants were members of the middle classes
compared with the migrants from other nations, possibly because their
total numbers in Hungary were very small, and they could achieve their
aims within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After the Trianon treaty,
between 1920 and 1924, some 350,000 ethnic Hungarians moved to
the new, smaller territory of the country from the areas that had been
annexed to the neighboring countries (see Figure 10.1)
The majority of these migrants had previously been public admin-
istrators and from other middle strata of society; thus the sizes of
these socio-occupational groups increased considerably within the new
boundaries of the country. Consequently, their higher initial concen-
tration and later, shortly before and during World War II, the political
and ideological climate initiated increased emigration of intellectuals
and other middle strata, many of whom were of Jewish background
(Puskas, 1981). However, the number who emigrated in this period was
statistically far less important than in former emigration waves.
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Figure 10.1. Migrations of ethnic Hungarians to the new, smaller
Hungary after World War I. Data compiled by Zoltan Dovenyi.
10.4 Migration between 1945 and 1988
The end of World War II brought about massive migrations in Europe.
These displacements were both caused by the fighting during the war and
the political changes thereafter, in particular by the forced population
exchanges and expatriations finally decided by the Allies in 1945 at the
Potsdam conference. As ethnic minorities played an important role in
these movements, Hungary was forcibly affected considerably by this
migration wave (see Figure 10.2).
In 1945--46 almost as many ethnic Hungarians immigrated to Hun-
gary from the neighboring countries as after World War I: 125,000 from
Romania, 120,500 from Czechoslovakia, 45,500 from Yugoslavia, and
25,000 from the Soviet Union. At the same time sizable population
groups were forced or chose to leave Hungary. The largest forcibly
displaced group was that of the ethnic Germans who were declared
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Figure 10.2. Forced migrations: influx and outflows, 1945-48. Data
compiled by Zoltan Dovenyi.
collectively responsible for war crimes. About 20,000 had already cho-
sen to follow the withdrawing German army, and another 185,000 were
forced to leave Hungary. Under the population exchange agreement be-
tween Czechoslovakia and Hungary, some 73,000 ethnic Slovaks moved
to Slovakia. Compared with these flows, only a small group of political
refugees left Hungary when the Communist party gained power in the
late 1940s.
Data on international migration during the Cold War after 1948 are
even more difficult to obtain than those relating to previous periods.
According to some estimates, in addition to the deported or exchanged
populations, about 196,000 persons emigrated from Hungary to Western
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Europe and to more remote destinations between 1945 and 1955, mostly
between 1945 and 1948 (Rande, 1987).
International travel was practically abolished after 1948. The Com-
munist regime regarded the desire to live outside the country as a man-
ifestation of anti-Communist views. On the other hand, those who
were authorized to cross the border were not trusted to be willing to
return; consequently individuals or families who were granted passports
and exit visas normally had to leave "hostages" behind to ensure their
return. Those who did manage to cross the border illegally, or who
crossed legally but did not return, were tried as criminals, sentenced to
prison terms (partly in their absence), and their property confiscated.
The defectors had to face permanent or at least very long-term emigra-
tion since, until recently, they could not even visit Hungary as tourists.
Moreover, their relatives were subjected to harassment, questioning, and
suspicion. Under such circumstances, whether to leave for "the West"
was an attractive but difficult decision to make.
Nevertheless, there was still some illegal emigration, although reli-
able and consistent statistical sources on international migration flows
during the period 1948-88 are still scarce. Also, each year between
1,000 and 2,000 legal emigrants applied for and were granted "emi-
gration passports". A considerable proportion of both legal and illegal
emigrants were of ethnic German origin who could settle in the Federal
Republic of Germany.
The 1956 revolution opened the Hungarian borders for a few months
during the Soviet military intervention, which made mass emigration
possible. In 1957, a report entitled "Main characteristics of persons
who have left the country illegally" was prepared by the Central Sta-
tistical Office (CSO), but was strictly confidential, and remained in the
archives of the CSO until 1991. According to this report, Austrian and
Yugoslav sources reported that 193,900 persons emigrated between 23
October 1956 and 30 April 1957, representing 1.5% of the population
of Hungary. [3] Most of the migrants were from urban rather than rural
areas: the city of Budapest alone lost 4.2% of its population. The other
main flow of migrants came from Hungary's provinces, probably be-
cause of the proximity of the border with Austria. These provinces lost
much higher proportions of their population than the central and eastern
parts of the country (see Figure 10.3).
In 1956-57 two-thirds of all Hungarian emigrants (66%) were men,
one-third (34%) women, and the majority of all emigrants were young,
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Figure 10.3. Destinations of Hungarian refugees after the 1956 rev-
olution. Inset: origins of refugees and proportion of population of
provinces. Source: Statisztikai Szernie, 1990/12; data compiled by
Zoltan Dovenyi.
aged 15-24 years (40%) or 25-39 years (30%). The emigration rates
were highest among engineers 00.6% of all engineers left the country),
other professionals with technical skills (6.8% of all technical profes-
sionals left), and medical doctors (4.9% of all medical doctors emi-
grated). Of all skilled manual workers in the country 4.2% (35,500 per-
sons) emigrated. The rates were much lower among other professional
groups. These figures indicate the severe loss of human capital from
Hungary, particularly young, flexible, and highly skilled individuals.
Apart from the recently released CSO report on emigration during
the 1956 revolution, Hungarian statistics on international migration are
scarce and partly unreliable. Migration statistics, with the exception of
tourism statistics, were processed in the Ministry of the Interior. Until
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1988, a fonn had to be filled out in duplicate by anyone who crossed the
border; one copy had to be handed to the border control on departure,
and the other when returning to Hungary. The fonn requested details of
the country of destination, intended length of stay, and purpose of the
visit, as well as personal details. The Ministry of the Interior was able
to keep track of any person who did not hand in the fonn upon return,
and could verify whether such a person had stayed abroad illegally. The
fonns were also used as the basis of all travel and migration statistics.
The infonnation thus gathered by the Ministry of the Interior on ille-
gal emigration was, however, classified confidential and even the CSO
was denied access to it. The official emigration figures covered those
who had applied for and were granted pennission to emigrate legally and
to settle in another country, which amounted to 1,700-2,000 emigrants
per year between 1958 and the mid-1970s. According to published
border statistics, an average of 1,900 emigrants left Hungary per year
between 1958 and 1972, and by the mid-1970s it had decreased to an
annual average of 1,200. According to the same source, immigration
between 1960 and 1972 amounted to an average of 950 per year, and
between 1975 and 1987 it increased to an annual average of 1,600. Until
the early 1970s the migration balance was negative, with a net loss of
some 1,000 persons per year. The 1970s showed a change in the flows,
as the balance turned positive, with an annual gain of 200--1,200.
Other sources which were made available by the various departments
of the Ministry of the Interior or the Office of the National Population
Register only cover short reporting periods, and in each case the commu-
nication was unofficial. Some of the tables that were made available did
not even mention the source or the agency that compiled the figures, and
in many cases the reported figures on emigration and immigration were
somewhat contradictory. Only the data and therefore the migration bal-
ance which could be calculated from the data provided by the Ministry
of the Interior for the period 1970-80 were close to the above-mentioned
figures, which were complied from the border statistics.
Another set of data was provided by the passport and alien adminis-
tration relating to the period 1979-88. During this period, the average
annual number of immigrants was 22,300 which is 10--15 times higher
than the number reported by the border statistics. The average number
of emigrants during the same period was, according to the passport and
alien administration, 4,400 per year for the period in which the border
statistics time series and the passport administration time series overlap,
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i.e., between 1979 and 1987 when the passport administration reported
3-4 times higher numbers of emigrants. Of all emigrants an average
annual number of 2,800 were reported to have crossed the border or
stayed abroad illegally and 1,500 legally. It seems strange that the high-
est number of illegal emigrants is reported for the year 1987, close to
the end of the socialist regime, when all travel restrictions were abol-
ished. Another peak, 4,600 illegal emigrants, is reported for 1980, but
the lowest illegal emigration figure was reported for 1984, when 2, 100
persons left or stayed abroad illegally.
A third source was an unofficial table covering the period 1980-
85 containing data provided by the Office of the National Population
Register. They did not report all immigrants, but only those who were
categorized as return migrants. The annual number fluctuated between
40 and 170, except for 1982, when 3,148 return migrants were reported
by the register. The emigration figures compiled by the Office of the
National Population Register were again different from any of the previ-
0us sources. The number of legal emigrants was lower than the number
registered by the passport authority, with an average of 1,300 per year.
The numbers of illegal emigrants they reported were lower in some
years but higher in others than the passport authority communicated.
Nevertheless, the average was the same: 2,800 per year.
The last year for which international migration statistics were col-
lected was 1987, when the system of observation, the statistical bulletin
collected at the border, was abolished.
It would be difficult to draw conclusions of how many emigrants
or immigrants may have actually left or entered the country, but on
the whole it seems that migration was insignificant during the period
1948-88, with the exception of a short period in 1956--57 linked to the
revolution and Soviet military intervention. This seems to indicate a
certain spatial immobility of the Hungarian society, even at times when
living circumstances were definitely not very attractive (push factor),
whereas there has always been an exaggerated image of the West (pull
factor). In addition, until 1989 almost all Hungarian emigrants could
count on being granted refugee status or being otherwise admitted to a
West European country, since fleeing from a socialist country in itself
usually justified some kind of preferential treatment.
It seems, therefore, that additional factors should be introduced to
explain the relatively small emigration flows prior to 1988-89. The
prosecution that illegal emigration entailed did not affect the emigrants
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personally since they were already out of reach, but the fact that they
were tried and sentenced under penal law also meant that they could
not return even for short visits for indefinite periods. Personal relation-
ships of any kind with relatives and friends therefore became difficult
or impossible to maintain. Also, unless their moves were very care-
fully planned and successfully executed, the illegal emigrants lost any
property or assets they had accumulated. These, besides the usual con-
siderations that influence decisions whether to move to another country,
may have played a role as arguments against emigration.
The fact that until the early 1980s immigration to Hungary was negli-
gible is also relatively easy to understand, since the political, economic,
and social system was not particularly attractive, the country was not
known for welcoming refugees, the language is difficult, etc. The most
important groups of immigrants were Greek refugees at the end of the
1940s and refugees from Chile after 1973. At that time Hungary had
not yet signed the Geneva Convention, there were no legal provisions
for accommodating refugees, so that their entry to Hungary and their
status were regulated by special government decrees.
It is not clear what definitions of immigration were used by the
various sources mentioned above; some of the sources may include
temporary labor migration, whereas others may not. Movements be-
tween East European countries were easier than between Eastern and
Western Europe, but still restricted. Labor migration within the region
was not characteristic and never significant, and was usually arranged
under bilateral agreements between governments, under technical coop-
eration projects in construction, within the frames of contracts between
enterprises and under individual work permits.
The first bilateral agreement was signed in 1967 between the gov-
ernments of the GDR and Hungary and was in force, with amendments,
until the end of 1983. Between 1974 and 1983 some 1,000 GDR
citizens worked in Hungary. Under another bilateral agreement with
Cuba, which was in force between 1985 and 1987, an average of 2,000-
3,000 Cubans came to Hungary for work and training annually. A
further agreement was signed with Czechoslovakia and provided labor
exchange for 1,000 persons from each side of the border, according to
the needs of enterprises. The employment of Polish workers was reg-
ulated by foreign trade agreements. In 1985 there were approximately
8,000 Polish workers in Hungary (Hars, 1992).
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Since 1988 Hungary's role in international migration has changed sig-
nificantly. In the last months of the Communist regime there were
radical changes in international relations that had an immediate impact
on migration patterns. Refugees from Romania were admitted in large
numbers, citizens of the GDR took temporary refuge and were even-
tually allowed to cross the Hungarian-Austrian border, and political
refugees and increasing numbers of other immigrants from African and
Asian countries also started to appear. Many of them do not intend to
settle in Hungary, but want to move to Western Europe.
In the late 1980s all remaining travel restrictions for Hungarian citi-
zens were abolished. Now they can cross the border without limitations
on the side of the Hungarian authorities, and they no longer need visas to
enter other European countries for short-term visits. From the Hungar-
ian side there are also no administrative limits to labor migration to other
countries. Despite this liberalization, however, there is no sign of any
dramatic increase in emigration from Hungary. The system of statistical
observation of international migration is only just being organized, and
as yet there are no data that can be evaluated. Indirect evidence of im-
migration to European and some non-European countries as reported by
the receiving countries shows, however, that although the total number
of immigrants from Hungary increased from 11,400 in 1987, to 16,300
in 1988, and 19,100 in 1989, it decreased again to 16,612 in 1990 (see
Table 10.2). On the whole, the numbers are not very high. Either the
domestic push factors are not forceful enough or the entry restrictions
in the potential countries of destination are too strict.
Despite the lack of Hungarian data, evidence for the migration flow
can be found in the immigration statistics of other countries, although
such data should be interpreted with caution for two main reasons. First,
the definitions used by the various receiving countries are not uniform,
so that persons who move to different countries with the same inten-
tions as to length of stay and purpose of going there may be counted as
migrants by one and not be counted as such by the other country. Sec-
ond, but more important, is that the aggregate figures do not specify the
nationality of the immigrants arriving from a given country. Emigrants
from Hungary may not necessarily be Hungarian citizens; for instance,
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Table 10.2. Immigrants from Hungary, as reported by receiving coun-
tries, 1987-90.
Country 1987 1988 1989 1990
Canada 717 1,201 1,003 806
CSFR 39 55 44 45
Denmark 33 39 69 80
Finland 49 40 129
France 53 66 124 97
Germany 8,938 12,966 15,372 12,523
Iceland 5 7 5
Netherlands 129 206 321 346
Norway - 36 40
Poland 14 30 10 12
Romania - 162
Sweden 390 507 713 567
Switzerland 298 351 413 403
CIS - 17 4
UK - 300
USA 641 701 844 946
Former Yugoslavia I - 2
Australia 100 130 110 140
New Zealand 11 15 8 7
Total 11,418 16,314 19,086 16,612
Source: Matrices compiled by the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNfECE, 1991).
many Romanian migrants move first to Hungary from Romania and
only later try to move on to Germany. The numbers of emigrants from
Hungary and the total of Hungarian immigrants to various countries
are thus necessarily dissimilar, although in the absence of Hungarian
migration statistics there is no way of verifying the differences. It is
important to note, on the other hand, that the bulk of the increase in the
number of Hungarian immigrants to other countries was absorbed by
Germany (82% of the increase in 1987-88, and 87% of the increase in
1988-89). Therefore the heterogeneity of the definitions adopted by the
various countries do not apply in their case.
Very little information is available on the actual numbers of immi-
grants, migrant workers, or other entrants to Hungary. Each category
of immigrants is handled by a different authority, and, although each
authority is supposed to keep an administrative register, the categories,
classifications, and definitions they use are not homogeneous and do
not contain adequate information for statistical or demographic analy-
sis. In 1991, however, the CSO began the harmonization of the various
registration and reporting systems.
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Not only is information on immigrants meager, but, even if immi-
grants are properly registered, they do not necessarily inform the Hun-
garian authorities when they leave the country. Consequently, even if it
were possible to capture the migration flows, the stock of the foreign-
born population still could not be estimated with any accuracy as long
as deregistration is not compulsory.
According to all estimates Hungary can now be considered an im-
migration country. It would be difficult to establish exactly when this
new period started, but the first large immigrant flow from Transylvania
arrived during the last weeks of 1987. Until the middle of 1991 the
inflow consisted mainly of refugees from Romania. More than 13,000
refugees were registered by the Hungarian authorities in 1988, more than
17,000 in 1989, and more than 18,000 in 1990. The fluctuations between
months show that the flows were largely affected by the political events
and turbulence within Romania.
According to a reliable assessment published by the Office of
Refugees (T6th, 1991), in 1991 there were 3,000 refugees, 20,000 asy-
lum seekers, 80,000 other foreigners who had settled as immigrants, and
20,000 labor migrants and seasonal workers living in Hungary.[4] T6th
(1991) estimated that the number of illegal immigrants was twice as high
as the number of legal immigrants. Illegal migrants are not included in
any register; therefore there is no direct way of establishing their actual
numbers.
Almost as soon as the massive inflow of refugees and immigrants
from Romania slackened, the war in Yugoslavia initiated a new wave
of refugees to Hungary. In November 1992, according to UNHCR
estimates, some 90,000 former Yugoslavians had been registered as
refugees or had not been registered but took refuge with friends or
relatives. The fluctuations over time of refugees arriving in Hungary
were influenced by the political events in Central and Eastern Europe
(see Figures 10.4 and 10.5).
A comparison of the refugees and immigrants arriving from former
Yugoslavia and from Romania shows that the latter group was mainly
composed of ethnic Hungarians, whereas in 1991-93 only about 25%
of refugees from Yugoslavia were ethnic Hungarians; the majority of
those from Yugoslavia are women and children, whereas the refugees
and other migrants from Romania were mainly young men, particularly
at the beginning of the flow.
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Figure 10.4. Changes in registered refugees in Hungary, 1988-92. Data
compiled by ZoItan Dovenyi.
Who are the labor migrants working in Hungary?[5] The number
of work permits issued to foreigners by the end of September 1991
was 36,623, of which 26,364 had been issued by the end of June of
the same year. The proportion of Romanian citizens among foreign
workers varied from 70 to 80%, and the majority of the immigrants
from Romania were ethnic Hungarians. Polish workers represented
around 10%, but their total number and proportion within the foreign
workers decreased from 3,600 at the end of June to 3,100 at the end of
September 1991. The significant rise in the number of work permits
issued during the second half of 1991 was probably due to the increase
in Chinese immigrants to Hungary.
Besides the foreign workers who are resident in the country, there is
a large number of foreigners who arrive as asylum seekers or refugees,
and also appear in the labor market but need not apply for work permits.
The geographical distribution of labor migrants is highly uneven within
the country, but they are concentrated in Budapest and large industrial
centers. The distribution of other immigrants and refugees, on the other
hand, is rather different. Budapest is the favored destination of all
•A
r
e
a
s
r
e
c
e
i
v
i
n
g
m
o
s
t
l
y
I
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
1
H
u
n
g
a
r
i
a
n
r
e
f
u
g
e
e
s
f
r
o
m
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
V
o
j
v
o
d
i
n
a
(
S
e
r
b
i
a
)
~
E
n
c
l
a
v
e
s
o
f
e
t
h
n
i
c
~
C
r
o
a
t
i
a
n
s
i
n
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
~
A
r
e
a
s
r
e
c
e
i
v
i
n
g
r
e
f
u
g
e
e
s
~
f
r
o
m
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
•
A
r
e
a
s
r
e
c
e
i
v
i
n
g
r
e
f
u
g
e
e
s
f
r
o
m
C
r
o
a
t
i
a
~
•
.
s
j
)
•
~
~
.
1
~
"
1
~
"
-
(
(
R
e
c
e
i
v
i
n
g
O
f
f
i
c
e
f
o
r
~
a
m
f
p
s
o
f
t
h
e
•
R
f
e
u
g
e
e
s
e
u
g
e
e
c
a
m
p
s
B
U
D
A
P
E
S
T
r
·
-
·
"
-
·
'
-
·
'
\
.
.
,
r
'
'
'
'
.
.
-
.
1
.
"
.
(
.
_
.
_
.
.
.
,
.
,
F
i
g
u
r
e
1
0
.
5
.
S
p
a
t
i
a
l
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
o
f
r
e
f
u
g
e
e
s
f
r
o
m
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
a
n
d
f
r
o
m
f
o
r
m
e
r
Y
u
g
o
s
l
a
v
i
a
,
e
a
r
l
y
1
9
9
2
.
D
a
t
a
c
o
m
p
i
l
e
d
b
y
Z
o
l
t
a
n
D
o
v
e
n
y
i
.
204 Zoltan Dovenyi and Gabriella Vukovich
immigrants, but although a large proportion is scattered all over the
country, there is an evident concentration in the eastern and southern
border region, easily explained by the significant number of immigrants
from Romania, Croatia, and Bosnia who prefer to stay in the vicinity of
their former home countries.
The socio-professional backgrounds of immigrants cannot be ac-
curately established, since the classifications adopted by the various
reporting authorities are hardly comparable. It seems to be clear, how-
ever, that the majority of those gainfully and legally employed have
jobs as manual workers in the construction sector (37% of all foreign
workers) or in industrial production (36%). Only very few foreigners
are to be found in the agricultural sector (2%).
The public acceptance of labor migrants is not unanimous. Un-
employment in Hungary is increasing rapidly, and by mid-1992 had
reached more than 9%. Security of employment was an unquestioned
principle and regular practice in the former political and economic sys-
tem. Workers and employees unused to the phenomenon now face the
threat of unemployment, a fate to which society and individuals have
not yet adjusted. The fact that even under such circumstances tens of
thousands of migrant workers have been able to find jobs might have
inspired a certain amount of hostility among the native Hungarians. But
some aggressive reactions and violence could also be attributed to the
rise of Hungarian nationalism. In any case it is doubtful whether the
unemployed themselves, or those threatened by unemployment, under-
stand that their uncertain situation is rooted in structural and economic
factors rather than caused by the immigrants.
10.6 Outlook
Handling the phenomenon and the implications of immigration is a new
challenge for Hungary. During the transition period Hungary is currently
living through, a number of social tensions have arisen that may not be
favorable to immigration. Refugees obviously have to be accepted
within certain limits, and labor immigrants or other persons who wish
to settle in the country should also be welcome, but the attitudes of
many Hungarians may nevertheless be less than welcoming because of
the rising unemployment. Also, there is a fear that in the future large
population groups may want to leave Russia, the Ukraine, and other
CIS countries, and that Hungary may be the desired destination for too
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many of them, but this is not very likely. A large proportion of those
who want to travel to the West will probably only pass through Hungary.
In this respect Hungary is not a unique case. The issue of migration
has come into the limelight in most countries, and multilateral efforts
to handle the problem and to curb international migration are already
under way. The migration policies that are called for will certainly be
influenced by international relations, and the emergence of the Central
and Eastern European countries on the European political scene may
give due consideration to their existence and concerns.
Notes
[I] There are literary anecdotes of Slovakian villages in Hungary where people spoke
English among themselves in the normal course of life, because the whole village was
populated by return migrants from overseas.
[2] Trans-Atlantic migration from Hungary again diminished in the 1930s. In 1935, for in-
stance, only 130 new Hungarian immigrants were registered in the USA. The number of
return migrants to Hungary exceeded the number of immigrants to the USA throughout
the 1930s (Puskas, 1981).
[3] Hungarian statistics on the emigrants of 1956 were based on the deregistration form
introduced by the Ministry of the Interior in the first months of 1957 and established
for each person who had left the country. The form was supplemented by a statistical
bulletin, which was then processed by the CSO. Some 151,700 statistical bulletins
reached the CSO, 42,000 less than the estimates based on other (Yugoslav and Austrian)
sources. The official figures probably underestimate the size of the emigrant population.
[4] These data relate to the period prior to the large flow of refugees from former Yugoslavia.
[5] The following overview of foreigners in Hungary only covers persons staying legally,
based primarily on the register of work permits issued by the National Labor Force
Center and cited in a study prepared by Hars (1992).

Chapter 11
Labor Migration from Former
Yugoslavia
Janez MalaCic
11.1 Introduction
Former Yugoslavia consisted of six large Slavic nationalities and many
other national minorities. Each large Slavic nationality (Slovenians,
Croats, Serbs, Muslims, Montenegrins, and Macedonians) had its own
republic within the federal state. In Serbia, there were two autonomous
provinces: Kosovo, which was inhabited predominantly by ethnic Al-
banians, and Vojvodina, with a large ethnic Hungarian minority. The
constitution of 1974 gave to Kosovo and Vojvodina federal status, which
was only slightly less important than the status of the republics. In the
second half of the 1980s Serbia abolished the high degree of the auton-
omy of its provinces and started the constitutional changes that finally
led to the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation.
The wars in Croatia (1991-92) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-
93) and the repression of ethnic minorities in Vojvodina, Serbia, and
Kosovo led to the largest wave of migration in Europe since 1945-46.
Between 1991 and 1993 some 5 million citizens of former Yugoslavia
became refugees or displaced persons. Of them only 700,000 have
come to Western Europe: 355,000 to Germany, 80,000 to Switzerland,
74,000 to Sweden, and 70,000 to Austria. In most cases they are not
recognized as political refugees, but are tolerated as de facto refugees.
Most Western countries have now closed their borders to the victims
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of war and ethnic cleansing in this part of the Balkans, so that 4.3
million refugees and displaced persons remain in the successor states
of former Yugoslavia. In mid-1993 there were 690,000 refugees in
the parts of Croatia under control of the authorities in Zagreb, 110,000
in parts of Croatia controlled by Serbian militias, 565,000 in Serbia,
82,000 in Montenegro, 45,000 in Slovenia, 27,000 in Macedonia, and
2.74 million in Bosnia-Herzegovina (data from UNHCR; Morokvasic,
1993; UNIECE Rapid Bulletin 3/1993).
On 15 January 1992 Yugoslavia ceased to exist, but the effects of la-
bor migration from this area are still visible, determining the distribution
of foreigners in Western Europe. This chapter is not only of historical
interest, although the analysis is limited to international migration from
and to Yugoslavia prior to 1991.
For former Yugoslavia, two principal sets of data for international
labor migration have been used. The first set was the last two popula-
tion censuses taken in 1971 and 1981, which gave a relatively complete
cross-sectional picture of the process. The second set, the National Em-
ployment Service's annual statistics on legal migration, was incomplete,
because it did not cover spontaneous and unofficial migrations. Both
sources, combined with other international data sources, have been used
in this chapter, although the main focus has been on the census data.
Yugoslav census statistics covered those international economic mi-
grants who maintained connections with their former home country
and who planned to return.[l] The census definition of a temporary
economic emigrant was very broad; the main criterion was Yugoslav
nationality, even in cases of dual citizenship. The National Employ-
ment Service's definition of migrant population was narrower, covering
only those migrants who had found employment abroad through the
cooperation between the Yugoslav National Employment Service and
foreign employers. According to the estimates of Yugoslav researchers,
however, only about 50% of the economic emigrants found jobs abroad
through the Employment Service.
11.2 Post-World War II Migration from
Former Yugoslavia
Traditionally, the regions that constituted former Yugoslavia, played a
significant role in overseas and intra-European migration. Until 1939
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the detenninants of Yugoslav migrations had been predominantly eco-
nomic, but this pattern was interrupted by World War II. At the end of
the war, huge numbers of political emigrants left fonner Yugoslavia.
Collaborators left with the occupying forces, and several hundred thou-
sand Yugoslavs of ethnic Gennan, Italian, and Hungarian origin were
expelled. At the same time the Tito government organized remigration
and repatriation of Yugoslav emigrants all over the world. The action
was not very successful, given the degree of destruction, poverty, and
underdevelopment of the country. During the late 1940s and the early
1950s borders were closed and there were very few emigrants, most of
whom tried to apply for political asylum in Western Europe. During the
1950s, the politically motivated emigrants were increasingly replaced
by labor migrants, as the liberalization led to a considerable increase in
international migration from fonner Yugoslavia. Between the census
years 1953 and 1961 Yugoslavia's net migration balance amounted to
-277,675 (Centar za demografska istrazivanja, 1971: 47). In this pe-
riod the majority of emigrants who left the country pennanently were
members of the Turkish minority living in the southeastern parts of the
country. Most ethnic Turks emigrated to Turkey; Macedonia, for exam-
ple, lost 165,000 people (i.e., approximately 10% of its population).
Toward the late 1950s and early 1960s international migration
changed its patterns and direction. Labor migration, partly temporary,
became dominant.
11.3 Developments since 1960
Yugoslav labor migration to Western Europe and overseas can be di-
vided into four periods. During the first period, until 1964, the overall
number of migrants was not large. The second period, 1964-73, was
characterized by an emigration boom. During the third period, 1974-
79, the extensive layoffs of Yugoslav workers abroad brought a halt to
emigration. In the last period, 1980-90, return migration was evident.
At the same time, the deep economic, social, and political crisis in Yu-
goslavia slowed down the process of return migrations and prepared for
a new wave of emigration.
Up to 1964 Yugoslav international labor migration was spontaneous
and unofficial; no statistical infonnation is available. Spontaneous em-
igration started from the northwest of the country and from traditional
210 Janez Malacic
emigration regions. At the end of the period an estimated total of
100,000 economic emigrants were living outside the country.
Between 1964 and 1973 emigration from former Yugoslavia was
caused by internal and external factors. The main internal factors were
connected with changes in the economic system and economic policy.
The government officially accepted the necessity for economic emi-
gration as the consequence of the transition from an extensive to an
intensive economy. For some years after 1965 the numbers employed in
the "socialist sector" of the economy steadily declined from 3.66 million
in 1965 to 3.56 million in 1967 (SGJ, 1970: 87).
At the same time, the postwar baby-boom generation started to enter
the labor market. The annual inflow of young workers doubled during
the 1960s. The main external reason for Yugoslav emigration at that
time was the growing demand for foreign labor in Western Europe,
the higher wages and salaries, and the relatively short distance between
Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and other recruitment areas. Since 1964
the National Employment Service of former Yugoslavia was involved
in this emigration process in cooperation with foreign employers. In the
period 1964-90, the government signed a series of bilateral agreements
with West European governments to regulate the migration processes.
The estimated numbers of Yugoslav migrant workers in European
countries in 1964-90 are shown in Table 11.1. In 1973 the number of
emigrants peaked, with 850,000 citizens living abroad. Their number
grew particularly in the years 1964-65 and 1968-71. The 671,908
economic emigrants from former Yugoslavia calculated from the 1971
census is probably too low; Baucic (1973) calculates that there was an
underestimation of 15%.
In the third period (1974-79) the number ofemigrants fell by 140,000
in just one year (1973-74). During the whole period employment of
Yugoslavs in Western Europe decreased. Table 11.1 shows that there
were considerable return migrants and relatively few new emigrants.
Return migration during this period was a direct consequence of the
economic crises in Western Europe caused by the first and second oil
price shocks. For Yugoslavia this period was characterized by the
return of large numbers of migrants, and at the same time the receiving
countries of Europe started to change their immigration policies and
introduced increasingly restrictive measures.
The fourth period, 1980-90, was characterized by reduced return
migration. A considerable number of Yugoslav immigrant workers and
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Table 11.1. Yugoslav migrant workers in Europe, 1964-90, absolute
numbers and indices.
Indices Annual change Number of emigrants
Year Number 1964 =100 (previous year =100%) (census data)
1964 100,000 100.0
1965 140,000 140.0 140.0
1966 220,000 220.0 157.1
1967 260,000 260.0 118.2
1968 330,000 330.0 126.9
1969 420,000 420.0 127.3
1970 540,000 540.0 128.6 671,908
1971 660,000 660.0 122.2
1972 740,000 740.0 112.1
1973 850,000 850.0 114.9
1974 710,000 710.0 83.5
1975 670,000 670.0 94.9
1976 590,000 590.0 88.0
1977 578,000 578.0 98.0
1978 570,000 570.0 98.6
1979 564,000 564.0 98.9
1980 558,000 558.0 98.9 625,069
1981 554,000 554.0 99.3
1982 540,000 540.0 97.5
1983 525,000 525.0 97.2
1984 510,000 510.0 97.1
1985 500,000 500.0 98.0
1986 505,000 505.0 101.0
1987 515,000 515.0 102.0
1988 525,000 525.0 101.9
1989 540,000 540.0 102.9
1990 550,000 550.0 101.9
Sources: For 1964-76, estimates ofTanic (Tanic, 1979: 177); for 1981, census data; and for 1977-80
and 1982-90 authors' estimates, based on the statistics on return migrations. State as per mid-year.
their families stayed on in the receiving countries, and the process ofthe
transformation of temporary into permanent immigration has continued.
At the end of the 1960s it was estimated that one in eight temporary
emigrants would become permanent (Komarica, 1970), while revised
estimates made in the early 1980s, suggested that no less than 50% of the
migrant workers would stay on permanently in the receiving countries
(Mulina et at., 1981).
The 1980s were also characterized by a deep economic, social, and
political crisis in former Yugoslavia. High unemployment, stagflation,
and the foreign debt crisis hardly encouraged economic emigrants to
return. Without Western Europe's restrictive immigration policies there
would have been even more new emigrants from former Yugoslavia. The
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transformation of temporary into permanent migrants can be seen in the
1981 census data. A new category of emigrants, the family members
of labor migrants, had started to play an important role, indicating
the growing number of family reunifications. According to the 1981
census 625,069 migrant workers and 249,899 family members were
living outside former Yugoslavia, among them 553,656 migrant workers
and 197,964 family members in Western Europe (Saopstenje, 1983).
11.4 The Selectivity of Temporary Economic
Emigration
Voluntary migration is selective (Sauvy, 1969: 43). In general, there is
"natural" selection in the case of emigration and "artificial" selection in
the case of immigration. The second one is caused by the criteria set
by the immigration policies of the receiving countries. For this analysis
we can distinguish between two types of migration selectivity. The first
denotes the differences between characteristics of the migrants and of the
nonmigrant population from which they originate. The second denotes
the differences between the characteristics of migrants and nonmigrants
at the place of destination.
Among Yugoslav postwar population censuses only those of 1971
and 1981 contain data on economic migrants, on the basis of which
indices of selectivity can be determined and analyzed.[2] However, the
data of the two censuses are not fully comparable.[3] Table 11.2 shows
indices of selectivity of economic migration from former Yugoslavia for
1971 and 1981, given by republics and autonomous provinces, age, sex,
education, occupation, and ethnic group. [4] The index can be understood
as a percentage that denotes the magnitude of the (positive or negative)
difference between the shares of a particular group or category under
investigation in the migrant and the nonmigrant population.
In former Yugoslavia economic emigration started from the north-
western regions; later, the recruitment area expanded toward the south-
east. With some exceptions, indices of selectivity by republics and au-
tonomous provinces illustrate this development. The emigration was the
most intensive from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and least inten-
sive from Montenegro and Kosovo. Similar conclusions can be derived
from the indices of selectivity by ethnic group. There are only three
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ethnic groups with positive indices of selectivity: Croats, Romanians,
and Hungarians.
The differences between 1971 and 198 I show the process of aging of
the Yugoslav emigrants and the absence of new emigration waves until
the late 1980s.[5] Education and occupation selectivity are positive for
those with 4-7 years of primary education and three years of secondary
education and for those working in agriculture, manufacturing, and
services. The lower educational level of emigrants is the consequence
of the low educational level in former Yugoslavia. The high selectivity
among those with three years of secondary education had particularly
negative effects on the country, in that mainly traders and skilled workers
from the mining, manufacturing, agricultural, transport, and service
sectors found employment abroad. In the more developed parts of
the country, skilled emigrant workers were often replaced by unskilled
workers and immigrants from less developed regions.
11.5 Return Migration
Return migration to former Yugoslavia began after the first oil price
shock of 1973, when many West European countries stopped recruiting
migrant workers and started to encourage return migration. According
to Mikulic (1987: 51), some 625,000 Yugoslavs returned between 1970
and 1981, another 110,000 returned between 1981 and 1985. But the
population census of 1981 shows only 282,873 return migrants for the
period 1965-8 I (Saopstenje, 1983). These data seem to indicate that
the number of return migrants dropped at the end of the 1970s.
Yugoslav population census data on return migration for the year
1981 allow analysis of who came back.[6] In 1981 the indices of
migration differentials were positive in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina (see Table 11.3). The shares of return migrants to these
republics were higher than their respective shares in the total population
of former Yugoslavia. Obviously, this was also a result of the intensity
of previous emigration. In any case the data show that the process
of return migration was more intensive in the northwest of the country.
Male migrants and economically active persons were overrepresented in
the returning population. The magnitude of sex differentials is indirectly
related to the process of family reunification.
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Table 11.3. Indices of migration selectivity in the case of Yugoslav
return migration with respect to republics and autonomous provinces,
sex, and activity in the year 1981.
Characteristics of migrant Index of
and nonmigrant populations Migrants Nonmigrants differential
Republics and autonomous provinces
Slovenia 26,190 1,850,038 9.4
Croatia 97,338 4,449,850 68.6
Serbia proper 54,329 5,541,532 -24.7
Vojvodina 9,472 1,986,694 -15.4
Bosnia-Herzegovina 67,005 3,990,354 29.5
Montenegro 2,464 574,529 -65.4
Macedonia 20,784 1,851,172 -13.1
Kosovo 5,291 1,555,445 -73.6
Sex
Males 210,068 5,906,448 22.6
Females 72,805 3,681,424 -33.1
Activity
Active population 231,202 8,733,604 101.7
Agricultural 49,246 2,321,509 61.1
Nonagricultural 176,852 6,412,095 109.7
Persons with income
from other sources
(e.g., pensioners) 13,851 1,856,320 -43.0
Dependents 28,730 10,491,511 -79.1
Source: Yugoslav population census (1981).
11.6 Destinations of International Economic Migrants
In general, emigration from former Yugoslavia was directed toward sev-
eral highly developed and industrialized countries of Western Europe
(see Table 11.4). In 1971 and 1981 the majority of the Yugoslav labor
migrants worked in Germany and in Austria, but during this period their
share fell from 83.8% to 76.2%. Of the two Mediterranean countries
listed in Table 11.4, France and Italy, France was the most favored
destination for Yugoslav workers. It ranked third among the countries
of immigration of Yugoslav workers in 1971, and ranked fourth ten
years later. However, it is impossible to place the whole country in
the Mediterranean region. As is well known, the majority of Yugoslav
immigrants in France found employment outside the Mediterranean re-
gions. In the case of Italy the situation was quite different. Traditionally,
Italy itself had a high rate of emigration, but somewhere in the 1970s
it became a country with high immigration. In spite of such a situa-
tion migrants from Yugoslavia have never been a numerous group of
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Table 11.4. Number and percentage ofYugoslav workers and employees
in selected European countries according to Yugoslav census statistics
(1971 and 1981).
Country of ~19,---7_1-,---__-----,oc-_
immigration Number %
1981
Number %
Index
1971=100
411,503
82,957
36,982
21,201
16,359
7,358
FRG
Austria
France
Switzerland
Sweden
Benelux
Italy
Europe (total) 590,428
Sources: Saopslenje (1983, No. 131).
69.7 324,324 58.6
14.1 97,618 17.6
6.3 32,903 5.9
3.6 59,624 10.8
2.8 16,829 3.0
1.2 7,913 1.4
5,956 1.1
100 553,656 100
78.8
117.7
89.0
281.2
102.9
107.6
93.8
temporary workers in Italy.[7] In 1981 their number was still low. On
the other hand, unofficial estimates from the literature give a range of
20,OO~O,OOOof Yugoslav temporary workers in Italy at the end of the
1970s (Hersak, 1983: 132), the majority of whom found work in the
northeastern regions of Italy near the border. This estimate is proba-
bly more reliable, because it takes into account both legal and illegal
employment of Yugoslav workers in Italy.
11.7 Development and Efficiency of
Migration Policy
Four stages of Yugoslav migration policy can be distinguished. Until
1964 there was no migration policy at all, and spontaneous and unof-
ficial migrations dominated. From 1964 to the early 1970s, migration
was seen as temporary, and both Yugoslavia and the receiving countries
expected the "rotation" model to work. At that time labor migration was
encouraged by the Yugoslav National Employment Service in coopera-
tion with foreign employers. The Yugoslav government had concluded
bilateral agreements with the receiving countries in order to regulate em-
ployment and to protect the legal and social status of Yugoslav workers
abroad.
During the third stage, in the early and mid-1970s Yugoslavia's
migration policy was reviewed. From the early 1970s the discussions
focused on the need for greater social engagement for the return and
organized reintegration of migrant workers. In the last stage, from the
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end of the 1970s, this policy was implemented at federal, regional, and
communal levels.
The official position of former Yugoslavia was that there was no
need for permanent emigration from the country, so that the temporary
character of the ongoing migrations was stressed and portrayed as a
transitional phenomenon linked to a certain stage of Yugoslavia's so-
cioeconomic development. Migration was also seen as an opportunity
for the unemployed and inadequately employed population, allowing
them to contribute to their own future economic advancement in former
Yugoslavia through temporary employment in foreign countries (Baletic
and Baucic, 1979: 85).
The aims and targets of Yugoslav migration policy were, of course,
derived from its economic and geopolitical situation. The main targets
were to speed up economic development through transfers of hard cur-
rency, to ensure the return of as many emigrants as possible, especially of
skilled workers and experts, and the creation of a social climate in which
the migrants would later invest their savings in domestic production.
The results of this policy were disappointing. The major obstacles
were inadequate investment programs for remigrants, underdeveloped
consulting services, a lack of political support at the local and communal
levels, an inadequate legal system with contradictory laws, restrictive
customs regulations, too frequent changes in the legal system, and legal
and political restrictions for the private sector of the economy. including
agriculture.
At the end of the 1970s it was predicted that by the mid-1980s "un-
employment and insufficient employment of the surplus agrarian pop-
ulation will cease to be a motive for emigration" (Baletic and Baucic,
1979: 91). On the contrary, the deep economic crisis of the 1980s,
an inefficient return migration policy, and the political disintegration of
Yugoslavia created new reasons for emigration. The restrictive immi-
gration policies of the receiving countries were the only obstacles to the
realization of this new emigration potential. At the same time, return
migrants contributed little to the creation of new jobs in the country but
caused additional pressure on the labor market by competing with the
domestic unemployed population for the few jobs that were available.
This situation continued until 1991-92, when the violent dissolution of
the country and the wars in Croatia and Bosnia caused Europe's largest
wave of migration and ethnic cleansing since 1945-46.
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[I] Yugoslav official statistics used the expression "persons who temporarily work abroad".
In the period 1970-90 such an expression became problematic because of the transfor-
mation of migrants from temporary to permanent ones.
[2] The index of selectivity compares characteristics of migrants with those of the entire
population.
[3] For comparison with the 1971 census, only migrant workers are included in the indices
of migration selectivity for 198]. Migrant workers' family members living abroad are
subtracted from the nonmigrant population of former Yugoslavia in 198], but are not
taken into account in the emigrant population for that year.
[4] In former Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia proper (without provinces), and Vojvo-
dina constituted the more developed part of the country; Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mon-
tenegro, and Macedonia belonged to the less developed part; and Kosovo was the least
developed part of the country.
15] Indices of selectivity with respect to sex are calculated on the basis of the acti ve
nonmigrant population. Such a procedure leads to more reliable results in the case of
females.
[6] For return migration the index of selectivity is calculated almost in the same way as for
emigration. The only difference is in the migrant population. However, census data
are less reliable and thus less useful in the case of return migration. The main reason
for the lower quality of the data in the case of remigrants is caused by changes in the
characteristics of migrants during their absence.
[7] In the ]971 census migrant workers were classified according to the country of desti-
nation. Italy was grouped with other European countries, so that no separate data are
given for Italy for ]97] in Table 11.4. Ten years later Italy was shown separately.

Chapter 12
Emigration from and
Immigration to Bulgaria
Daniela Bobeva
12.1 Historical Overview
Until the end of the World War II the unstable boundaries of Bulgaria
were the basic factor explaining migration, especially in the border
regions. After five centuries within the boundaries of the Ottoman Em-
pire, the Bulgarian state was restored in 1878 and its borders underwent
numerous alterations afterward. The most intensive migration pro-
cesses (both emigration and immigration) took place immediately after
the restoration of Bulgaria. Under the provisions of the San Stephano
Peace Treaty (1878) all territories inhabited at least partly by Bulgarians
(Macedonia, Eastern Thrace, and Dobrudja) were included in the Bul-
garian state. A year later, as a result of the Berlin Congress (1879), the
area of Bulgaria was reduced considerably and mass immigration from
these territories began. For several decades these territories became a
permanent source of immigration to Bulgaria; for example, after the
St. Elija Uprising in Macedonia (1903), 30,000 immigrants settled in
Bulgaria.
Before World War I the immigration flows were greater than those of
ethnic emigration (e.g., ethnic Turks) which stemmed from the consol-
idation of the Bulgarian nation-state and the stabilization of its bound-
aries. In 1878 over 1.5 million Bulgarians were living outside the
22\
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Table 12.1. Ethnic structure of the Bulgarian population (% of total
population.
Bulgarians Turks Gypsies Pomaksc Others Total
1900 77.1 14.2 2.4 6.3 100.0
1905 79.8 12.4 1.7 6.1 100.0
1910 81.1 10.8 2.8 5.3 100.0
1920 83.3 10.7 2.0 4.0 100.0
1926 83.2 10.5 2.5 3.8 100.0
1946 86.4 9.6 2.4 1.6 100.0
1956 85.5 8.6 2.6 3.3 100.0
1965" 87.9 9.5 1.8 0.8 100.0
1991 b 82.6 7.0 5.9 2.9 1.6 100.0
1992 85.5 9.7 3.5 1.5 100.0
a After 1965 the publication of statistics on the ethnic structure of Bulgaria's population was inter-
rupted.
b 1991 data are preliminary due to the lack of censuses since 1985.
'Until 1965 and in 1992, the Pomaks (i.e., ethnic Bulgarian Muslims) were counted as either Bul-
garians or Turks.
borders of the country, in Middle Asia, southeastern Thrace, Epirus, and
Moldova.
During both world wars Bulgaria was allied with Germany and there-
fore on the losing side, and so had to give up some parts of its territory
in 1918 and again in 1944-45. In the interwar period, and especially
during the crisis of 1929-33, migratory movements were strongly in-
fluenced by economic factors. At that time mass migration to the USA
reached a peak, leading to a build-up of a Bulgarian minority of about
70,000 in the USA (Petrov and Nikolov, 1988: 178).
In modem history the principal migratory flows from Bulgaria have
always been those of ethnic Turks to Turkey. In the period 1878-
1913, after the liberation of the country from the Ottoman Empire, some
250,000 Turks left Bulgaria, but a considerable number remained to
form the Turkish minority. Despite the high natural growth rate of this
population, its share fell from 14.2% in 1900 to 7% in 1991 as a result
of mass emigration (see Table 12.1).
After World War II and the establishment of the Communist regime,
one result of the socialist model was that no political and intellectual
emigration was registered, since the closing of state borders stopped
almost all migration flows. Official data for this period are not avail-
able, but there is evidence from biographical literature that at least some
intellectuals and political opponents of the regime managed to leave.
For the great majority, however, any travel or emigration to the West
became impossible. The regime also began an ideological battle against
Emigration from and Immigration to Bulgaria 223
emigration and criminalized would-be migrants. Emigrants were called
"persons-never-to-return"; some of them were even killed. The same
regime also oppressed the national minorities through forced "Bulgar-
ization", including compulsory changes of first and family names. On
several occasions such developments led to mass emigration of Gyp-
sies and ethnic Turks. Political oppression and ethnic discrimination
also contributed to the formation of a huge emigration potential which
exploded in the first years after the end of Communist party rule.
In 1988 under pressure of perestroika and the new political climate
in Europe, the access to passports and exit visas for Bulgarian citizens
was liberalized. The opening of the borders "set the spirit free from the
bottle" and led to an unforeseen increase in international migration from
this part of the Balkans.
12.2 Emigration to 1\nkey
Since the early twentieth century Bulgaria's Turkish minority has been
highly affected by mass emigration to Turkey (Figure 12.1). Some
political efforts were made to regulate the process, which can be in-
terpreted as both a result of Bulgarian nation-building and as part of
a decolonization process. For instance, the Bulgarian-Turkish Emi-
gration Agreement signed in 1935 was followed by mass emigration
in 1936-38 when an average of 12,000 Turks left the country for ever
each year. In 1912-13 the Bulgarian Pomaks became targets of forced
conversion to Christianity.[l] In 1938 the government started attempts
to force the Turks to change their names to Bulgarian ones.
After 1944 when Communist party rule was established, waves of
emigration from Bulgaria to Turkey took place following each emigra-
tion agreement that was signed between the two countries. Between
1950 and 1953 some 250,000 ethnic Turks were allowed to leave, com-
pared with just 25 in 1954-68. Under the provisions of the 1968 Agree-
ment 95,210 Turks were granted the right to emigrate to Turkey, of
whom only 14.1 % were reluctant to emigrate and remained in Bulgaria
(unpublished data from the Ministry of the Interior). The Turkish gov-
ernment negotiated an annual emigration of 10,500 ethnic Turks but did
not stand by its obligations; in 1975, for example, only 338 Turks were
accepted, and another some 14,250 were denied permission to resettle
in Turkey.
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Figure 12.1. Bulgarian emigrants to Turkey, 1935-92. The data are only
for legal emigrants according to the bilateral agreements with Turkey.
These are persons who left the country in order to live permanently in
Turkey. Source: Data from the Ministry of Interior.
The attempts of the Communist government to assimilate the minori-
ties by enforced change of names and by depriving them of their rights
caused ethnic conflicts and a wave of emigration of Turks and Pomaks
to Turkey in 1988-89. The wave was motivated by political and ethnic
factors, and it stopped with the return of the right to use original names
and the restoration of the citizen rights of Turks and Pomaks within the
country - the reintroduction of the Turkish language in schools, freedom
of religion, traditions, etc.
Besides its ethnic background this wave was caused by both the at-
tractiveness of Turkey - a country of relative economic prosperity and
higher demand for a qualified labor force - and the unstable political
situation and the expected economic crisis in Bulgaria. One of the main
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Table 12.2. Emigrants by sex.
Number Percent
1989 I 990a 1991 1989 I 990a
Males 106,432 68,759 19,112 48.8 78.2
Females 111,568 19,136 21,152 51.2 21.8
Total 218,000 87,895 40,264 100.0 100.0
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1991
47.5
52.5
100.0
a Since 1990 the National Statistical Institute has accepted the UN methodology for defining the
status of emigrants. These are persons who have resided continuously in the country for more than
one year, or who are departing to take up residence abroad for more than one year. The number of
all emigrants in 1992 was 65,000.
pull factors was the willingness of the Turkish government and citizens
to receive these immigrants. Integration programs were introduced, fi-
nanced by various international institutions. In 1989, for instance, the
US government granted $9.5 million for the Bulgarian Immigrants' Ed-
ucation and Employment Program; the Council of Europe Settlement
Fund provided a loan of $250 million for the construction of 21,488
dwellings for the Bulgarian immigrants; for the same purpose, the Turk-
ish government allocated $15 million and liberalized the regulations for
acquiring Turkish citizenship.
According to data from the National Statistical Institute, 218,000
Bulgarian citizens emigrated to Turkey in 1988-89 (Table 12.2).[2]
In 1990 and 1991 the outflow to Turkey subsided (Figure 12.2). A
slight rise in the number of emigrants was registered in 1992 when
emigration to Turkey again rose to 60% of the total. But there was also
return migration from Turkey. For the whole period 1988-92 a good
estimate of the net emigration to Turkey (both legal and illegal) would
be 280,000, which partly coincides with data on legal immigration from
Turkish sources (Gokder, 1992).[3]
According to these sources, a total of 247,959 Bulgarian Turks re-
ceived Turkish citizenship from mid-1989 to mid-1992, of whom 32.4%
were adult males, 32.0% adult females, and 35.6% children. By 1992
some 73,400 of these immigrants had already found employment. Ac-
cording to the same sources, around 160,000 illegal emigrants from
Bulgaria also arrived in Turkey with tourist visas. The Bulgarian data
on the balance of those leaving for Turkey and those returning to Bul-
garia do not correspond to these numbers. If the Turkish estimates are
accurate, the last wave of emigration from Bulgaria to Turkey would
have comprised more than 400,000 people. However, a considerable
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Figure 12.2. Emigration from Bulgaria by destination, 1990. Source:
National Statistical Institute.
number of ethnic Turks also returned to Bulgaria, thus reducing the
negative migration balance.
Due to recent political reforms Bulgaria has become the only Balkan
country with a fairly high participation of ethnic minorities, especially
Turks, in the government. As a result of the 1991 elections the Move-
ment for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), representing the Turkish mi-
nority, became the third leading political force in the country after the
Union of Democratic Forces and the Socialist party (former Commu-
nists). Besides, 58 municipalities elected ethnic Turks as mayors, and
the government was elected with the mandate of MRF. These political
achievements of the Turkish-speaking minority have helped to reduce
the ethnic tensions in Bulgaria, and they have also reduced the number
of emigrants.
In 1992 a second wave of emigration to Turkey was discussed in
the media and in political debates. It was very difficult to identify the
size of this wave, which gave way to political speculation. Turkey
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introduced strict immigration regulations, and as a consequence the
number of illegal migrants with tourist visas rose sharply. An indicator
of the magnitude of the emigration outflow to Turkey in 1992 is the
balance between the number of Bulgarian citizens that left for and those
returning from Turkey. By the end of September 1992,29,119 of those
who left Bulgaria did not return, compared with 25,139 in the same
period of the previous year.
Today, the reasons for the emigration of ethnic Turks to Turkey are
predominantly economic, particularly the growing unemployment (14%
of the active population at the end of 1992). The future prospects are
for a continued steady outflow. Evidence for the economic motivation
for this outflow can be found in the fact that most of the emigrants come
from depressed southern regions populated mainly by ethnic Turks.
The demographic effects are already visible. The mass emigration to
Turkey in 1988-92 caused a significant decrease in the population of
southern Bulgaria and some municipalities were even rendered desolate.
In contrast, the number of ethnic migrants from northeastern Bulgaria
was much lower in 1991-92 than in 1988-90.
The demographic composition of the ethnic migrants shows almost
equal numbers of males and females (Table 12.2), and their age distribu-
tion does not differ significantly from that of the whole population (Table
12.3). Both facts seem to indicate that most of these migrants intend
to settle permanently in Turkey. A substantial number of them (9,000,
according to the Turkish statistics) are university graduates. This brain-
drain from the Turkish minority group in Bulgaria is likely to have a
negative impact on the development of this group in the new democratic
situation. The deficits of engineers, teachers, and economists in the
regions populated by Bulgarian Turks will become additional obstacles
to the economic restructuring of these underdeveloped regions.
In some southern regions, such as the Rhodopes region, the level of
unemployment among the active population exceeds 40%. Economic
restructuring would require huge investments in infrastructure and pro-
duction which cannot be afforded by the state, since it already has an
external debt of $12.5 billion and an internal debt ofBGLv9 billion (end
of 1992). The activated trade and investment process from Turkey to
regions inhabited by Bulgarian Turks is one means of overcoming the
crisis. The economic restructuring of these regions is being assisted
by the several projects of the EO's PHARE program (the Project for
Regional Restructuring and Development in the Rhodopes Region, to
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Table 12.3. Emigrants by age.
Number Percent
Age groups 1989 1990 1991 1989 1990 1991
D-4 10,612 - 467 4.9 1.2
5-9 14,044 1,426 6.4 3.5
10-14 12,800 1, III 2,350 5.9 1.3 5.8
15-19 14,372 5,576 2,805 6.6 6.3 7.0
20-24 21,293 11,847 3,217 9.8 13.5 8.0
25-29 28,234 12,877 4,927 13.0 14.7 12.2
30-34 28,569 14,480 5,632 13.1 16.5 14.0
35-39 22,433 14,051 5,162 10.3 16.0 12.8
4D-44 12,926 11,478 4,618 5.9 13.1 11.5
45--49 10,759 8,442 3,255 4.9 9.6 8.1
50-54 9,815 4,618 2,221 4.5 5.2 5.5
55-59 10,071 2,310 1,796 4.6 2.6 4.5
60 and over 22,072 1,105 2,388 10.1 1.2 5.9
Source: National Statistica1lnstitute.
which ECU 7.5 million have been allocated) and some EU direct invest-
ment projects. But the process of restructuring is expected to be quite
long. Both the fall in living standards and the growing unemployment
will maintain the emigration at a non-negligible level for some time to
come.
12.3 Waves of Emigration
The opening of Bulgaria's borders allowed a huge increase in foreign
travel. In 1989 some 921,987 Bulgarians traveled abroad; in 1990 the
number rose to 2.4 million, representing one in every four Bulgarians.
This intensity of foreign travel remained stable in 1991 and 1992 as
well. In general this can be interpreted as a positive development,
for intensive cultural, economic, and political exchange are essential
parts of the transformation process. Travel for tourism is dominant
(1992: 55%), followed by paid visits to foreign countries (1992: 38%).
Business trips dropped both in absolute numbers and in relative terms
from 7.6% in 1990 to 5.6% in 1992.
To a certain extent the large number of trips abroad can be seen as
a mechanism for channeling future migration, since the travel routes
often coincide with the main migratory flows. In 1990 Western Europe
became the main destination rather than Turkey. That was the time
of the second wave of emigration after the initiation of the reforms,
although it differed substantially from the first "ethnic" wave in terms
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of motivation, intensity, and demographic and professional composi-
tion of the migrants. The emigration wave of 1990 was caused by
two major factors: first, by the disappointment of a great part of the
population, especially young people, with the results of the 1990 elec-
tions when the ex-Communist party won a solid majority of seats in
parliament; and, second, by the fact that people began to fear the lack
of fuel, cold winters, and possible starvation. Thus the West became
increasingly attractive (Dimova et al., 1990). The second wave differed
considerably from the first: 92% of these emigrants were of working
age (Table 12.3), more than 75% were males (Table 12.2), and a large
proportion were well educated. More than half of the emigrants in 1990
had received secondary education, and more than 10% were university
graduates (Table 12.4). Therefore we can say that some brain-drain took
place. Among the highly qualified workers the largest share (10%) were
technical specialists, followed by economic and agriculture specialists
(6%) and engineers (5%). High on the list of these emigrants' motives
were the desires to develop and practice their professional knowledge,
as well as to escape from the growing threat of unemployment resulting
from the closure of many scientific and research institutions.
In contrast to the first wave (1988-89) of emigrants, many of those
of the second wave chose to go to highly developed West European
countries and to the USA; only 6.3% headed for Turkey. Germanyat-
tracted the largest proportion (20%) of Bulgarian emigrants of this sec-
ond wave, most of whom were seeking political asylum, not because of
a new era of political repression in Bulgaria, but rather because they saw
no other way of establishing themselves legally in Germany. A bilateral
agreement between German and Bulgarian governments was signed in
November 1992 for the return and reintegration of these migrants. The
project envisages the foundation of three professional training centers
for unemployed return migrants. Such programs are seen as an effective
way to deal with the problem of reintegration of the returning migrants.
During the period under review, the seasonal migration to neigh-
boring countries, especially Greece and Turkey, has also become more
important. Unpublished data from the Ministry of the Interior suggest
that in 1990 some 33,000 Bulgarian citizens migrated to Greece as sea-
sonal workers, most of whom took up jobs in the agricultural sector.
Because seasonal labor migration takes place under the form of tourism
it is difficult to estimate the real size of this flow, but can be regulated
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Table 12.4. Emigrants by education, 1990-91.
Number Percent
1990 1991 1990 1991
Unfinished elementary 176 0.2
Elementaryl Basic (8 years) 21,006 16,025 23.9 39.8
Secondary 20,919 7,127 23.8 17.7
Vocational training 31,818 4,751 36.2 11.8
College 3,955 7,368 4.5 18.3
University 10,021 4,993 11.4 12.4
Total 87,895 40,264 100.0 100.0
Source: National Statistical Institute.
under bilateral agreements; one such agreement between Greece and
Bulgaria is currently under negotiation.
Comparing 1990 and 1991, the numbers of male and female em-
igrants were about the same, with a slight increase in the number of
emigrants below working age (about 15%). The intensive emigration of
highly qualified workers continued; of the total emigrants in 1991, some
12% were university graduates and 18% had received college education
(Table 12.4).
In 1991 and 1992 the emigration wave was smaller than that in
1989: some 40,264 in 1991 (Table 12.2) and 38,000 in 1992. Total
emigration from Bulgaria is decreasing, but not so the desire of would-
be migrants to move westward. The main reasons for the smaller number
of emigrants are the mounting barriers set up by Western Europe. For
instance, Bulgaria's association with the EU is based on an agreement
signed in March 1993, in which the Bulgarian government committed
itself to measures to control and reduce the East-West mobility of its
citizens.
Emigration during the first four years of economic and political
reforms after the fall of the Communist regime (1989-92) led to a net
loss of population of about 400,000, according to preliminary data from
the December 1992 census.[4] If 1988 is included, the total loss could
be estimated at 600,000 people. So far, this mass emigration has not had
a positive effect on Bulgaria because a substantial part of the emigrants
did (and will) not return at all and those who return have not acquired
experience, skills, or financial means during their stay abroad. This
means that in most cases short-term migration cannot ensure anyone's
future in Bulgaria and therefore will not contribute to the acceleration
and the successful implementation of the reforms.
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At the same time, however, emigration has led to the establishment of
substantial groups of Bulgarians in some West European countries such
as Germany. The consistent policies ofEuropean governments to restrict
immigration and to stimulate the return of immigrants to their countries
of origin creates a new problem: how to deal with the returnees. The
problem is being complicated by the fact that upon return these people
are confronted with higher levels of unemployment, a further decline in
material output, and even tougher competition in the labor and the other
markets than at the time of their departure.
12.4 Immigration Inflows
The fall of the Iron Curtain intensified not only emigration, but also the
inflow of people into Bulgaria. Despite the poor state of its economy,
Bulgaria is becoming more and more attractive to immigrants. Evidence
can be found in the official statistics on arrivals of foreigners in Bulgaria.
The number of foreigners visiting Bulgaria is growing, and in 1991
reached a peak level of 7 million, mostly tourists and businessmen.
In 1992, 6.12 million foreigners entered the country, about 28% of
whom were Turks, 27% Romanians, 6% Greeks, and 6% from the CIS
countries. Compared with arrivals during 1991, the number of visitors
from the former socialist countries in Central Europe has fallen: from
Poland by 80%, from Hungary by 20%, and from the Czech Republic
and Slovakia by 30%. Visitors from the USA, Germany, and other
Western countries increased, largely due to the intensification ofbusiness
contacts.
The number of transit travelers is also increasing: from 4.42 million
in 1990 to 4.33 million in 1991, and 4.8 million in 1992. Such transit
has also become the basic mechanism for illegal immigration both to
Bulgaria and to Western Europe (often using Bulgaria as a starting
point), particularly for citizens of Morocco, Nigeria, and other African
countries. During and after the Gulf War various other Arab countries
also tried to use this migratory channel. On several occasions the
police and the Ministry of the Interior discovered criminal organizations
dealing with the transfer of people from Africa and the Middle East to
Western Europe. But Bulgaria is also becoming a transit country for
migrants from several CIS countries, Turkey, and some Arab states to
Europe; only a few tend to remain in Bulgaria.
232 Daniela Bobeva
Information on the number and status of immigrants in Bulgaria is
very limited and so far has not been published. The Law on Foreign
Residence in Bulgaria recognizes two categories of foreigner: perma-
nent and temporary residents. By the end of September 1992 some
28,000 permanent foreign residents were registered in Bulgaria (data
from the Ministry ofthe Interior): 20,000 from the former Soviet Union
(CIS countries, Georgia, and the Baltic republics), 1,000 citizens from
former Yugoslavia, 800 Poles, 800 Czechs, 450 Germans, and 4,950
others. Of the temporary residents, about 13,000 were considered to be
illegal, among them 4,000 from Syria, 2,000 from Iran, around 2,000
from Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, 1,000 from Bosnia, etc.[5]
One reason for the considerable illegal immigration is the liberal
regulations for entry into the country. Bulgaria has not imposed any
visa requirements for citizens of almost all "sending" countries. A
voucher for a hotel or other accommodation providing for an overnight
stay is sufficient to enter the country and to stay as a tourist. In the
early 1990s the Ministry of the Interior increased its attempts to control
the illegal resident foreigners, and several citizens of Nigeria, Mozam-
bique, Ghana, Morocco, and Sri Lanka were expelled. In 1992-93 an
immigration wave of people from Romania, the former Soviet Union,
and former Yugoslavia reached Bulgaria, which has no visa regulations
with these countries.
As in Western Europe, there is also fear in Bulgaria that a wave
of immigration from the former Soviet Union might result from the
introduction of a new Law on the Freedom of Travel in Russia and
several other CIS countries. In early 1993 Bulgaria therefore introduced
some restrictions designed to limit the immigration and transit migration
of Russians to Europe across Bulgaria.
Labor immigration is emerging as a new problem in Bulgaria. At
the end of 1992 the unemployment rate reached 14% of the active
population, and the labor market has become extremely sensitive to any
additional labor-force supply. At present (1993), the Law on Foreign
Residence in Bulgaria (Article 9) does not restrict the access of foreign
persons to the domestic labor market irrespective of the kind of stay in
Bulgaria. The access of foreigners to the Bulgarian labor market is also
facilitated by the Law on Economic Activity of Foreign Persons and on
Protection of Foreign Investment. According to Articles 2 and 3 of this
law, foreigners are allowed to employ Bulgarian and foreign workers,
and the latter have the same rights and obligations as Bulgarian citizens.
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Despite the liberal laws regarding foreign labor, the growing numbers
entering the country at a time of high unemployment have encouraged
the authorities to try to restrict the employment of foreigners. Since
mid-1991 special work permits have been issued by the Ministry of La-
bor and Social Welfare: only 58 permits were issued between June and
December 1991, and 380 between January 1992 and March 1993. This
means that the majority of foreigners in Bulgaria are working without
permission, largely because there is no clear distinction between the
cases of issuing working visas and the cases of issuing business visit
permits. For the latter, the procedure is simplified, there are no restric-
tions, and the term of the permits is three months; it may be renewable
thereafter. The lack of clear legal distinction and administrative super-
vision on behalf of the state institutions facilitates mass immigration of
foreign labor, especially from Turkey and Russia. Ironically, the mass
emigration of Bulgarian citizens to Turkey is being accompanied by
mass labor immigration in the opposite direction.
The occupational structure of foreign workers is as follows: some
75% are employed in trade and services sector, 6% in construction, and
7% in entertainment. Foreign workers are employed mainly in small
and medium-sized enterprises, such as bakeries, handicrafts, and trading
companies. Immigrant labor is also legally employed by intermediary
companies (as of the end of March 1993 there were more than 112),
operating mostly with CIS countries and recently also with Chinese
citizens.
Labor migration to Bulgaria is not a completely new phenomenon.
Under the Communist regime foreign labor was recruited - on the basis
of bilateral agreements - from Vietnam, Nicaragua, and some other
countries. This recruitment took place to cover a deficit of manual
workers produced by overemployment. These foreign workers became
"useless" at the beginning of 1990 when it was found that there was no
deficit of manual workers, and hidden unemployment in other segments
of production. The population developed a rather negative attitude
toward the Vietnamese in the country, and domestic public opinion
pressed for their removal. Before the terms of the bilateral agreements
expired all Vietnamese and Nicaraguan workers were expelled at the
expense of the Bulgarian state. This case reveals that the Bulgarian
people are neither prepared nor inclined to tolerate foreign workers. This
means that if the inflow of foreign workers is not limited it may cause
internal social tensions, the consequences of which are unpredictable.
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12.5 Refugees and Asylum Seekers
Due to its economic and social problems Bulgaria has not yet become
an attractive destination for asylum seekers and refugees. In 1993 only
120 persons from Croatia possessing legal refugee status were residing
in the country, mostly mothers and small children accommodated by
the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. They were not allowed to
work, and the expenses for their stay were covered by an emergency
fund of the state budget. At the end of 1992 another 40 persons were
seeking asylum in Bulgaria. As long as the procedure was not legally
regulated, refugee status was acquired through decisions made by the
Bureau of the UNHCR in Sofia. In the future the Bureau for Refugees
at the Ministry of the Interior established in 1993 will be responsible for
decisions on whether to grant refugee status.
A draft Law on Refugees in Bulgaria worked out by the People's
Rights Commission of the National Assembly defines the term "refugee"
in accordance with the conditions of the Geneva Convention ratified by
Bulgaria in 1991. The procedure is also defined: it should take no
longer than 90 days and the expenses for the refugee's stay during that
period are to be covered by the state. The draft provides for preferential
status for refugees over other foreigners staying in the country. Parts of
this draft are included in the draft for amendment and completion of the
Law on Foreign Residence in Bulgaria. Thus the refugee's status may
be regulated within the Law on Foreign Residence in Bulgaria as well.
A first refugee camp was being built in 1993.
12.6 Emigration and Immigration Policy
Bulgaria has difficulties in formulating and implementing a compre-
hensive migration policy, some of which have to do with the fact that
migration flows have changed markedly since the beginning of political
and economic reforms. Under Communist party rule emigration was
almost impossible and had a negative label. At the same time Bulgarian
society had no experience with immigration.
Today emigration is still not accepted as a normal social phe-
nomenon. In a public opinion survey only 35.5% expressed a positive
attitude, 35.8% negative, and 28.7% expressed no attitude at all (Bezlov,
1991). In these interviews more people over age 60 (43.3%) rejected
emigration than younger cohorts. Positive views were expressed by
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48.5% of university graduates and 52% of all people below age 25. A
large majority of both unemployed and scientists questioned were in fa-
vor of emigration. Between 1989 and 1992, Bulgaria's migration policy
included:
• Adherence to the Charter on Human Rights establishing the freedom
of movement for Bulgarian citizens and for foreigners living or
traveling in the country.
• Abolition of almost all travel restrictions on Bulgarian citizens and
the introduction of visa-free travel regimes with many countries.
• Ratification of conventions concerning refugees and asylum seekers,
especially the Geneva Convention.
• Promotion of the cultural and educational development of ethnic
Bulgarian minorities living abroad.
• Drafting of new legislation on emigration and immigration.
In the field of labor emigration, successive governments have tried
to organize and regulate it in accordance with international norms and
the legislation of the receiving countries. Bilateral agreements on labor
migration were and are considered instruments for regulating the move-
ment of labor, while eliminating the discrimination of legally employed
Bulgarian citizens on foreign labor markets. At present, two agreements
with Germany (for 2,000 workers) are in force. Similar agreements with
Belgium, France, Switzerland, and Greece are expected.
12.7 Migration Prospects
Since the late 1980s a number of surveys have been carried out to quan-
tify and evaluate Bulgaria's emigration potential. Economic hardship
and political instability were identified as basic factors motivating a
substantial share of Bulgaria's population to consider emigration.
Over the last few years Bulgaria's potential emigration has been high.
According to NSI data for 1990 and 1991 (Kalchev and Tzvetarsky,
1991: 6-7) and the results of studies conducted by the Center for the
Study of Democracy in 1990, 1991, and 1992, the potentially mobile
part of the population that would be willing to emigrate comprises some
26-28% of the working-age population. According to data from the
International Organization on Migration (10M, 1993: 71), the potential
migrants comprise up to 36% of the population. According to NSI data
gathered at border check points (National Statistical Institute, 1992: 29)
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up to 5% of people aged 18-60 would be prepared to emigrate during
their present trip abroad.
Males are more inclined to emigrate than females. Age also plays a
role: the higher the age the lower the intention to emigrate. Every third
Bulgarian aged 18-29 expresses the desire to emigrate, while of those
aged 60 and above only 6.9% expressed the same intention. The greatest
emigration potential can be found among people with higher education.
Among those ready to leave, 3.9% have had primary education, 6.5%
basic education, 11.5% secondary education, and 15.9% higher educa-
tion. The proportion of those who categorically reject the emigration
option under any circumstances (i.e., the categorically non-mobile) is
lowest in the group with higher education (55%), followed by those
with secondary education (63%), with basic education (78%), and with
primary education only (82%).
The basic motive for emigration among the potential emigrants is
individual welfare, stated by about 60% of those ready to emigrate.
Other motives vary among the different educational or professional
groups of migrants. The less well-qualified potential emigrants mention
at second place the desire to live in and to get to know developed
countries, while engineers, scientists, and intellectuals mention careers
and self-realization at second place.
Political factors are also significant for the high potential mobility
of the Bulgarian population. According to 33% of those interviewed of
working age, the basic motive for emigration is the unstable political
situation.
12.8 Conclusions
The migration situation in Bulgaria can be described as having decreas-
ing emigration, increasing immigration and return migration, intensive
labor migration between neighboring countries, an as yet inadequate
legal framework, and a hesitant policy on migration.
Migration has become a common subject of political discussions.
Opinion polls and surveys show a high emigration potential due to the
economic difficulties of the country during its political and economic
transition, while the ethnic tensions that caused the mass emigration of
ethnic minorities to Turkey in the past seem to have lost their impact.
At the same time, larger numbers of immigrants are expected to come
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from the CIS and some Middle East countries. New legislation is being
developed and a new migration policy is making its first difficult steps.
Notes
[l] Pomaks are ethnic Bulgarian Muslims, most of whom traditionally settled in regions
with a high proportion of ethnic Turks.
[2] This number refers to the overall emigrant wave in the period, but it can be used to depict
emigration from Bulgaria to Turkey because most Bulgarians were not yet allowed to
travel to other countries. Travel restrictions for Bulgarian citizens were lifted only in
late 1990.
[3] Because no information is available, these are author's assessments based on journeys
of Bulgarian citizens abroad and the difference between the numbers who departed and
those who returned.
[4] Preliminary data from the December 1992 census; Money Newspaper, 2411993.
[5] lJIegal migrants are those who cross the border illegally, and those with expired visas.
The data are collected and estimated by the Ministry of the Interior.

Chapter 13
Emigration from the Former
Soviet Union: The Fourth Wave
Anatoli Vishnevsky and Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya
13.1 The First Three Waves of Emigration
Prerevolutionary Russia participated in the great intercontinental migra-
tion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. According to
some estimates, between 1861 and 1915,4.3 million people left Russia,
of which almost 2.6 million during 1900-15. Two-thirds of the emi-
grants left for the USA (Obolenskiy, 1928: 20). Compared with the
whole population of Czarist Russia, this number of emigrants was not
very significant; in contrast with many other European countries, the
possibility of internal agrarian colonization provided an alternative to
mass emigration.
The First Wave (1917-38)
After the 1917 revolution the Soviet Union experienced several waves
of mass emigration. They were largely linked to specific political cir-
cumstances and greatly differed from the prerevolutionary economic
emigration pattern. It has been estimated that between 1917 and 1938
some 4-5.5 million people left the country (Heitman, 1987: 10; 1991:
2; Vishnevsky and Zayonchkovskaya, 1991: 5-7; Tsaplin, 1989: 177).
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Table 13.1. Emigration from the former Soviet Union, 1948-90.
Jews Germans Armenians Greeks Others Total
1948-70 25,200 22,400 12,000 - 59,600
1971-80 248,900 64,300 34,100 347,300
1981-86 16,900 19,500 6,300 1,300 44,000
1987-90 301,300 308,200 31,700 23,000 20,200 684,400
Total
1948-90 592,300 414,400 84,100 24,300 20,200 1,135,300
Proportion
of total (%) 52.1 36.5 7.4 2.1 1.9 100.0
Source: Heitman (1991: 2).
The Second Wave (1939-47)
The second wave of emigration occurred during and after World War II.
According to some Western estimates, between 8 and 10 million peo-
ple emigrated in this period, whereas recent Russian estimates put the
figure at only 5.5 million. The main divergences are in the estimates
of the emigration of Poles and Baltic peoples. Emigration studies were
never priority research topics in the former Soviet Union and both pub-
lic opinion and specialists know little if anything about it. However,
they now have access to archives so their knowledge of the history of
emigration will grow. However, one should not ignore the fact that emi-
gration from the country during periods of political and military turmoil
is not always recorded in the archives, so that much of the information
is often irretrievably lost. During the same time about 600,000-700,000
immigrants (Ukrainians, Belarussians, Armenians, etc.) came to the
USSR.
The Third Wave (1948-90)
The third wave of emigration, for the first time relatively voluntary,
appears to have been much smaller (1.1 million emigrants) than the first
two (Table 13.1). In using these estimates we have to bear in mind
their approximate and illustrative nature, as is usually emphasized by
the authors of publications.
Beginning in 1961, official data from the USSR State Statistics Board
(see Figure 13.1) show that, in the 1960s during the Khrushchev regime
and immediately afterward, there was some immigration to the USSR.
They were mainly Armenians returning to their historical homeland,
refugees from China, and a sharply increased flow of students who
came to the USSR for extended periods from Asia and Africa. There
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Figure 13.1. Net migration of the population of the former Soviet
Union, 1961-90. Five-year averages for 1961-65 and 1966-70. Source:
Vishnevsky and Zayonchkovskaya (1991).
was certainly a small outflow, too, but it was well compensated by
immigration, thus making the migration balance positive.
During the later decades the inflow decreased sharply. There was
also an outflow, but it was a thin stream limited by strict bans, so that
the migration balance became negative. During the 1970s the figures of
negative net migration were between 10,000 and 15,000 people, rising
in certain years to 30,000 to 45,000, but during the 1980s emigration
figures were even smaller.
A fundamental change took place in 1988 when almost free emi-
gration of Jews, ethnic Germans, and Greeks and travel to the West by
private invitation were allowed. The population quickly reacted to the
greater freedom of movement. In 1988 emigration from the USSR
increased 2.5 times compared with 1987 (108,000 against 39,000),
again more than doubled in 1989 (235,000) and doubled again in 1990
(452,000). The reverse flow was not large. The distinctive feature of
the USSR international migration exchange in recent years has been
its strongly pronounced one-sidedness: a great increase in emigration
while immigration has remained negligible.[l]
The main flow of emigrants in 1988-90 (about two-thirds) came,
almost equally, from Russia, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan (Table 13.2).
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Table 13.2. Geographic origin of pennanent emigrants (number of exit
pennits issued), in %.
Republics
Russia
Ukraine
Belarus
Moldova
Lithuania
Latvia
Estonia
Georgia
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Uzbekistan
Kyrghyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan
Total (former USSR)
1980
19.1
18.5
9.4
10.8
3.0
3.7
1.2
2.5
2.7
14.9
1.9
2.6
2.5
0.1
7.0
36,366
1988
19.1
16.4
3.0
2.0
0.6
1.0
1.5
0.8
0.5
14.6
3.3
9.8
5.5
0.1
21.8
108,189
1989
20.2
21.3
6.2
3.2
0.8
1.3
0.7
1.5
1.3
5.2
4.3
7.1
4.5
0.0
22.5
234,994
1990
22.9
21.1
7.5
4.6
0.8
1.1
0.2
1.4
2.7
1.2
9.3
4.0
2.8
0.1
20.4
452,262
Considerable flows also came from Belarus (7.5%) and Moldova (4.6%).
From the European part the emigrants were mostly Jews, and from Ka-
zakhstan and Central Asia mainly ethnic Gennans. The share of emi-
grants from Central Asia was only 16%. The most intensive emigration
flow came from the capitals and their surrounding areas. In 1989-90
about 40% of emigrants from Russia were inhabitants of Moscow and
from the city and province of St. Petersburg. In 1990 emigrants from
the Ukraine came mainly from the city of Kiev and Odessa province,
those from Belarus came from Gomel province and the city of Minsk,
and those from Kazakhstan came from Karaganda province and the city
and province of Alma-Ata.
In spite of great quantitative changes during the late 1980s, qualita-
tively we can still identify the same third wave of emigration consisting
of representatives ofseveral national minorities who were given the right
of free emigration, most of whom returned to their historical homelands
or to join powerful foreign diaspora. In fact it was only due to political
and economic pressure at the international level and support from abroad
that the third wave of emigration had become so numerous, and this is
its distinctive feature. A variety of factors motivated these emigrants to
leave the country - economic, political, ethnocultural, and religious -
but they all had one thing in common: politically powerful bridgeheads
abroad.
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For certain parts of the population of the former USSR these specific
"ethnic" factors of the third wave of emigration will continue in the
future, but their importance will inevitably diminish, whereas economic
and political factors are already becoming apparent. The Law on Em-
igration from and Immigration to the USSR adopted by the Supreme
Soviet in May 1991, which came into effect on 1 January 1993 in Rus-
sia and probably in other states in the new federation CIS, guarantees
freedom of travel and migration as a basic human right that will en-
able citizens of all CIS countries, regardless of their ethnic origins, to
emigrate for economic and other reasons, such as to search for work.
Considering the present state of the Russian, Ukrainian, Belarussian,
and other CIS economies and the overall sociopolitical crisis, there is
every reason to suppose that there is the potential for increased emi-
gration, which may become a mass movement. Many, if not all newly
independent states will face a new, fourth wave of emigration.
13.2 Potential Composition of the Fourth Wave
of Emigration
It is already possible to identify the components of this future wave of
emigration. It may include:
1. Continuation of the third wave of ethnic emigration of people dissat-
isfied with their position in the legal successor states of the USSR,
primarily national or religious minorities.
2. New ethnic emigration which may conventionally be called "post-
colonial" and which will affect major ethnic groups, particularly
Russians who are forced to leave the regions where they do not
belong to the new national majority.
3. "Economic" emigration of two groups. "European" emigrants will
include the skilled labor force, creating a "brain-drain" from Russia
and the European republics due to worsening economic conditions
or simply because of the more profitable conditions of labor abroad.
"Asian" emigrants will include unskilled workers from the Asian
republics in response to the population explosion, agrarian overpop-
ulation, and low rates of development in nonagrarian sectors of the
economy, when it will be impossible or inexpedient to emigrate to
Russia or other European republics of the former USSR.
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4. Political and ecological refugees who may arise from situations of
bitter political crises or ecological catastrophes.
13.2.1 Continuation of the third wave of emigration
The new Law on Emigration affects all citizens of the former USSR
including, naturally, those who constitute the main part of the third wave
of emigration, which will thus merge into the fourth. In the first place
it is necessary to assess the potential of that part of future emigration
flows.
According to our estimates, the number of national minorities who
could be regarded as potential emigrants attracted by other countries and
ethnic communities living abroad hardly exceeded 8 million people in
1989. The most numerous among them, according to the 1989 census,
were ethnic Germans (2 million), Jews (1.4 million; including Jews
from Central Asia and Georgia, 1.5 million), and Poles (1.1 million).
In addition to these ethnic groups, Chesnais (199la: 8) included in his
list 178,000 Karelians and Finns, 439,000 Koreans, 385,000 Greeks,
171,000 Hungarians, 40,000 Persians, 25,000 Czechs and Slovaks,
262,000 Gypsies, and 208,000 Turks.
Since the 1989 census no fewer than 300,000 Germans, 400,000
Jews, and about 100,000 Armenians have left the country. Hence the
maximum potential that existed in 1989 and which we estimated at
8 million people has now decreased by at least 10%. Considering the
emigration that took place after the 1989 census, the four most numerous
groups of potential "ethnic" emigrants - Germans, Jews, Poles, and
Armenians - now include about 5-5.5 million people (see Figure 13.2).
Each of these national minorities has its own reasons for emigration,
but a number of factors may also discourage emigration. Many of them
have deep roots in the places of their present residence, most were born
and sometimes have lived there for several generations, have never been
to their historical homeland, often do not know its language, and have no
permanent contacts with it. Moreover, they are not always particularly
welcomed in their historical homelands.
In this sense, an article published in Izvestia under the headline
"March of Soviet Poles to Warsaw will not take place" is significant.
As is known, large numbers of Poles were repatriated to Poland during
the postwar period, particularly in 1945--46. The 1950 census in Poland
showed that 2.1 million residents had arrived from those regions which
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Figure 13.2. Emigration from the USSR in 1990 by countries of des-
tination (number of exit permits issued), Source: Vishnevsky and
Zayonchkovskaya (1991).
after 1939 had become part of the USSR (Marianski, 1969: 128) and in
1955-58 they were joined by 200,000 repatriated Poles. But according
to the 1989 census there were still 1,126,000 Poles in the USSR, living
in rather compact areas in Belarus, the Ukraine, and Lithuania, only
30.5% of whom consider Polish to be their mother tongue. In fact that
they did not take advantage of repatriation in 1944-47 nor in 1956-57.
No less important is the position of the Polish side. Izvestia quotes the
Polish newspaper Courier Polsky:
According to the Foreign Affairs Consular and Refugees Department it is
impossible to agree to a mass emigration of Poles from the USSR in the
present financial state of the country. Suppose one million Poles returned
to Poland within five years; that would need from 20 to 30 trillion Polish
zloty [$2-3 billion].... Emigration [to Poland] of a considerable number
of Poles... would contradict the political interests of Poland. (Izvestia,
1991)[2]
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Thus, if we talk about the continuation of the third wave of emi-
gration, we might conclude that its actual potential seems to be much
smaller than the annual 500,000 people estimated by Western experts
(see Chesnais, 1991a: II). In certain years this level may be achieved,
but it is unlikely to continue for a lengthy period.
13.2.2 New ethnic emigration
The numbers of national ethnic minorities who are emigrating most
actively now will inevitably decrease due to the fall in the overall number
of potential emigrants in this category. However, this does not mean that
such emigration will disappear completely; on the contrary, it will soon
receive new impulses connected with serious changes in the migratory
and also in the general political situation inside the country. The main
nations - especially the Russians - are becoming new minorities in
many regions and republics. Sooner or later many of them might find
themselves involved in the emigration process, perhaps as a result of a
process of "decolonization".
Russian territorial expansion began several centuries ago and was
driven by the desire to extend the borders of the Russian Empire. With
the occupation and colonization of new territories it sharply increased in
the nineteenth century as a result of both military expansion and agricul-
tural colonization. The growth of demographic pressure and increasing
overpopulation that forced peoples from many European countries to
cross the ocean led in Russia to "internal" colonization, for she had
enough free and sparsely populated territories available within her own
borders.[3] Russians and many other ethnic groups took part in the peo-
pling of Novorossia, the regions near the Urals, Siberia, the Far East, the
steppes of Kazakhstan, etc. This internal colonization saved them from
the necessity to emigrate overseas; thus even now there is no sizable
Russian diaspora abroad.
In the present century the emigration of Russians to the peripheral
regions of the country received a strong new impetus through urbaniza-
tion. Before World War I and in the years of the first Soviet five-year
plan, the urbanization occurred largely within the territory of Russia
and the Ukraine, but after World War II it spread to include the eco-
nomic and geographical peripheries of the USSR. The citizens of the
central districts of Russia were most mobile at that time, and rushed to
the growing towns in Belarus, Moldova, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and
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Table 13.3. Increase in Russian populations living outside Russia,
1959-89.
Number of ethnic Increase in ethnic
Russians (millions) Russian population (%)
In the Outside In the Outside
Year (former) USSR In Russia Russia USSR In Russia Russia
1959 114.1 97.9 16.2
1970 129.0 107.7 21.3 13.1 10.0 31.5
1979 137.4 113.5 23.9 6.5 5.4 12.2
1989 145.2 119.9 25.3 5.7 5.6 5.9
to several autonomous republics of the Russian Federation. A part of
that flow was linked to the development of the natural resources of the
outlying territories, such as mineral deposits, virgin lands, etc.
In the postwar period there was also an intensive flow of ethnic
Russians to Latvia and Estonia, where the natural rate of increase in
population in the 1960s was low and living standards were higher than
in other areas of the country. That inflow resulted in serious changes
in the ethnic composition of the population. In the mid-1930s Latvians
made up 76.2% of the population in Latvia, Estonians 90.7% of the
population in Estonia, and Russians 9.7% of the population in Latvia
and 5.6% in Estonia (Marianski, 1969: 167). In 1989 the percentage of
Latvians in Latvia had fallen to 52%, of Estonians in Estonia to 61.5%,
while the Russian population had grown to 34% and 30%, respectively.
In the 1960s the growth of the Russian population outside the territory
of Russia was 2.4 times greater than in the USSR as a whole, mostly
as a result of migration. But the 1970s saw new trends. The inflow of
ethnic Russians into other republics slowed down, while their number
outside Russia increased by twice as much as in the USSR as a whole.
In the 1980s it barely exceeded the USSR level. This means that their
outflow from Russia had practically stopped and remigration was well
under way (Table 13.3).
The migration processes of the 1960s and 1970s gradually prepared
for the events of the 1980s, when the remigration of ethnic Russians into
their republic replaced their territorial expansion. Strictly speaking, the
process of ousting Russians began much earlier. It began in Georgia,
from which the rapid outflow of Russians began in the 1960s: from 1959
to 1988 the number of Russians in Georgia fell by 18%, which means
that emigration greatly exceeded the natural rate of increase of ethnic
Russians. Azerbaijan was to follow. There the outflow of Russians
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Table 13.4. Index of growth of Russian populations in (fonner) Soviet
republics (USSR =100).
Republics 1959-70
Russia 0.97
Ukraine 1.14
Belarus 1.26
Moldova 1.25
Lithuania 1.03
Latvia 1.12
Estonia 1.23
Georgia 0.86
Azerbaijan 0.90
Armenia 1.04
Uzbekistan 1.19
Kyrghyzstan 1.21
Tajikistan 1.16
Turkmenistan 1.05
Kazakhstan 1.23
1970-79
0.99
1.08
1.14
1.15
1.06
1.09
1.15
0.88
0.88
1.00
1.06
1.00
1.08
1.05
1.02
1979-89
1.00
1.02
1.02
1.05
1.07
1.04
1.10
0.86
0.78
0.69
0.94
0.95
0.93
0.91
0.98
started at the same time and their numbers began to decrease in the
1970s. Altogether, since 1959, it has decreased by 22%. The outflow
of Russians from Central Asia started in the second half of the 1970s
(Table 13.4).
Between 1979 and 1988 the remigration of ethnic Russians went
on in most of the republics, although emigration to some republics
continued, but at a much slower pace. The Russian population was
already decreasing in Central Asia and in Transcaucasia, but emigration
into the Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, and Moldova continued. In
1989 Russians left only for the Ukraine and Belarus, and only a few of
them went to Estonia, whereas they were returning from other republics
(Table 13.5).
Thus, the remigration of ethnic Russians is not a new phenomenon
but a tendency that began in the early 1970s. But in recent times the
pace of this process has been increasingly detennined by the social and
political developments in the various republics of the fonner USSR. As
a result of the many years of migratory movements from the Russian
center of the country to its developing peripheries, more than 25 million
ethnic Russians (17.4% of their overall number in the fonner USSR)
are now living outside Russia, almost 70% of them concentrated in the
Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The number of Russians is highest among the
population of Kazakhstan, and in Latvia, Estonia, and Kyrghyzstan (see
Figure 13.3).
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Table 13.5. Migrations of Russians to and from other (former) Soviet
republics, 1989 (thousands).
Republics
Ukraine
Belarus
Moldova
Lithuania
Latvia
Estonia
Georgia
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Uzbekistan
Kyrghyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan
Total
Arrivals to
Russia from
other republics
102.1
17.5
6.8
4.8
7.4
4.9
7.8
11.1
4.0
21.5
9.0
6.9
4.7
63.0
271.5
Departures from
Russia for
other republics
136.1
23.0
6.8
4.4
6.9
5.2
3.4
4.0
1.0
15.1
7.4
4.7
4.3
52.5
274.8
Migration
balance of
ethnic Russians
-34.0
-5.5
0.0
0.4
0.5
-0.3
4.4
7.1
3.0
6.4
1.6
2.2
0.4
10.5
-3.3
A relatively new phenomenon is the appearance of ethnic Russian
refugees from the areas of severe ethnic conflict. Thus, in April 1992
some 73,500 ethnic Russians, "forced to leave the places of their per-
manent residence" outside Russia were officially registered in Russia.
Even when Russians leave other republics not because of direct danger
arising from interethnic clashes, but in a relatively calm situation, their
departure often appears to have been forced. A feeling of danger is
driving ethnic Russians and other Russian-speaking peoples, i.e., those
representing Russian culture, out of Central Asia and certain other re-
gions of the former USSR, as is evidenced by the strong increase in net
out-migration from some of these areas.
Similar to the period of Russian settlement migration (to Siberia
and Central Asia), which also brought Ukrainians, Belarussians, Jews,
Armenians, Tatars, etc., to the peripheries of Czarist Russia and the
Soviet Union, today the current flow of remigrating ethnic Russians has
been increased by people from these other groups.[4] At present it is
evident that the exodus of Russians and the accompanying groups from
the CIS and Baltic states is likely to continue. It is particularly true
of those states where Russians are few in number and dispersed over
large areas. It is more difficult to forecast the development of events
in regions with more numerous and sufficiently concentrated Russian
populations, such as eastern Ukraine, northern Kazakhstan, and Estonia.
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Figure 13.3. The number of Russians living outside the Russian Feder-
ation, 1989. Sources: Vishnevsky and Zayonchkovskaya (1991).
The collapse of the Soviet Union and its transfonnation into 15 new
states has meant that 60 million people have become members of new
ethnic minorities. In many cases this will lead to voluntary or forced
migration - a process that will reduce the ethnic heterogeneity of the
CIS and Baltic states. The largest group consists of 25 million ethnic
Russians who find themselves for the first time in the position of being a
national minority. Many of them are willing to return to Russia, but for
the time being conditions for considerable numbers of return migrants
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in Russia are unfavorable. Russia is neither materially nor psycholog-
ically prepared to receive large numbers of ethnic Russians from the
neighboring republics, let alone representatives of other nations. Russia
and other states of the former Soviet Union even have difficulties ac-
commodating the army contingents that are now being withdrawn from
other countries.
Freedom of movement within Russia is still restricted. Moscow,
St. Petersburg, most major cities, and many regional centers are trying
to curb the inflow of population. The lack of a real housing market
greatly complicates spatial mobility and the process of resettlement,
so that many ethnic Russians who were forced to leave their former
places of residence outside Russia remain homeless or without stable
accommodation. In Russia most of them cannot settle in their familiar
environments. In the suburbs of the bigger cities it is difficult to obtain
plots of land on which to build houses, so that many of these return
migrants are forced into outlying rural districts with shrinking local
populations. It is clear that people used to urban life have tremendous
problems in adapting to living conditions in these rural peripheries.
If the situation does not change many ethnic Russians (as well as
Ukrainians, Belarussians, and other national minorities in similar situa-
tions) will start looking for opportunities either to settle in a state where
their ethnic group forms a majority or to emigrate abroad. This has been
confirmed by several opinion polls. According to the results of one
of these polls 18% of the members of these ethnic minorities, mostly
skilled workers, are planning to leave the country (Mezhdunarodnaya
Gazeta, 1991: 159). A field survey of 945 ethnic migrants, conducted
by the Center of Demography and Human Ecology of the Institute for
Employment Studies (G. Vitkovskaya), showed that 27% of them would
like to emigrate to another country. Of those who would like to emi-
grate, 42% are highly trained professionals. Comparing the intensity of
the third and fourth waves of emigration, it is interesting to note that
five times as many Armenian refugees desire to leave the former USSR
as Russian refugees.
13.2.3 Emigration for economic reasons
"European" Emigration
Despite the prospect of new waves of "ethnic" migration, it is unlikely
that they will determine the nature of the fourth wave of emigration. The
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economic crises that all the new nation-states of the former USSR are
now experiencing will increase the potential for mass emigration to the
West, i.e., emigration that is not associated with ethnic tensions and the
decolonization processes mentioned above. The main motives for the
expected fourth wave of emigration are economic and to a certain degree
social, i.e., the opportunity for improving living standards, individual
incomes, working conditions, etc.
Under prevailing conditions, those who have higher skills and a good
education are the most likely to emigrate to the West. One might call this
brain-drain a "European" wave of emigration because these emigrants
are more likely to come from the European part of the former USSR
than from the Asian part of Russia. The populations of these western
regions are much better prepared to adapt to the Western way of life,
they are more spatially and occupationally mobile, and they have a better
knowledge of West European languages.
It is extremely difficult to assess the possible scale of this "European"
type of economic migration. Until now it has not been part of the
international migration of labor. The first steps are being taken now to
conclude intergovernment agreements that will permit a strictly limited
number of Russian, Ukrainian, Belarussian, and Baltic citizens to go
to West European countries for limited periods of time. However, this
involves some tens of thousands of people, whereas according to the
results of several opinion polls several million people appear to be
ready to leave the country as labor migrants. [5]
In 1991 Tikhonov, a researcher from the Center of Demography and
Human Ecology of the Institute for Employment Studies, conducted a
study of 30 experts, representatives of the state government apparatus
(high-ranking ministry employees), socioeconomic sciences (heads of
scientific institutions), and business (owners of enterprises and broker-
age offices, members of stock exchange committees) to estimate their
prospects of emigration from the territory of the former USSR. Half of
the experts thought that about 2-4 million emigrants could be expected
for the period 1992-97; and 20% of the experts thought emigration
during this period will not exceed 2 million people, 30% expected 4-5
million emigrants. Estimates of the number of emigrants by the turn
of the century were less definite, varying from 400,000 to 2 million
emigrants per year, although almost half of the experts (40%) limited
their estimates to 400,000-800,000 per year. Most of the experts agreed
that the "ethnic" feature of emigration will weaken, and that the level of
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skills and education will be the basis for the next wave of emigration.
Most experts think that in the future emigrants will be dominated by rep-
resentatives of specific professions with high and very high professional
skills.
Thus, "European" emigration of labor, which is expected both by
experts and by public opinion, has the characteristic features of a brain-
drain from a poor country that nevertheless has a relatively high cultural,
scientific, and technological potential. This forecast fully corresponds
with developments that are now taking place. According to published
information, some 70,000 scientists had already left the country by 1989.
In 1990 one in six Soviet emigrants was a scientist, an engineer, or a
medical doctor.
"Asian" Emigration
"Asian" emigration for economic reasons may have a different nature
than the "European" type. Its basic cause is agrarian overpopulation
and competition in the labor market, with rapid natural increases in the
population and labor force.
In the new nation-states, such competition has so far led to the ousting
of minorities and foreign borns by members of indigenous and majority
populations, replacing them in many jobs. In Central Asia, for example,
the number of workers of indigenous nationalities in all republics almost
doubled between 1977 and 1987, whereas the number ofworkers ofother
nationalities increased by only 3-9%; in Turkmenistan it decreased by
12%. In all cases the share of indigenous nationalities within the labor
force exceeded their share in the overall population. There has been a
sharp rise in the spatial and socioeconomic mobility of members of the
indigenous and majority populations, which is being pushed by rural
overpopUlation. Fewer and fewer jobs are left for other nationalities.
However, the ousting of newcomers and minorities does not, of
course, solve all the problems raised by overpopulation and often pre-
cedes a considerable outflow of sections of the indigenous population.
The former USSR experienced a series of such population outflows, but
previously they passed quite peacefully and almost unnoticed. Over a
period of 20 years there has been an exodus of Armenians from Arme-
nia, and of Moldavians, Kazan Tatars, and Northern Caucasian people
from their territories. This exodus became particularly visible in the in-
tercensal period of 1979-89, particularly from Moldova, Central Asia,
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Transcaucasia, and Northern Caucasus. Most active were Moldavians,
who scattered throughout the country. Russia, the Ukraine, and the
Baltic states all received immigrants. [6]
Nevertheless the outflows from these regions were smaller than could
have been expected from the development of main economic indicators.
The main cause seems to have been the low social and spatial mobility
of Central Asian populations. This leads to a paradoxical situation
described, for example, in an article in Izvestia (15 June 1991):
Tashkent needs workers. Local enterprises and construction works need
15,000 workers. . .. The aviation plant alone has about 2,000 vacancies,
and the textiles group of enterprises 1,500.... This group, which has been
taken on lease, is forced to shuttle temporary workers from the neighboring
regions of Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, in the town itself, paradoxically as it
may seem, about 25,000 of its citizens are considered to be unemployed.
Low occupational mobility, as described in this chapter, can only ex-
ist under the conditions of a rural economy with undeveloped monetary
and market relations, a traditional economy preserved by the so-called
socialist system. Sooner or later spatial and occupational mobility will
also become an economic necessity in Central Asia. Then representa-
tives of indigenous peoples, such as Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kirghiz, Turkmeni-
ans, and others, will to a larger extent occupy the internal labor market.
But they will also start to move in larger numbers beyond the borders
of their own nation-states.
Most of this labor force will be absorbed by the economic space
of Russia, the Ukraine, and other parts of the former USSR; for it is
easier for Uzbeks or Kazakhs to adapt themselves to the conditions of
Russia or the Ukraine than to those of the West European labor market.
However, other scenarios might also make sense.
Even now migratory streams are extremely sensitive to the aggra-
vation of the crisis, to the flaring up of nationalism, ethnic clashes, and
local wars, and to the decline in living standards. The analysis of the
data for recent years shows that migrations have become more limited
geographically. The growth of the spatial mobility of the population
which had just started among the nations of Central Asia and reached
a high level among Transcaucasian peoples, Moldavians, and Kazakhs
has suddenly stopped. The national interchange has narrowed. All this
has led to an increase in unemployment in Central Asia and eventually
to the aggravation of both economic and national tensions.
Since 1988-89 competition in the labor markets and controversies
over citizenship, political power, ownership, use of land, etc., have in
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many areas led to nationalism and ethnic conflicts and even wars, not
only between Russians and the new majorities but also between local na-
tionalities and religious groups within the new states (e.g., the conflicts
in the Osh region between the Kirghiz and Uzbeks; in the Fergana Valley
between the Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks; in the Northern Caucasus
between the Chechens and Ingushis; the civil wars in Moldova between
the ethnic Moldavians, ethnic Russians, and Gagauz Turks; in Georgia
between the Ossetes and ethnic Georgians; and the war between Armenia
and Azerbaijan). Political instabilities, which have most often acquired
ethnic, sometimes ethno-religious overtones, have become one of the
main push factors that have forced various ethnic and religious groups
to flee. At the same time, these processes make it unsafe for them to go
to other neighboring states. For historical reasons the main destinations
for these refugees and emigrants from Transcaucasia and Central Asia
are Russia and other states in the European part of the former USSR.
However, the present economic and political crises in these states may
reduce the pace of this migration process, but it urges other population
groups to emigrate. This applies especially to Caucasians: Armenians,
Georgians, and Azerbaijanis, but also Avarians, Darjenes, Chechens,
Ossetes, Ingushis, and others. These populations are highly mobile,
largely urbanized, and many of them are actively looking for jobs and
opportunities in urban areas. In contrast, the indigenous peoples of Cen-
tral Asia are still less mobile and rarely leave their republics, despite low
living standards and unemployment. However, agrarian overpopulation
is quickly growing there, so that interethnic conflicts that stimulate both
ethnic cleansing and gradual resettlement may change the picture.
Since Russia's big cities are no longer safe havens for potential
migrants of non-Russian descent, many of them have started to look for
other destinations. For example, Meskhetian Turks are now more likely
to emigrate to Turkey, whereas in many other cases the orientation is
most often toward the West, although emigration to countries like Iran
and Afghanistan could also become an alternative.
The economic opportunities for the various groups of would-be mi-
grants are different. All nations and nationalities in Central Asia, Kaza-
khstan, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Northern Caucasia have
elite groups with high levels of professional qualifications and educa-
tion. Their emigration would lead to the same kind of brain-drain as
the emigration of skilled labor from the European part of Russia, the
Ukraine, or the Baltic states. But these elites might not only go to the
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West; some specialists will probably migrate to Turkey, Iran, and some
Arab countries. For the majority of the populations of these regions the
situation is different: if they were to leave their countries of origin, their
emigration would be comparable to the emigration of unskilled labor
from the Third World. However, such labor migration from Central
Asia to the West and to some Gulf states is unlikely to take place during
the coming decade, for the following reasons:
1. The mobility of the indigenous populations of Central Asia and
Azerbaijan is still low and is unlikely to grow very rapidly.
2. The geographical and economic position of Central Asia and Ka-
zakhstan will not immediately enforce stronger ties with the West
and with the Gulf states.
3. The populations of these regions lack traditional relations with the
West, as do the people living in former British and French colonies,
that would facilitate their entry to the European labor markets. Un-
like Armenians, the predominantly Muslim peoples of Central Asia
have no ethnic bridgeheads in the West. Therefore if emigration
from the above-mentioned regions begins, the labor markets and
economic niches of Russia and the Ukraine are most likely to be
explored first.
4. The requirements ofthe Western economy are changing: the demand
for long-distance unskilled labor migrants is falling, making it even
less likely that people with no knowledge of English, French, or
German will find ways to establish themselves in the West.
For all of these reasons, the appearance in Europe of larger numbers
of Uzbeks, Kazakhs, or Azerbaijanis seems to be very unlikely.
13.3 In Search of a Reasonable Strategy
In the past, the media in the former Soviet Union, Russia, and the West
have published estimates of the potential number of East-West migrants.
Most of them were based on the extrapolations of the tendencies of
ethnic migration in recent years (but, as we have seen, they cannot
automatically be applied to other types of migration) or on public opinion
polls (which inevitably reflect the lack of experience with migration).
Most estimates were, as a rule, greatly exaggerated. It was said, for
example, that there would be 5,6, or even 20 million potential emigrants
just waiting for an opportunity to leave for the West. It is sometimes
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suggested that such estimates are purposefully aimed at frightening the
West to increase and speed up financial aid to the former USSR. In reality,
the serious restricting factors that exist in both the former USSR and in
the potential countries of destination will undoubtedly limit East-West
migration.
Shrinking economies and continuing crises are likely to force more
and more people to look for better earnings, working conditions, and
living standards. Moreover, political instability, if it continues for a
long time, will contribute to this. On the other hand, new political and
economic realities may act in the reverse direction. For instance, in
some new nation-states the euphoria of independence and the growth
of national sentiments may serve as counterbalances to economic push
factors. The Baltic republics, which have large diaspora abroad, are
even encouraging their former countrymen and their descendants to
return from the USA, Canada, and Western Europe. In the larger states
such as Russia and probably in the Ukraine, however, the new states and
political situations are unlikely to reduce the push factors.
Emigration presupposes a certain degree of psychological readiness
(and as we have seen, at present it is not very high since there are no
appropriate traditions in the country), as well as a rather well-developed
and complex infrastructure. For the time being, for purely technical rea-
sons, emigration and even travel from Russia, Kazakhstan, or Central
Asia to the West is almost impossible for a large majority of the popula-
tion. Bus, rail, and air transportation capacities, visa-issuing embassies
and consulates, frontier and customs services cannot cope with the flow
of people who may want to travel or emigrate.
The lack of bridgeheads in the West also has an important impact.
Usually a network of emigration linkages and a system of capillaries,
facilitating the movement of people from habitual to unfamiliar eco-
nomic and social environments, are necessary. Such a system is formed
gradually alongside the accumulation of immigrants in the receiving
countries, their self-organization, the formation of associations of com-
patriots, immigrant communities, etc. So far, most national groups and
minorities living on the territory ofthe former Soviet Union cannot rely
on such networks, a retaining factor that will probably reduce the build-
up of the fourth wave of emigration in the years to come. The lack
of support networks in the West will not only make emigration more
difficult for the migrants of the fourth wave who do finally settle in the
West, but their experiences will also lead to greater caution among those
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potential emigrants who are now expressing their readiness to leave the
country. This effect will also limit the emigration flows.
The anticipation of these difficulties has already had some impact on
public debates and policies aiming at the formulation of new strategies
for emigration. A growing number of senior civil servants, politicians
and other opinion leaders are promoting the idea that emigration should
not be impeded through travel restrictions and other prohibitive mea-
sures. It would be better to shape and channel unorganized emigration
at one's own risk, as is practiced by some former Soviet citizens. The
new strategy of the countries of departure should be aimed at a gradual
transformation of a "crisis" emigration of parts of the labor force into a
"normal" one, largely temporary, at the removal of all obstacles to de-
parture and re-entry, and at the formation of stable flows of emigration
and return migration. In the view of most CIS and Baltic states, inter-
governmental agreements between the sending and receiving countries
should become an element of this strategy.[7]
All this, however, points not only to the complexity of problems en-
gendered by the probable large-scale emigration from the former USSR,
but also to the particular geopolitical meaning of their solution. The phe-
nomenon of this emigration itself needs to be better comprehended. It
is not sufficient to treat it as "economic" or "ethnic" emigration. It is
essential to regard it, perhaps first and foremost, as an indispensable
and most important step on the way to the transformation of one of the
largest industrial societies on Earth from a closed into an open one, and
its inclusion in the world of Western civilization. If no such transfor-
mation takes place, and if internal stresses in the former Soviet society
result in its new "closure", the implications may be very serious for the
entire world.
Notes
[I] For example, according to the former Ministry of Internal Affairs 235,000 people left
the country for permanent residence in 1989,452,000 in 1990, with only 2,000 people
coming to the USSR for the same reason. As a result, net emigration increased 7.5 times
in 1989, reaching 204,000 against 27,000 in 1988, and in 1990 it reached 413,000.
[2] Another characteristic example is an interview given by a representative of the South
Korean Embassy to a correspondent of Literaturnaya Gazeta. When asked, "Would
you like to see Soviet Korean repatriates in Seoul?", he answered, "Rather 'no' than
'yes.' We are a small country of more than 40 million people. We, of course, do
not close the door to those of our countrymen who wish to return to the land of their
ancestors, but we would not like to have a mass immigration of Koreans from abroad.
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Soviet Koreans are citizens of the USSR and we would like them to stay in their own
country" (Literaturnaya Cazeta, 1991: 6).
[3] The scale of this colonization was rather large; the Polish geographer Marianski
(1969: 152), referred to the peopling of the steppes of the south of Russia "mass
colonization... that can be compared only with ... the peopling of the North American
prairies."
[4] For instance, according to the results of a sample survey conducted by the State Statistics
Committee of the Russian Federation, in collaboration with the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, of those who came from outside Russia in 1991 and settled in new areas, 56%
were Russians, 15% Ukrainians, 4.2% Armenians, 4.2% Belarussians, 3.2% Tatars, and
2.5% Azerbaijanis.
[5] Several opinion polls have been conducted by the All-Union Center for Public Opinion
Study (Moscow) and by the 10M (see 10M, 1993).
[6) As a result in Russia the number of ethnic Moldavians in 1979-88 increased by 69%,
against 10.5% in their own republic; ethnic Georgians and Armenians increased by
46% (against 10.3 and 13.2%, respectively, in their republics); Azerbaijanis by 220%
(24%); Uzbeks and Turkmenians by 180% (34%); Kirghis by 29% (33%); and Tajiks
by 210% (46%).
[7] We should not overlook other aspects of emigration from the former USSR that are
acquiring international political significance. It is worth recalling the reaction of the
Arabs to the massive flow of emigrants to Israel from the Soviet Union and their
settlement in the West Bank and Gaza. Another example is the anxiety of Western
countries concerning the possible emigration of Soviet specialists possessing atomic
and other military and industrial secrets to countries such as Iraq or Libya.

Chapter 14
Migrants from the Former Soviet
Union to Israel in the 1990s
Eitan F. Sabatello
14.1 Jewish Migration during the Czarist and
Soviet Regimes
In the nineteenth and twentieth century Jews from the former Czarist Em-
pire and the USSR have represented a large part of the Jewish migration
worldwide. The largest wave of emigration - about 2.5 million people
(see Kuznets, 1960, and sources quoted therein) - occurred between
1880 and 1920. A peak of some 200,000 per year was reached in the
decade 1900-10, and was directed mainly to the Americas. But the few
thousands who settled in Palestine - then a neglected Ottoman province
- were instrumental in the creation of a viable Jewish community there,
including the foundation of the first network of voluntary collective
villages (kibbutzim) and of agricultural settlements (moshavoth).
A second sizable wave started in the early 1970s, when more than
200,000 Jews left the Soviet Union, close to 70% for Israel, and most
of the rest for the USA. However the distribution by destination was
uneven during the decade (see Table 14.1); until 1974 the majority of
the 100,000 Jewish migrants went to Israel, while less than half of the
113,000 who left during 1975-79 did so. During the 1980s more than
70% of about 110,000 emigrating Jews opted for destinations other than
Israel (CBS, 1991 a; HIAS, 1992).
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Table 14.1.
Period
1965-69
1970-74
1975-79
1980-84
1985-89
1990
1991
1992
Eitan F. SabatelJo
Soviet Jewish immigrants to Israel and the USA, 1965-92.
Total Israel USA % to Israel
8,000 7,600 400 95.4
101,500 95,800 5,700 94.3
112,600 54,000 58,700 47.9
37,400 10,900 26,500 29.1
70,300 17,900 52,300 25.4
216,500 185,200 31,300 85.6
182,600 147,800 34,700 81.0
113,400 65,100 48,300 57.3
Sources: Israel CBS; HIAS.
Since 1989 Israel has had to face - for the second time in 40 years -
the multifaceted impact of mass immigration. Created in May 1948 by
a small community of barely 650,000 Jewish immigrants, the state of
Israel received almost 700,000 new immigrants during the first three and
a half years. These were largely integrated. During the 44 years of its
existence (1948-92), Israel has received close to 2.3 million immigrants
from all over the world. Its current population (at the end of 1993) of
5.3 million includes over 4.3 million Jews who are in large part first-
or second-generation immigrants (39% each); 9% of the country's total
population and about 10% of the Israeli Jews arrived between late 1989
and the end of 1992, including over 400,000 from the former USSR.
The current wave ofmore than 400,000 people (1989-92) is therefore
one of the three largest waves of Jewish emigration from those areas in a
century, and the largest that has ever arrived in Israel from one country,
comprising 17% of the total gross immigration since independence. The
quota restrictions applied by the USA since the late 1980s and the fact
that emigrants from Eastern Europe are no longer eligible for political
asylum in the West have greatly reduced the relative size of migratory
flows there. Currently the destination of the majority of the Jewish
emigrants from Russia and other CIS countries is Israel. In fact during
1990 and 1991 the size of the Soviet Jewish migration to the USA did
not even reach the granted quota of 40,000 per year.
Since 1948 immigrants from the USSR have sometimes constituted
a large part of the total immigration to Israel (see Figure 14.1) and some-
times this flow has been almost irrelevant, according to the prevailing
policy of the USSR at various times. In 1990-92 the share of Soviet
immigrants was well over 80%.
The distribution by age group of the Soviet migrants to Israel and to
other areas during the 1970s and 1980s was somewhat different. Israel
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Figure 14.1. Immigrants to Israel by period of immigration and country
of origin (annual average, %).
received larger percentages of both elderly and children than the USA,
whereas the USA received more young adults (Table 14.2). Altogether,
Jewish immigrants to Israel were older, on average, than those heading
for the USA. Among the recent (1990s) immigrants, however, the pattern
has changed in favor of younger age groups.
There are also differences in the level of education and skills of the
Jewish migrants. Those arriving in Israel in the early 1970s appeared
less skilled than those who went directly to the USA. By the end of the
1970s, when the number of immigrants to the USA clearly outnumbered
those going to Israel, the situation was reversed (Table 14.3).
The last wave of USSR immigrants to Israel comprised a sizable part
of the Jewish population of the former USSR and the CIS. The 1989
Soviet census registered some 1.45 million ethnic Jews; if account is
taken of other Jews registered under other nationalities (such as Russian
and Ukrainian) and for non-Jewish family members of Jews, then the
total stock of population potentially entitled to migrate to Israel might
have numbered 2-2.25 million at the time of the census. Since then
about 450,000 people have left, probably more than 90% of them Jewish.
At present only slightly more than 1 million Jews and a few hundred
thousand persons related to Jews may still be left in the CIS (Florsheim,
1991).
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Table 14.2. Soviet Jewish population in the USSR and Soviet Jewish
migrants to Israel and the USA, by age group, 1971-91 (millions).
Period 0-14 15-44 45--64 65+
Soviet Jewish population"
1970 (Russia only) 10 39 31 20
1979 (Russia only) 8 35 33 24
1989 (USSR) 8 33 35 24
Soviet Jewish migrants to Israel
1971-75 23 45 22 10
1976-78 23 42 21 13
1979-80 21 40 23 16
1981-88 21 42 20 17
1989-91 23 47 18 12
Soviet Jewish migrants to the USA
1971-75 20 53 21 6
1976-78 20 48 22 10
1979-80 19 45 22 12
1981-88 21 45 21 13
1989-91 19 44 23 14
a Population census; figures for 1989 are provisional estimates based on partial census data provided
by Tolz (1992) and on census data for Moscow (Altshuler, 1991).
Sources: Israel CBS; HIAS.
Table 14.3. Soviet Jewish migrants to Israel and the USA, by occupa-
tional group before arrival, 1971-75 and 1989-91 (%).
Academics, scientists,
technicians,
Period professionals
Soviet Jewish migrants to Israel
1971-75 43
1989-91 72
Soviet Jewish migrants to the USA
1971-75 51
1989-91 60
Sources: Israel CBS; HIAS.
Managers,
clerks,
salesmen
15
4
14
10
Industry, service,
and agricultural
workers
42
24
33
30
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the new
nation-states may induce an expansion of the US quota for migrants
from these areas. It is difficult to predict its impact on the size of
immigration to Israel. Although would-be emigrants may prefer the
USA, most of them may have relatives and friends in Israel by now and
might therefore opt for family reunions,
The current flow of ex-Soviet immigration to Israel has had an enor-
mous effect on the housing market and the building industry in Israel,
is inducing a revival in the use of the Russian language and culture, and
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is also influencing the occupational structure of the population. During
the 1992 election campaign the immigrants also attracted the attention
of the established political parties, since in Israel immigrants arriving
(and registered) up to three months before the polls are entitled to vote.
14.2 Absorption Policy and Data System
Each person arriving or settling in Israel as an immigrant is fully recorded
with hislher main sociodemographic characteristics. He/she is given an
identity number (ID) and hislher file with demographic details is entered
in the Population Register, and thus becomes a permanent resident. The
Population Register file of an individual includes (besides the ID and
family, first, and father's name): sex, year of birth, marital status,
country of birth, year of immigration, address in Israel, religion, ethnic
origin, and legal status (whether full citizen, permanent or intended
resident). An individual's file is linked, if relevant, to those of hislher
spouse and children to form a family file.
Unlike the usual practice of most European countries, a foreigner
admitted as an immigrant under the Law of Return of 1950 automatically
receives Israeli citizenship, unless he/she formally refuses it within
three months after arrival or settlement. The Law of Return applies
to alllewish immigrants and their family members (except in specific
cases indicated by law, such as people carrying dangerous contagious
diseases or convicted criminals). People not entitled to settle under the
provisions of the Law of Return, or those who prefer not to benefit from
it, may apply for residence or citizenship, and obtain it by procedures
and conditions established by the Citizenship Law, 1952.
Registration in the Population Register entitles an immigrant and
hislher family to an ID card and to a series of benefits for given periods
after their arrival. Until 1990 these benefits, accorded individually or
to a family as a whole, and updated from time to time, ranged from
allowances for initial living arrangements (in low-cost hotels for a few
days or weeks) and for renting a flat (usually for one or two years), to
low-interest loans to purchase one (for several years), Hebrew course
fees, help and special lessons for children, health insurance, occupational
orientation and retraining, income tax exemptions, and tax reductions
for buying basic domestic equipment and a car. Since mid-1990 most
of the short-term benefits and tax exemptions have been abolished and
replaced by a lump sum payment - the "absorption basket" - that a
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family unit receives for one year and uses at its own discretion. Other
benefits (e.g., tax reductions on cars) are adapted to changing situations.
On the basis of the records of the immigrants at registration, of
their personal changes in the Population Register, and of their frontier
movements (through the country's border control system), the Israel
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) prepares statistical data on both
immigrants and emigrants (CBS, 1991a). During the 1970s and early
1980s, the CBS complemented these sources with a series of special
follow-up surveys. Representative samples of adult immigrants of any
country of origin are interviewed at regular intervals for three to five
years after their arrival. Details of background characteristics, as well as
changes in their situation in housing, work adaptation, proficiency and
use of Hebrew, and social and cultural integration are recorded and used
for in-depth analysis and policy making. Immigrants from the USSR
usually receive special attention (see, e.g., CBS, 1982).
Currently, the CBS has resumed similar, though less detailed, surveys
of Soviet immigrants. Some results of the first round of this new survey,
carried out in early 1991 on a sample of 1,200 immigrant households
who arrived in January-June 1990, are given here (CBS, 1991b). A
second round was carried out during the winter of 1991-92 on a similar
sample ofimmigrants belonging to the larger cohort (of more than 83,000
people) who arrived in October-December 1990, with a follow-up a year
later.
Other official sources of information on the immigrants' absorption
processes in Israel may be traced in practically all the current or special
surveys of the CBS. A typical Israeli questionnaire routinely includes
questions on the year of immigration and birthplace. The Household
and Population Census of 1994, similar to that of 1983 (CBS, 1989a), is
another source of direct information on the living conditions of former
Soviet immigrants. Many other surveys and studies on recent immi-
grants from the USSR have been initiated by other government, public
and private agencies, or academic institutions.
14.3 Demographic Characteristics
Israel has a moderately aging population, one of the youngest of the
developed countries, with only about 9% of its population aged 65 years
and older. The Jews from the former USSR are considerably older;
according to the 1989 census the share of elderly was close to 24%.
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Table 14.4. Demographic characteristics of Soviet immigrants to Israel,
1990-92.
1990 1991 1992
Total number 185,234 147,810 65,100
Males (%) 47.3 46.7 47.2
Age distribution
0-14 22.8 20.6 20.0
15-65 65.1 65.7 65.4
65+ 12.1 13.7 14.6
Family status (aged 15 and older)
Never married 15.0 17.1 18.5
Married 69.3 63.8 59.3
Divorced 6.3 8.6 11.2
Widowed 9.4 10.5 11.0
Sources: Israel CBS, registration data.
Migrants from the former Soviet Union of the 1990s constitute an in-
between demographic group, whose age structure at the beginning of the
period 1989-92 was closer to that of the receiving population and later
came closer to the sending one. For example, the proportion of those
aged 65 years and older has continuously increased from 10.4% in 1989
to 14.6% in 1992 (see Table 14.4). The same is true for the percentages
of those aged 75 and older. This may be a consequence of two not
mutually exclusive factors. First, a self-selectivity initially favored the
immigration of relatively young people, and later also included the older
age groups; and second, the Jewish population and their relatives left
behind in the CIS per se are becoming increasingly older.
In the long run, both factors are a result of the relatively low fertility
(total fertility rate = 1.6 children per woman) prevailing among Jewish
couples in the former USSR and on the low propensity of potential
emigrants to leave while their children are very young (CBS, 1991c).
Women migrating to Israel tend to be significantly older than men:
close to 14% in 1990 and 17% in 1992 were 65 years or older, compared
with 10-12% of men. Even though it is aging, the migrant population
from the USSR is still younger, on average, than the population from
which it stemmed.
The age patterns of immigrants of 1990 from various former Soviet
republics were somewhat different. In comparison with the overall
average of 13% aged 65 and older, those from the Ukraine or Moldavia
have the highest percentage of elderly (17-18%), those from Belarus
and the Baltic republics are slightly above average, while only about
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11 % of those from Russia and close to 9% of those from the Asian
republics were aged 65 or older.
Since their fertility is low and age relatively high, families (which
constitute the overwhelming proportion of Soviet immigrants to Israel)
are necessarily small. However, households may be considerably larger
than a nuclear family, since two or more generations often live together.
A typical household contains a couple with one child and one (or more)
elderly parent. Single-parent nuclei of two or three generations are also
rather frequent (10%), compared with their low prevalence (less than
5%) among veteran Israelis. Accordingly, in 1990-91, 87% of adult
women had been married (compared with 76% in Israel), but close to
30% of them were either divorced (9-10%) or widows (15-16%).
During 1990-92 the demographic and socioeconomic patterns of the
former Soviet immigrants in Israel changed somewhat. In 1990, when
the flow was growing, age, marital status, education, and occupational
distributions were to some extent more "favorable" than in 1991-92,
when the number of newcomers gradually diminished.
14.4 Background and Current Occupational
Conditions
The current wave of immigrants from the former USSR includes an
unusual proportion of people with post-secondary education. About
75% of adult immigrants aged 15 years or older in 1990 and around
66% in 1991 and 1992 were recorded at registration as qualified for
academic, scientific, or other professional occupations (Table 14.5).
Jews from the European republics included similar shares of highly
skilled individuals. Among those from the Asian republics this share was
lower but still represented at least 60% formerly employed in the high-
rank occupations. Even if border registration somewhat exaggerates
the share of immigrants belonging to these categories, the large inflow
of professionals, scientists, engineers, and artists potentially constitutes
an exceptional brain-gain for Israel; it is therefore an important task of
Israeli policy makers to minimize the possible brain-waste. However
many professions do not fit the Israeli economy, as is the case for
engineers in specialized or obsolete fields: in Israel there is no need
for experts on building trans-Siberian railways or sub-Arctic farms. In
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Table 14.5. Soviet immigrants to Israel (15 years and older) who worked
before their arrival, by selected occupation 1990-92.
Total number aged 15+
Employed in the USSR
Labor-force participation rate
1990 1991
142,900 117,400
96,000 79,700
67.2 67.9
1992
52,000
33,700
64.8
Occupations
Scientists and academics 39.4 36.2 32.7
Of which
Engineers and architects 25.6 23.3 20.0
Medical doctors, dentists 6.2 4.4 3.8
Other professional and
technical staff, etc. 34.6 33.2 32.9
Source: Israel CBS, registration data.
some fields there is also a problem of occupational surpluses. In 1991-
92, for instance, 10,000 new arrivals (3%) claimed to be physicians,
representing 1% of all physicians in the former USSR.
Although this number could be somewhat reduced (as the numbers
of those actually applying for doctor's licenses or refresher courses
demonstrate), 6,000-7,000 of them expect to join an existing body of
14,000 Israeli medical doctors already working in the country. In the
short term, it is unlikely that there will be a 50% increase in medical jobs
in a small country like Israel, which is already equipped with about 190
hospitals and hundreds of first-aid clinics attached to one of the over 100
public, semipublic, or non-profit hospitals. In 1989 most of the basic
health parameters of Israel were satisfactory by any Western standards,
including the rate of 1 physician per 320 inhabitants.
The same may apply for the 43,000 registered immigrant engineers
and architects who arrived in 1990 and 1991, most of whom hoped to
join the stock of 27,000 engineers and architects already working before
1989. The same applies to the several thousands of musicians, actors,
and other artists. One major exception may be the 4,000-5,000 Soviet
immigrant nurses who will join a group of 40,000 veteran nurses whose
turnover is high and the demand for whom usually exceeds the supply.
The problems and dilemmas of the integration of new immigrants in
the Israeli labor market are only partially revealed by the sex and age
rates of labor-force participation and distribution, as derived from the
analysis of the sample of immigrants who arrived in January-June 1990.
This may have been a somewhat special group who had the chance to
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Table 14.6. Soviet immigrants ofJanuary-June 1990 aged 15 and older,
by period spent in Israel (months), labor-force characteristics, and sex
(%).
Period in Israel (months)
6-8 9-11 12+ Total
Total in civilian labor force 51.9 57.4 59.3 56.6
Of which
Employed 68.4 69.3 76.3 70.6
Unemployed 31.6 30.7 23.7 29.4
Not in civilian labor force 47.9 42.4 40.7 43.6
Men in civilian labor force 64.6 67.7 70.6 67.0
Of which
Employed 74.5 77.1 85.5 78.1
Unemployed 25.5 22.9 14.5 21.9
Not in civilian labor force 35.4 32.3 29.4 32.5
Women in civilian labor force 41.1 48.4 50.5 46.8
Of which
Employed 60.2 59.7 66.2 61.4
Unemployed 39.8 40.3 33.8 38.6
Not in civilian labor force 58.9 51.6 49.5 53.2
Note: The range of the 95% confidence interval is J .7-4.2% in the total column. and less than 8.9 in
the other columns.
come to Israel with the first wave, at a time when many job positions
were still available.
Two-thirds of the adult men and 47% of the adult women in the
sample had already joined the labor force (Table 14.6) within 6-13
months of arrival, but the unemployment rates were high - about 30%
for both sexes, compared with 9% for the general population. Among
these immigrants, unemployment was quite high for all age groups, but
especially for women and those aged above 45 (CBS, 1991b).
Many of the few academics, professionals, etc., already employed
had been unable to find jobs in which they could make use of their
qualifications. For example, about 10 months after arrival only 20%
of the male and only 5% of the female engineers and architectsf 1]
were working in their professional fields, 50% of the male engineers
were employed in other occupations, and 20% were still unemployed.
These experiences seem to be very different from those of the Soviet
immigrants who came to Israel in the early 1970s. At that time only
a minority of professionals had to change to other occupational fields
one year after arrival (CBS, 1982; Sabatello, 1979). Compared with
the highly skilled former Soviet immigrants of 1990-91, the semiskilled
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Table 14.7. Soviet immigrants of January-June 1990, aged 15 and older,
employed in Israel by occupation in Israel and before immigration, and
by sex (%).
Employed before
Employed in Israel immigration
Men Women Total Men Women Total
Total number
of immigrants" 9,100 5,800 14,900 13,700 13,200 26,900
Scientists and
academic staff 9.0 8.7 8.9 30.5 37.6 34.0
Other professional
and technical staff,
etc. 10.5 18.1 13.4 16.3 27.4 21.8
Administrators
and managers 11.3 4.1 7.7
Clerical workers (1.4) 6.9 3.5 2.4 13.4 7.8
Sales workers (2.3) - 2.2 3.4 4.5 4.0
Service workers 12.4 36.4 21.8 2.9 5.8 4.3
Agricultural
workers (1.9) (2.3) (2.0)
Skilled workers
in industry, etc. 48.4 18.1 36.6 32.5 6.4 19.6
Other workers in
industry and
unskilled workers 13.3 7.4 11.0 (0.8)
"Including those whose occupations are not known. The 95% confidence interval of each cell is less
than 5.2%. Values in parentheses are estimates with relatively high sampling errors.
were more likely to be employed at all and to have found a job close to
their former one (CBS, 1991b).
Ten months after arrival in Israel the occupational structure of the im-
migrants differed substantially from the positions and jobs they had held
before they left the USSR (Table 14.7). The differences mostly reflect
the selective entrance into the Israeli labor market. Many immigrants
were obliged to accept jobs below the level of their former occupation.
In these low-level jobs they often substituted for foreign labor force,
mainly Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, im-
migrants who had come to Israel (even slightly) less recently obtained
positions more closely related to their skills.
14.5 Re-emigration of Immigrants
In Israel emigration has been much lower than immigration but not
negligible. Since independence about 10% of all immigrants have left
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the country, usually within the first few years after arrival; as a rule, the
larger the inflow within a given period, the larger will be the outflow
a few years later. Israel's "border monitoring register"[2] at any time
allows an assessment of who has left the country, who has come back,
and who is still abroad. A stay abroad for a continuous period of more
than one year is a good proxy for long-term emigration (CBS, 1991d).
For the new immigrants, a shorter period of continuous absence, such
as three months, may be enough to establish their intentions not to settle
in Israel (CBS, 1989b). In the last decade this system ensured that
an annual net addition of 10,000-15,000 residents joined those staying
abroad for more than one year.
In the 1970s, when a previous wave of immigrants had arrived from
the USSR, the continuous immigrant absorption survey was used to
assess emigration.
Focusing on the immigrants of the 1970s from the former USSR and
other former Communist countries we can say that 3-7% of the adult
immigrants from Eastern Europe again went abroad (for more than three
months) within three years after arrival. After five years, the rate was
9-11 %, depending on the migratory cohort considered. Highly skilled
immigrants were more likely to emigrate than others (CBS, 1989b).
These rates are significantly lower than those for the immigrants to
Israel from Western countries.
For the more recent inflow of the 1990s from the USSR, it is of
course too early to seriously check re-emigration trends. We can only
say that assumptions made to prepare 1990-based projections of the Is-
raeli population until 2005 (CBS, 1992) are based on the past trends of
emigration among the East European and Soviet immigrants, as well as
the educational-occupational mix of the current immigrant flow. Ac-
cordingly, an emigration rate of up to 15% of the several hundreds of
thousands of immigrants expected to arrive during 1990-95 is antici-
pated. Most of these emigrants will not remigrate to a CIS country but
will try to settle in Western Europe and North America.
14.6 Conclusions
Immigrant registration statistics in Israel indicate not only the magnitude
of the recent wave of immigration but also the socioeconomic character-
istics of the former Soviet newcomers of the 1990s. For the moment the
crucial question is how to integrate these immigrants and how to make
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use of the potential brain-gain they represent. Between 1989 and 1992
Soviet immigration increased the Israeli population by 9%. Of these
new immigrants, 65-70% are highly skilled professionals, technicians,
people with scientific and other academic backgrounds, increasing the
total numbers of people in Israel with such skills by no less than 30%.
It seems almost inevitable that some of those who worked in highly
skilled jobs in the former Soviet Union will be obliged to accept less
qualified jobs in Israel, certainly in the short term. This would apply to
a larger extent than average to those who were over 40 or 50 at arrival,
to women, and to all those for whom suitable retraining is difficult or
impossible. This, at least, was the experience of Soviet immigrants
of the 1970s. Although their numbers, the pace of their arrival in the
country and their impact on the existing Israeli labor force were smaller,
these immigrants were more "absorbable" within a relatively short time
than the current inflow.
Notes
[1] In the survey, occupations could be more accurately investigated and recorded than at
border registration (see above).
[2] Each resident leaving the country for any purpose must fill in an "ExitlRetum" form,
which is fed into a computerized border monitoring register.
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